

**PATHWAYS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL**  
**Organisational Culture and Identity Processes in Greece**

*Jordanis Psimmenos*

*KEKMOKOP, Panteion University, Athens, Greece*

**Second report** prepared for the project: Does Implementation Matter?  
Informal administration practices and shifting immigrant strategies in four member states  
(IAPASIS)  
funded by the European Commission, Research DG, Key Action Improving the Socio Economic  
Knowledge Base (Contract HPSE-CT-1999-00001)

**For more information**, please contact Dr. Jordanis Psimmenos, email: [jordanispsimme@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:jordanispsimme@yahoo.co.uk)

#### 4. Control Pathways: organisational culture and identity processes<sup>1</sup>

...As the global economy develops into a culture of risk, the nation state is forced to invest more and more in internal systems of governmentality... (Turner 1997, in Culpitt 1999:116)

Almost ten years ago, Greece was experiencing a major wave of immigrants and refugees from mainly the ex-socialist countries of Europe. For the Greek authorities this influx of economic immigrants and of political or ethnic refugees/repatriates is mostly viewed as both a socio-economic *challenge* and as a *problem*. Both seem to be reflected in the Prime ministerial speech on immigration (2001) as aspects of the progressive governance of Europe and Greece in the twenty-first century. Reflecting on the above speech one is acknowledging the major dilemmas Greek authorities are faced with. These are: how to govern migration so as to regulate its flow and its use by the Greek labour market; how to control the unpleasant effects of undocumented migrations, namely criminality and xenophobia or racism; and more importantly how to *assimilate* migrants in the market necessities of the Greek economy.

To answer the above questions the director of C.N.R.S. (French National Centre for Scientific Research), Weil (2001) stresses the importance the implementation of immigration control policies in EU states and in newly migration countries like Greece have. For this reason Weil states that:

...the process of policy implementation is crucial: does implementation depend on fragmented and/or competing administrative agencies or on unified ones? Does it depend on local or on national agencies? Can national or constitutional courts block legislation, effectively slowing down or totally preventing implementation? For all these reasons, the possibility of successfully implementing immigration (control) policies depends mainly on their fit and on their adaptation to particular constraints... Effective management requires co-operation and co-ordination with other receiving states and with the source countries of migration and exchanges of know-how... (Weil 2001:18-19)

In relation to the above, controlling migrant labour in Greece necessitates not only the development of an appropriate industry (King 2000) that *supplies, hires* and *uses* migrant labour, but also the development of an appropriate welfare management. The chapter here is about this welfare management, which, through the mobilisation of *organisational culture* and of *identity*, as Lefebvre has argued (1976), sustains and reproduces those mechanisms and processes that determine the migrants' status and

---

<sup>1</sup> Please note that the numbering of the sections follows from the first project report (which included sections 1-3) that is now published as part of the collective volume *Migration Pathways. A historic, demographic and policy review of four countries of the European Union* (see IAPASIS web site).

allows the further flexibilisation of the Greek labour market. To paraphrase Cohen (1987), controlling migrant labour is not only an issue of border patrols and of policing the streets of the city, but it is also the development of welfare *practices*. These practices are organised through objective and subjective mechanisms that *normalise* migrants' "status" in society, and through organisations and administrators responsible for their social exclusion.

One could argue that welfare practices in the Greek context, probably for the first time, respond to market conditions through the organisation of a *culture* which is establishing a set of definitions and categorisations about the claimant and beneficiaries of welfare services. Administrators, through their everyday practices and through their translation of bureaucratic power over migrants, define the limits and the "*borderlines*" of internal social security. This is articulated here through the application of a new type of management, which is based on traditional and new ideas or values about the economy and the way(s) individuals should relate to the society (Tsoukalas 1995, Culpitt 1999).

When Greece, during 1998, decided under pressure to regularize its immigrant labour force, it became clear to immigrants and academics that immigration control was no longer the subject area of only police officers and hirers of individual migrant labour power. Instead, immigration control became almost overnight, the subject issue of civil servants and of social workers in voluntary organisations, who were charged with the responsibility to control: the flow of workers into the Greek labour market, and their paths of inclusion into the cultural system of the society. Organisations and administrators once responsible for welfare provisions and for locating and training workers for the local labour markets, were now responsible for exercising power over the migrants' entry/exit and internal categorisation.

Since the *metamorphosis* of welfare institutions into immigration control enforcement agencies, it became clear that the new ideal for the implementation of migration policy in Greece is inseparable from an analysis of the way welfare organisations and administrators *practice* and *think* of *control* in relation to work and residence permits.

For this reason this chapter will concentrate on the everyday practices, and shifting realities of welfare officers responsible for *work* and *residence permits*. More specifically, the analysis will concentrate on the issue of organisational *culture* and *identity* processes of officers, that uncover the *micro-dynamics of power* over migrants and lead towards their allocation into the labour market.

In order to analyse organisational culture and identity processes the focus will be placed: on the description of the administrative system in Greece; the research methodology it has been followed; the description of organisational culture; and finally the processes of policy implementation and images that officers have for migrants. The first section will deal with a general description of the traditional and new ways Greek civil service and voluntary organisations contextualise their control over the migrants' labouring activity, and implement their policies. This section examines the interstices between old and new administrative ways and between old and new disciplinary techniques of officials for welfare recipients. The second section is explaining the major theoretical questions and steps the analysis of organisational culture and of identity processes has followed. It should be noted that a discussion of theoretical and methodological concerns here, is not separated both from the context (i.e. Global

economy-local labour market) and from the different types (i.e. internal/external) of control exercised over migrants. Section three, is about the emergence of an organisational culture of control through administrative practices that, as it will be seen, link together authoritarian, party-political and economic interests. In this section the organisational culture of *hiring* and of turning employees labour into administrative power, is examined. The emerging organisational culture of different organisations is developing, against all expectations, within an environment that accommodates both traditional and bureaucratic values, emphasizing both the formal centralization of decision-making and the deregulation of everyday practices of officials. This seems to be achieved through the manufacturing of a *consent* amongst administrators that is characterised by the arrival of a new understanding for welfare services. The analysis of section four is further divided into two issues: The organisation of OAED's (Manpower) and of IKA's administration, and the way employees organise on a cultural basis the implementation of immigration policies. The first, focuses on the division of labour and the way *consent* amongst employees towards immigrants is being constructed. The emphasis is on the ways OAED and IKA administrators organise services towards the immigrant population, the types of authority that develop out of implementing immigration policies and the parameters that influence the latter in their everyday practices. In the second, the analysis is centred around two issues: that of identity processes and how they indirectly affect the images employees hold for immigrants and how these identities affect the implementation of immigration policies. The emphasis throughout all four sections is on the powerful interplay between the structure of organisations and the pivotal role staff members have for the implementation of immigration policies. The intention of all different sections is to offer a contemporary sociological understanding of the pathways of control of immigrant populations through a closer look upon those cultures that stand in between *human agents* and *organisations* and have a meaning for Greece's transformation of labour markets.

#### **4.1 Characteristics of administrative practice in Greece**

In *Chapter three* the analysis has concentrated upon the main legal framework concerning immigration control according to the rule of law. With the development of a global flexible economy, immigration control, once the subject of border patrols and police forces, has now entered into a new stage: that of welfare administration.

Organisations belonging to the civil service and the voluntary sector are now the institutions which control the immigrants' flow into the Greek labour market. Organisational theory and the Greek context, however, shows that administrative practice often follows a "*fuzzy*" route of implementing immigrant policies. This "*fuzzy*" route is full of *conflicts* and a wide range of decisions, alternative or same to what may be expected. It would probably be a mistake to view the administrative practices of officers as something that results directly from the executive orders of the state. In actual fact according to the sociology of work and in particular the sociology of culture, administrative practices are often viewed as "products" of processes and relationships between officers, the organisation, and the society (Dobbin, 1994). In contrast to

understandings that perceive organisations and administrative practices as *acultural* and *derivations* of *universal* principles of social regulation, or as products of *subjective-experiences*, the Greek case shows that: *culture*, officers' *consent*, and *work structures* play a vital role.

Organisations and the state pursue immigration control through a relationship of negotiations, bringing together old administrative practices with new ones. This relationship of negotiations exemplifies the importance of both *structures* and *agents*, and allows both organisations and administrators to contextualise their actions within the divergent interests of the Greek labour market (Brown 1999, in Roberts 1999). In other words, what is suggested here is that the outcome of these negotiations between different and often competing groups of people and institutions, is visualised in the practices of welfare control. The essence of the issue is that the implementation of immigration policies in the Greek context, especially those relating to immigration control, has more to do with *party politics*, *ideology*, *personal favours* and a highly *centralized* and even *authoritarian* style of administrative management. But this management is only possible through the building of an administrative *consent* or culture that maintains certain traditional values and reinforces certain new ones.

Administrative practice in Greece has a long history of centralization and of heavy politicisation, often leading academics to point towards the understanding of civil service as a special class of people with special treatment by Greek governments (Tsoukalas 1999). More specifically, the Greek governments, through their party systems, have always indirectly retained an almost complete power over the hiring and appointment of civil servants, whilst, on the other hand, the latter seem to have retained the complete control of organisations through informal practices. Especially institutions central to the Greek economy, have always played the role of *power game* between fractions of some or of different political parties, competing for rule and for ideological and personal gains. On the other hand, voluntary organisations which are mostly regionally organised, often act as pressure groups and as "*independent*" authorities for charitable services. Very few voluntary organisations, however, are independent of party-rule and of a bureaucratic structure.

Charitable organisations (i.e. usually named as Philanthropic) play a significant role in the manufacturing of a control culture that tries to achieve social order and an internal security of the Greek society via the reinforcing of values of individual or atomised welfare and responsibility. Directors of charitable organisations are often informally "*appointed*" through party-political structures, whereas members (i.e. volunteers) often have little or no powers to executive decision making, and mostly their powers are limited to the implementation of care on individual cases.


Concentrating more on the Greek system of state administration (see Figures 4.1.a and 4.1.b ) one sees that it is organised on a national level and is centrally governed, but the execution of legislation and the enforcement of immigration policies is usually left to local police or welfare agencies. The latter, as it is reflected in the above figures, together with social organisations, are involved in the "*drafting*" and policing of immigration control. Figure 4.1.a shows the schematic structure of social order between different organisations at state, local and civic/grass root levels of social order. The assumption that administrative control is mostly surrounding the state alone is heavily politicised and mostly a one-sided perspective of Greece's administration. a considerable

body of information supports the assertion that Greek administrative practice is both *centralised* and at the same time informally arranged around private/civic and localised interests. For the local political and social organisations, Greek administrative practices are organised on a formal/state and informal civic-client basis, often resulting in what this essay refers as the “*personalisation of bureaucracy*” and vice versa.


Figure 4.1.b reflects the *administrative paths* a migrant has to follow in order to acquire a work and a residence permit in Greece. The figure shows the practical steps migrants “*usually*” follow in order to meet the immigration control officers’ demands, reminding one that a migrant always starts from a bureau that certifies his or her personal status. This status is *recorded*, further *explored*, *double-checked* (with authorities at the country of origin) and finally *categorised* into different groups of migration and types of work/residence permits (see steps one-two). At the outset (external control) the immigrants’ status is mostly *mapped* by administrators and information is indexed according to the applicant’s relation with: *security agencies*; *social security* contributions; and *assimilation* activities at the local level, between civic agencies and the migrant. The indexation of the migrant’s personal, political and social status leads to a second layer of control, which, as it will be shown from the case study of OAED and IKA administrative practices, often involves the *construction* of the migrant’s *suitability* and *use* in the Greek labour market. The internal control steps often involve those organisations that are responsible for social insurance, employment, and the civic representation of immigrants in Greece.

From figure 4.1.b one understands that those organisations mostly involved with the above are: the manpower organisation; the social insurance institution, and at local or ethnic level, the various N.G.O.s, which represent or respond to the migrant’s specific cultural and economic demands. The manpower and social insurance organisations have the task to index the migrant’s status according to two main parameters: the personal/ethnic profile and their “fitness” in relation to the Greek labour market necessities; and to explore further the migrant’s potential for a coordinated activity between work and residence permit. In relation to the first two, both OAED and IKA determine the applicant’s ability to respond to the legal and social framework of labour activities, verifying whether or not one meets the regulatory aspects of work and whether one is contributing or not to the Greek market, by being taxed and by being in continuous search for work. Ethnic identity and the type of migration one has been categorised into by the external control officers, is important for the *construction* of separate categories of work/residence permits and the channelling of immigrants towards separate benefits/rights schemes. There are two-year or one year permits, and there are different benefit schemes according to ethnic and/or personal status (i.e. whether or not one is Kurdish or Pontian, or Albanian, married or not).

**Figure 4.1.a Schematic presentation of Administrative context in Greece**



**Figure 4.1.b. Description of administrative paths to immigration control**



In relation to the coordination between work and residence place, there is a multiplicity of people and organisations in a variety of national-local settings that *construct, classify* and *determine* a migrant's social status in Greece, what most organisations try to determine (i.e. OAED, IKA, N.G.O.s) is the migrant's contact and participation with social organisations like political parties, charitable institutions and

local authorities. In an informal, flexible economic environment this is most important if one is to be assimilated into the Greek context of civic administrative environment. The coordination between work and residence places, ensures the administrative *visibility* of the migrant and in addition determines the individual migrant's activities in specific local sites. For administrators the understanding of one migrant's relations between work and residence and in particular between local and extra-local agencies, is important for the implementation of immigration control. Social relations, in an economy that undergoes a rapid transition and concerned with the flexible re-structuring of the labour market(s) is part of the management objective. The primary focus is on the regulation of both economic and social aspects of work in Greece. Both are seen as areas of concern that determine not only the physical or social beingness of immigrants in the country but more than this, the relations of the latter with the local population.

Hence, it is pivotal for a flexible labour market to know how the migrant's micro-social activities are coordinated and how they could be concerted more to suit the everyday changing (i.e. in skills, personnel and values) demands of such a market.

The implementation of immigration control policies has got a dual path of action: one which is based on the instituted decision-making of the different executive organs of the state and, one which is based on the specific local social organisations and labour markets. In relation to the latter, organisations which are responsible for the migrants' welfare and in particular for their work and residence permits (like the OAED and IKA), contextualise their activities around the local government and the Prefecture. Work on the control of immigrants is operated through informal networks that link together members of state organisations, voluntary-philanthropic institutes and mainly local branches of political parties.

As it will be explained later (through the analysis of the case of Manpower and social insurance organisations), these informal networks of activity are reflecting personal localised political interests and the interests of different industries or small enterprises. The conflict of interests or contradictions that may arise out of divergent social and economic interests at the regional and local levels of administrative practice, is usually represented through the delaying or non-implementation of Ministerial policies on immigrants. Different industries and local organisations compete over social and economic power through the regulation of the local labour markets. This is often resulting in the pursue of immigration control by local organisations according to the specific interests of the area, and according to the dominant influences of the officials who represent those organisations. Especially in the region of Attica, the conflict of interests between local and state organisations is mostly visible in the use of surveillance politics and of taxonomy of immigrants' labouring activity according: to the type of industry that is dominant in the area, and the political interests of the local party officials. For example, in the North of Attica, Pakistani and Indian immigrants who work as agricultural workers in the local mono-crops are less intimidated by police or other welfare officers. The same seems to be true in other regions, like that of Eastern or Western Attica, where different types of industries and political interests are dominant. In eastern Attica, workers who work in agriculture and the construction industry are mostly favoured over workers who work on mono-crop cultivations or in heavy industry. On the other hand, workers (i.e. especially from the ex-USSR) who work in heavy industry and especially the ship-building, are mostly favoured in Western Attica. This has resulted in the so-called

*racialised* implementation of immigration policies which categorise migrants according to ethnicity and the type of work they perform (Chtouris 1997). A similar view is expressed by Hadjimichalis and Vaiou (1990) in their studies of ethnic division of labour and a *racialised* structure of the labour market in the North and Eastern provinces of Greece. In relation to the second, Vaiou and Hdjimichalis (1997) show that local interests push Polish immigrants towards agricultural jobs and specific areas.

Some organisations, however, seem more reluctant to implement control measures against immigrants for various administrative reasons, whilst other institutions (as it will also be shown in the study) are more willing to play such a role. Those institutions in the study that were more reluctant to enforce immigration control policies in relation to the labour market were mostly involved with the external control (i.e. border control and the issuing of arrests orders) of immigrants. The opposite was true for those institutions, which, according to Brochmann and Hamar (1999), have been responsible for the internal control of immigrants, through the implementation of policies, relating mostly with welfare provisions given to immigrants, and especially with work/residence permits.

The different local branches of administrative organisations, that mostly belong to the above set of institutions, operationalise their practice of immigration control in conjunction with local government representatives, employers, and local branches of trade unions, the church and ethnic associations or societies. Thus, work and residence permits are usually issued based on the inter-exchange of favours between “*partners*” of different local groups and officials. Such an informal context exists in a parallel line with the official context of different institutions. Whenever these two parallel lines of organisation come into conflict or inaction, due to special circumstances, the mobilisation of culture and legislation, provide a powerful appeal, through which the politics of control of migrants’ labour market status come into a realization.

This culture is mostly identified with the traditional idea of administrative work in the Greek context, which implies party-favouritism, political clientelism, a sense of belonging to a special group of people, and mostly the acceptance that bureaucratic power must be legitimised before its use. Having said this, the account of officials in the study shows that, immigration control rests not only on traditional ideas of administrative practices but also upon the “*building*” of new ideas about work and individual responsibilities.

Global economic activity and the implementation of flexible policies in the work structure of Greece seem to have eroded social hierarchies of established order, of territorial or social distances, and of political control in the traditional way. Apart from new uncertainties, welfare officers for almost the first time in the history of Greek administration are charged with the responsibility and the status to draw the new “*border lines*” of who lies inside or outside the Greek society, who is a contingent worker, who deserves or not social welfare, and certainly of how should responsible citizenship be conducted. This is becoming more important especially in a society where more people compete over less job vacancies, and where even more social rights are connected with less welfare resources (Gorz 1999). The job of administrators becomes more central, especially in a Greek context where *welfare provisions* and labour control are effectively translated as security mechanisms, through which one is certified as a member of the community and a person worthy of limited resources.

According to a recent study of the Greek state administration, there are five main features which characterize the Greek system of civil service organisation. These five features are being identified as that of overlay of ministerial jurisdictions; of distorted horizontal communication between offices; of politicisation of staff; of centralization; and finally of Prime Ministerial involvement in the actual decision-making of civil administration.

...a shifting and extensive overlay of jurisdictions among ministries and among divisions of the same ministry... inadequate horizontal communication and coordination among ministries and among divisions of the same ministry. Every ministry has an overabundance of political appointees... Authority is centralized at the top political layers of each ministry where policy-formulation and the execution of most important policies take place... A wide range of decisions are taken by the Prime Minister himself... (Sotiropoulos 1999:14)

Following from the above understanding, in order to approach the context of Greek organisations central to the implementation of immigration policies, one must keep in mind that apart from *centralization* and the *politicisation*, organisations are made of: experts, professionals; formal and informal structures; are being divided by different administrative groups; and are related to social organisations. In actual sense, what we so easily define as an “organisation” is made of members with different interests and social backgrounds, and are not existing in isolation, free from the wider community and political environment, but are part of it.

The Greek case of administration, state or voluntary, shows that officials are not only *receivers* of instructions, but also, as Sotiropoulos (1999) suggests, have the ability to shape the implementation of a policy. Through delaying, misinformation or non-cooperation with other departments of the same organisation, officials are also *actors*, and they can play a pivotal role in immigration control.

Immigration control and officials’ resistance to the new Civil Service Code (i.e. in replacement of Code 1951/1977), are only two of the most current examples that demonstrate the pivotal role officials can play in resisting or accepting and promoting government policies. Officials of state organisations (e.g. the manpower and social insurance organisations) not only they do control migrants’ integration into the Greek society through their practices, but they also impose their *taxinomies* on people and promote their ideas of who and how should become a member of society. As we shall see later, although these ideas and *taxinomies* are not in direct conflict with the general perspectives of the government, they impose the power of the welfare expert over the rule of law and they reinstate the *authority* of bureaucracy in the Greek society.

In relation to the new civil service code, officials resist any alteration in their present status and practices, through a continuation and enlargement of an internal labour market, and through making it difficult for other organisations to administer their clients. Such a “monopoly” over “information” and “expertise” has led the Manpower Organisation to claim from the general budget (2000-2001) an extra two billion drachmas for the control of immigrants (interview with an official from the Prefecture). The Greek

case shows that despite the general perspective that holds institutions to be more or less the “*puppets*” of political ruling parties, interests between different rank officials or even between administrators and the government are crucial to implementation.

...Professional and other “*experts*” are crucial to its operation (i.e. regulation) but they also have their own interests and priorities, which means that day-to-day policies and practices are not unified, integrated or easily predictable. Similarly, social regulation, while discursively constrained is not simply imposed from above in the form of direct constraint or imposition, but by encouraging and supporting individuals to exercise their freedoms and choices, thereby allowing government at a *distance*... (Parton 1999:105)

Such a refined system of administration in the Greek context, seems to be reflected in an organisational culture, which allows officials to manoeuvre around the rule of law and yet promote their party political interests or even manipulate immigration policies to suit their financial interests (i.e. corruption). This is more true of local organisational branches where immigration policies are often implemented according to the political interests of the *prefecture (nomarchia)*, the local government, specific employers, and even immigrant representatives, which are actively involved in the party political system of Greece. The latter are often mobilized by officials (informally) in order to secure support for local-party candidates, and in return they gain favours for members of their immigrant associations. Officials in turn, as it will be shown later, gain personal financial “gifts” by immigrants and by high-ranking officials they gain positive appraisals for their work.

In other instances financial and career incentives are guaranteed via the indirect involvement of public officials with *Committees* and *pilot projects* on the integration of immigrants into the Greek society. Committees establish a *second layer* of decision-making, that supposedly act on behalf of government initiatives for the implementation of immigrant policies. In actual sense, the objective is to secure individual freedom in a highly bureaucratized environment, and to establish a relationship between the community and the organisations, creating thus an extensive network of political support for political representatives (i.e. ministers). It is not unusual for the Greek administrative system to use official funding and human resources for the mobilisation of social forces important for future general elections. Thus, one could argue that the system of *government at a distance* in the Greek case has a dual purpose: to keep in its place government rule via the individual involvement of officials in the implementation of policies, through the building of a consent.

This *fuzzy network system* of personal, party-political and bureaucratic organisation has no clear lines and it is intermixing formal organisational structures with informal structures. Thus, this system often leads towards the “*bureaucratizing*” of the personal and towards the “*objectifying*” of the political, through the manipulation of hidden clauses of the rule of law, or through *legitimations* of informal practices. The latter remind us that the issue of implementation of immigrant policies in Greece becomes a *fuzzy* but a flexible opportunity through the creation of a consent or culture

that contextualizes the interests of public officials within specific institutions and specific labour markets. It does not matter so much whether or not officials believe in their own “*propaganda*”, but what matters most is the *guiding ideas* or *culture* that gives their everyday practice a sense of purpose, a meaning, and is expressive of what organisations perceive as the “guiding principles” of their wider interest (Berger 1963).

Immigration control is full of such legitimating procedures that provide officials and the top echelons in the administration with opportunities and constrains, but more than anything else they provide them with a *flexible structure*. Such *flexible structures* in the case of Greece, and especially in welfare offices, not only come more in line with flexible global economic arrangements but also:

...offer identities that actors can and do use in their definition of the situation and appropriateness judgments...  
(Lazega 1997:133)

#### 4.2 The Interview design

In order to investigate our two objectives (i.e. the impact of organisational culture on implementation, and the identity processes of public officials), one has to start reducing the level of abstractions guiding macro and molecular questions into specific projects and methods of evaluation (Horowitz 1963; Kandylaki 1996). The great advantage of such a *reductionism* is that it allows the analysis to build a *stage procedure*. Through this procedure methods and questions asked turn general issues into specific ones, and provide interpretations of data gathered. As Merton (1999) and Mills (1979) have argued, this “*bombards*” the macro and molecular understanding of the problem and of the explanatory frames used. These stages are identified here as that of: identifying the subject matter; operationalizing organisational culture, and identity processes; identifying the organisations and public officials; and finally organising our field research.

Identifying the subject matter has never been an easy task especially when one has to deal with so many *metaphors* (i.e. the city context, organisations), and vague notions such as *organisational culture*, *identity processes* or even that of *implementation* of policy measures. Following Ginis (1999), Trigas (2000) and Triantafyllidou’s (2000) understanding of organisational culture, the analysis has focused here on the *welfare practices of control* and in particular that of issuing work/residence permits, as these are followed by officials of state organisations like that of OAED and IKA. These *practices of control* were then contextualised within specific *ideas* that: *legitimize* officials’ responses towards immigrants and their labour activity in the labour market of Athens. Following from this, the analysis has focused upon embodied practices of control as these are reflected or constructed out of “mutual interactions between attitudes, practices and institutions” (Ringer 2000:164), focusing both at the structural and cultural levels of control. These *pathways*, through which the control of immigrants is organised in terms of actual procedures and in terms of “*ideologies*”, *myths*, *stories* or *belief systems* held by the officials, became the actual issue of the analysis reflecting the socio-cultural parameters that influence or dictate social control.

The above understanding has led the analysis to a second stage, that of the *operationalisation* of organisational culture and identity processes especially inside the OAED and IKA organisations. To allow or rather to build a frame that examines both, the research has turned its attention towards global-National and local (i.e. organisational) features that construct a dynamic frame of control of immigrants by officials. The first of these has been the demographic and social composition of organisations. The background demographic *nature* of the administrative force is critical here if one is to understand *who* controls, and *why*. The second theme has been that of the *basic structure* of both the organisation and of services produced. The research asked two main questions: what do organisations do and how is it done. Both questions uncover the real nature of control based on an understanding of how organisations *legitimate* their *presence* to the public, what do they actually do (if different) and how they try to implement their services. The theme of *basic structure* has been further subdivided itself to administrative procedures, departmental, and atomised “*rules*”/roles followed for the exercising of social control.

The third theme of concern has been that of *operating structures*. The basic idea here has been that: for social control to become a viable possibility, certain structural and cultural parameters must be present, to “*allow*” officials to control a group of people that by definition (i.e. undocumented workers) lie in the margins of the Athenian labour market. These parameters seem to be connected with the work environment of officials, the co-operation, and their understanding of their role at work. In connection to this, an understanding of decision-mechanisms (fourth theme) has complemented officials’ role at work plus, it has furthered the capability of the research to investigate the *ways* through which the manufacturing of control is produced/reproduced. This will be achieved through the testing of *how decisions are reached* and *what criteria* are being used for the legitimization of services towards migrants.

Finally, the emphasis has been placed on national, professional and personal beliefs of officials, and the *way* they (i.e. beliefs) become “*constructions*” that guide the power of officials to control, and the *way* they become part of meaningful actions for officials. Based on the works of Bauman (1998,1998), Poole (1999), Alexander (1998) and Sztompka (1999), the theme of *location* explores how public officials see their roles in relation to their work, organisation, immigrants, and the social environment, where they live and work. In addition, this final theme examines public officials’ relationship with certain key ideas about managing work and immigrants. Instead of asking how officials relate to these ideas, questions have been asked in an indirect manner, about how officials think migrant people relate to key values and systems of organisation. (see Appendix for a full presentation of the interview guide). Some of these *key ideas* have been that of *work flexibility*, *autonomy* and values concerning *trusting* relationships between officials and migrants. All three issues were considered as more appropriate for investigating both organisational culture and identity processes. This is so because they seem to characterize much of the new Global economic and political initiative to organise labour activity, the welfare state, and the control agencies responsible for welfare migrant services (i.e. work/residence permits, social security provisions).

The first three parts of the interview guide (i.e. structure/culture) have

been set forward to investigate the components and the ideas that *produce/reproduce* the social control of migrant labour in Athens. Apart from the general dimensions (i.e. that were set by the general project IAPASIS) the guide has put an emphasis upon: the allocation of tasks and responsibilities to individual or group members of the organisation; the discretion that is allowed due to specialization; the designation of formal/informal practices by officials; the division of labour amongst officials; the delegation of authority and the communication of information. For the analysis of organisational culture, apart from the above issues, the interview guide has also put an emphasis on *motivant* ideas that *drive* public officials' operations in the context of control. The fourth part (location) tests public officials' perceptions of the immigrant population, against values which seem to "*capture*" a major part of the new welfare *management ideology* in Greece. These seem to be responsible for new categorizations and the simultaneous appearance of forms of new *symbolic powers* over migrants. These *symbolic powers* take different forms and are expressed via different *paths*, but they are understood here as a pivotal search for community, professional and national identity; a search for the identical or the *mythical identical*, that is constructed out of the marginalisation of difference. In a globalised flexible but also traditional society as Greece is today, this *symbolic powers game* unveils *old* and *new* issues that contest for *visibility*, recognition and appear at the forefront of the new order of things or of the new rule over people.

The third stage of the research, has focused upon the identification and selection of the areas of investigation. The procedure of investigating the two objectives in Greece (i.e. that of organisational culture and identity process) has necessitated the framing of organisational culture and of identity processes, within organisations responsible for the social control of migrants in the Athenian labour market. Based on the interview guide and the theme areas of concern that were mentioned above, the original decision was to include into the research investigation both public-state and voluntary organisations. The understanding was that the different nature of the two types of organisations, if well handled at the analysis, will (in accordance to the project's hypothesis) reveal possible differences in the types of organisational culture and hence in the implementation of policy measures, as well as in the way immigrants are represented by officials. But, whereas most view these two types of organisations as different, based on an understanding of *ownership* alone, the research here has focused on forms of work organisation that has to do with: division of labour; object of labour; control of labour; the size of organisations, as well as the issue of ownership (Wolf 1989, in Ahrne 1998). Following this understanding, the research has concentrated on organisations that differ, but which are also responsible for different types of control. In relation to the second issue there has been a selection of organisations that represent main features in the "*business*" of immigration control in the country of Greece. Apart from the *state/voluntary divisions*, there are divisions between organisations, according to the type of control they exercise, and according to the *pathways* they follow to implement these different types of control (Brochmann and Hammar 1999). However, because of space limitations, the analysis here will only focus on OAED and IKA organisations.

Tables 4.2.a and 4.2.b summarize this understanding through a presentation of the main features of organisations in the study. According to the above tables, the study has focused upon organisations responsible for entry permits or

restrictions for preventing undocumented immigration (external control). Also, the study has focused upon *internal control mechanisms* and upon organisations responsible for the framing of migrants into the Athenian labour market through classification, allocation and the regulation of welfare resources.

Both the external/internal and explicit/implicit types of control have provided the research with a framework of organisational web through which, both of the two above objectives can be analysed and provide the new consolidation of migrants' regulation in the labour market of Athens. The analysis of this framework has further concentrated upon the aspirations, experiences, beliefs and everyday practices of high and low-ranking officials, selected from the most representative areas of the already mentioned organisations. Selectivity of officials was based upon certain criteria and upon whether or not individual officials qualified to be represented in the study's analysis. These criteria were: frequency and centrality of officials to immigration control; volume of immigrant cases they handle in an organisation; variation of responsibilities; abilities to endorse policies of control (formally/informally); availability at the time of the study; and finally location in the hierarchy of the organisation, and in the geographical area the organisation is situated.

Finally, the above schema became operational through four main stages of research: participant observation; the training of interviewers; a pilot study and the conducting of semi-structured interviews. The issues that dominated in the first stage were mostly concerned with the identification of those *key-people* and *key-points* that document the "*transactions*" between officials and immigrants; the understanding of the practice of control, and of the *settings* this control flows from. Through participant observation the research came close to the *understandings* (*verstehen*) and *meanings* officials share in order to come to terms with what is *true, false, sincere or deceit*, and how they come about to organise their practices, order their presuppositions and knowledge about immigrants. To follow from the argument of Dingwall (1997:62), this first stage has enabled the research to frame organisations and people, so that prior to any interviewing one comes to recognize how *boundaries, stability and control* are set between officials and migrants, and how officials come to *solidify and stabilize* their working environment.

**Table 4.2.a: Organisations studied**

<b>external control</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Ministry of Internal Affairs
	Manpower Organisation (OAED)
	Aliens Departments-Athens Security
	Council for Refugees
<b>internal control</b>	General Secretariat for Greek Emigrants Institution for Social Welfare (IKA)
	Ministry for Education
	Institute for Pedagogy
	Local Government of Athens
	Prefecture

	Ministry for Labour
	Council for Refugees

**Table 4.2.b: Pathways of control according to different types of control**

<b>direct/explicit</b>	preventive mechanisms
	deterrent measures
	surveillance by police - IKA/OAED
	authorities
	benefits-access to resources-housing
	naturalization-legalization
<b>indirect/implicit</b>	refoulment
	classification-cultural/employment segregation
	discrimination
	opinion building amongst officials
	ideal interests
	administrative discretion

Source: adapted from Brochmann and Hamar 1999:13-14

The second stage, that of the training of the interviewers, took place at the centre for social morphology and social policy (KEKMOKOII) of Panteion University. Researchers were assigned with the completion of a number of interviews, which were then transcribed and collectively appraised by the research team. Within a three-month period interviewers were tested on a number of issues that had to do with: data collection, the use of audio-recording equipment, accounting to each other, reporting abilities and analytical questioning, as well as with issues that had to do with interviewing techniques and validation of research findings.

The third stage begun in September 2000 and tested the operational and thematic appropriateness of the semi-structured *draft* interview guide. Researchers collected eleven interviews and according to their findings a number of further linguistic and thematic improvements were introduced to the final guide. A number of further instructions were added for the operation of the final stage, that assisted the interviewers to focus on the essential features of the interview like: how to establish what is relevant and what is not; what should be the conduct of the interviewer; how to question respondents and how to demystify the language or terminology used by the latter; how to assure confidentiality; how to transcribe and how to improve interview reports.

Finally, Table 4.2.c presents an overall picture of the complete interviewee response towards both the first and second objectives of the project. However, for purposes of confidentiality of officials' participation in the research, there is not any actual naming of the departments involved in the study, since this would easily reveal the identity of the people who were interviewed by the research team.

**Table 4.2.c: Overall Response rate**

	Interviews taken	no response
Pilot study	11	2
objectives 1&2	43	6
Total	54	8

### **4.3 Controllers and Control institutions**

Officials, as both *actors* and “*members*” of control institutions, practice the regulation of immigrants in the Athenian labour market, through a number of processes and social mechanisms. These, as Weber would argue, have a *meaning* for both officials and institutions, that is both *sensical* and *legitimate* in the eyes of officials, and more in the eyes of the public who uses their services. In this sense, the Greek *administrator* not only have to practice control but derive a meaning from it, from which they can explain their role inside an organisation. Unlike, however, of seeing the practice of immigration control as something that derives from a straight line causation between organisations and the authority of officials, the study starts from a different understanding. In other words, the organisational culture of immigration control is viewed here as something not given but under construction. The building of control practices is not something in existence prior to formal or informal activities and relations but rather a culture in the making. This is emphasizing the importance of the building of a consent which leads to authority and the legitimation of practices of control. This building of a consent is very important for administrators and their practices of control because it provides them with a cultural instrument of stability, and self-preservation that empowers them and gives them a claim to exercise real power (Levin 2000:x). By referring, therefore, to *legitimation* and the *meanings* officials attach to control one cannot miss to discuss issues of *personal profile*, *hiring* and *selection* processes, prior to the practice of control over the immigrant population. Bringing, however, officials and institutions of control closer, no one assumes that the two have the same interests or that ordinary civil servants one day turned into controllers by accumulating the values and goals of the organisations they are now working for. Consent towards the new values of control is a process not free from conflicting strategies between officials, institutions and the government, and from contradictory practices that problematize the implementation of official-formal policy measures (Gouldner 1954).

In the Greek context of administration, issues of conflict and of contradiction are handled usually through informal practices of employment where institutions “*search*” for the “*right*” employees through a pool of reserve workers that seem to “*match*” the informal criteria. These criteria have both to do with the policies of the government but also with the internal stability of the organisations. In the first case, as Sotiropoulos (1999) explains, the Greek government is interested to appoint high-ranking officials to positions sensitive for the control of implementation of government policies. The criteria often used are managerial and party-political, and have very little to

do with the control of immigrant population directly but more, with the control of public officials. In the second case, stability within especially public-state organisations is ensured through the selection and hiring of officials who are directly responsible for the control of immigrants but are also the responsibility of middle-level administrators. Contrary to the official line for the hiring of public employees from the pool of graduates of the School of Public Administration, low-rank officials are usually hired from within the civil-service or from a pool of college/university graduates, or of young unemployed high-school trainees. Middle-level administrative officers, as it was revealed by the research, select and hire their subordinates according to whether or not an official does not endanger the social status and hierarchies of the existing members of the organisation. This is usually achieved through an *internal market* of labour, that promotes the interests (i.e. political and financial) of a given department. As both Cambetta (1998) and Burawoy (1982) argue, an *internal stability* and an *internal labour market* are both necessary for officials and organisations since the first establish their criteria and promotion policies, and the second establish social mechanisms through which labour power turns into labour for administrative practices. In particular for Burawoy (1982), Braverman's, Weber's, Crozier's and Gouldner's work show that the establishment of an internal labour market is part of a system of bureaucratic control that:

...rationalized the enterprise's power by making its application more predictable and stable, and hence bureaucratic control evoked a more stable and predictable behaviour from workers; that is bureaucratic control tended to legitimize the firm's exercise of power, and translate it into authority... (Richard Edwards in Burawoy 1982:107)

Concentrating both upon the internal stability and the internal labour market, this section will focus upon: the social background of officials, the selection, and the hiring practices of the organisations responsible for immigration control.

From the analysis of the overall responses of interviewees, what has come to light is: that between public-state and voluntary organisations, and internal or external types of control, officials share almost the same social background. Almost all administrators had similar educational backgrounds, and they were working at the time of the study with the same contractual obligations. Low-rank officials were mostly graduates of technical colleges or universities and high-rank officials were both graduates of Lyceum (i.e. secondary education) or of universities. The first type of officials also shared similar experiences of unemployment and of retraining youth schemes, since they were mostly chosen from the OAED (i.e. manpower organisation) lists of young trainees. High rank officials on the other hand, shared common experiences amongst themselves, through civil service or political affiliations with one of the main political parties. All of the respondents expressed directly or indirectly that prior to their present post they had no previous experience in dealing with immigrants, and especially low-rank officials saw their post as a necessary step in their career training, which may allow them to work either in the private or public sectors. Controlling immigrants was mostly seen as a *valuable experience* in social administration rather than as a way to implement the agreed policies of the state or of voluntary organisations. A young employee at a state

organisation sees her job as part of a wider strategy for her to develop her managerial abilities:

...(in relation to my post here) my aims are very high. Very high indeed. I will one day rule the world... I will become the King of the world (the motto taken from the film *Titanic*)... but because I am a realist, as I said to you, (I am looking) for a job (i.e. permanent) a house, a family, so that I can live, drink my coffee, learn my culture, that what I want. That is what I want only... (Organisation M)

In a similar fashion another young trainee explains that:

...I will be here for few months. Getting trained will be important if I want to continue becoming a civil servant or even have a career in the business sector... What you learn here is important like *not to trust people* and always *check* on them... (Organisation K)

The experience, however, for a high rank official was a little bit different from the above statements. Her reasons for being in the post have very little to do with training or career prospects but rather with direct control over her local environment:

...Through this post I check the flow of people into my country... I control the illegals and do something for my kids... they go to a kindergarden and the majority are Albanian kids... if we do nothing in few years my kids and the kids of my neighbours will not have a place at the local school... If it wasn't for (our control) to protect the schools of our children, Albanians would have occupied the places of our children...(Organisation K)

The personification of administrative practices, individual competitiveness and community interests, were some of the issues that respondents have used as a “*repertoire*” of symbols for the understanding of their work in public-state and voluntary organisations of immigration control. For both low-rank and high-rank officials, the fundamental *challenge* for their work seemed to be not so much the Greek civil service or the Greek philanthropic organisations, where the notion of *society*, *helping others* and *party politics* produced a moral bond amongst employees. Rather the new challenge amongst officials seemed to be an organisational culture that rests upon *abilities* to act independently, to manage resources and people, and upon an understanding that the local environment, the community, and the cultural boundaries should be the new *entangling alliances*.

For Burawoy (1982) this new *repertoire of symbols* of work is made possible in an organisational culture that at the same time is *responsive* towards market criteria through an emphasis on individual abilities and a culture of competitiveness, and is able to provide a number of *choices* at an individual level. Unlike however, Burawoy's understanding of *consent*, symbols of work and what surrounds organisational culture,

extends beyond the “*gates*” of organisations and the labour process of state institutions. The issue of class-ethnic alliance, the local or community environment and dominant views on work, hierarchy and the role of officials into the Greek society, emerge as equally important to the way work is structured inside organisations. This is more so, in relation to employment and hiring practices organisations seem to follow. In the Greek case the above was seen to construct itself in the wider context of the Greek educational system and family environment. A large number of low-rank officials were either graduates of management schools or of colleges and universities (i.e. the Law School of Athens) and together with their family culture, were motivated to *validate* themselves by getting involved as Sennet and Cobb argue, in a career structure that earned them respect through a possession of important abilities or skills. The study is showing through the interviews, that at least for low-ranking officials the motivant factor, is probably a wider cultural commitment to become part of a community of people that invest in a career in order to “stand out of a mass” (Sennet and Cobb 1993:65), and dictate the terms and criteria for work. However, it should also be noted, that personal beliefs or ideology, and the personal influence of various staff members are responsible for the construction of limits of tolerance towards immigrants.

Training, the learning of new skills on the job and the opportunity to work at the department of an organisation, is seen more as respondents claimed, as part of a series of *challenges* and of *choices* to earn respect by becoming independent. In a flexible environment such *choices* may lead them towards a position where they decide what to do with resources and people. As an official at a voluntary organisation argued: “*doing well at work* (controlling benefits and services for immigrants) *means doing well with human or other resources, and in turn it means taking the right decisions, being firm with market criteria and developing managing skills on the personal level*”. This personal view in the administrative level, is expressed differently by different officials but the majority saw their work as more or less an arena of *personal contest* where, the job description mattered only insofar as it allowed the trainee to practice self-development through learning how to match *responsibilities* to people, or how to draw the lines between what we will explain later: *responsible citizens* and *welfare cheats* of ethnic and social background. More of the personal aspects of work will be discussed at a later section where officers’ identity processes and perceptions of migrants is analysed.

The selection of officers by high or middle level administrators depended mostly on two factors. These were: personal interests and seasonal or departmental work objectives. The personal interests were mostly expressed in two ways by high or middle level officers: financial incentives and party favouritism. Both were materialized through the selection of low ranking officers who were seen as more fit, for example, to assist in the completion of a European or government funded project or, in the application of organisational objectives. Both public state and voluntary organisations were involved directly or indirectly in projects of retraining of immigrants or with schemes of *integration* of certain immigrant groups (i.e. of the Kurdish, or Greek-Pontians). High ranking officials were sometimes directly involved in such projects. They drew financial resources for themselves from these projects: in the form of overtime work done for the organisation, or in the form of subcontracted training schools (i.e. payments were usually given by the directors of these schools), or in the illegal form of *bogus-attendants of services*, where officials received the financial benefits intended for immigrants in the

first place. On the other hand, low-rank officers were selected either because they were known to high ranking officials, so that they can be *trusted* insofar as their willingness to participate to the above forms of informal corruption, and/or due to their abilities to carry on projects of training or of general integrating services for immigrants. Especially in the second case, applicants were selected for their educational background that *legitimized* the application of high-rank officers for a project on immigrants, or they were selected because they have had little or no experience with immigrants, but their skills were considered relevant for a project on immigration.

Usually what happens is that an officer receives a note from his/her organisation for an advertised proposed seminar, training or benefit schemes, relating either with immigrants or department work itself. The second step, as respondents argued, would be to see how could some funding be directed to the department and increase the cash-flow of individual officers, whilst at the same time show to their directors, that they are concerned with the issues of the organisation. They will immediately search in their close environment for people who could be the participants (i.e. both low-rank officers and immigrants) of such a project or scheme. If officers cannot fill their project applications with people of their immediate environment, then they usually rely on the external market (i.e. graduates, scientists, teachers of schools). They would usually have very little knowledge of the organisation officers' work. As an alternative selection process officers would allow a private agency to do the hiring of low-ranking officers allowing once more very little relationship of subcontracted employees with the organisation and the high-ranking offices. Examples of such agencies that operate independently to the organisation are: centres for educational training, corporations for the teaching of Greek language, or corporations for the promotion of services to migrants. Contrary to the above, for the selection of immigrants, as officers argued, they usually follow a scheme that is based upon the *sharing of people* from different organisations. As an officer has explained:

...Whenever we need a group of immigrants for day schools, we phone (Organisation E). I ask the officer there to do the selection and he sends me ten or twenty immigrants for the purposes of the project... (Organisation A)

On the other hand, the so called party favouritism is usually expressed through what is known as *rousfeti* (exchange of personal favours for political ones), and through a system of mutual political support. The first, as an officer explained, is taken place usually after local or national elections and follows a system of exchange of party favours between debtors and creditors. The *debtors* are usually local administrators or MP candidates who, if elected, reward their campaign teams with a job-placement in a local office or the Civil service. The *creditors*, on the other hand, are usually high-rank officials who are in "*agreement*" with such personal-political favours either because they themselves return a favour or because they may be in need of one, in the foreseeable future.

...We organized for him a national campaign... Together with another ten young people we held his local promotion... In return one day (after he was elected) I

received a call from his secretary to be at the organization next morning... It was awful. I was replacing another official. She lost her job simply because in front of everyone he ordered her to leave the office... He said to her that she is occupying a desk that now I was to occupy and she was fired... The girl that was fired also found her job through *rousfeti*. Almost ninety-nine per cent of all employees were appointed to the job in a similar manner... (Organization B)

As the interviewee explained, there were also employees selected because of their educational qualifications or merit, but the majority were selected because of their party affiliation or because they were involved with political campaigns during election periods. Such party favouritism as it was reported, it is not always a permanent solution to unemployment, since, as it was revealed in the above organisation, most favoured employees are hired as seasonal or part-time labour and their renewal of contract depends on whether or not the debtors (i.e. MPs, local administrators) are being re-elected. In another instance, according to employees in public-state and voluntary organisations, selection and hiring of officials follows a rather complex mutual system where *creditors* are involved in an unofficial political support. As two employees explained in an interview (i.e. these parts of the interview were not tape-recorded) this mutual system of political support “*guarantees*” the election or re-election of certain key people in very important posts, which in turn “*guarantee*” the unofficial continuation of creditors’ work in certain organisations. Either through the mobilisation of potential voters or through the management of services, *creditors* play a significant role in the political manipulation of organisational culture.

The mobilization of potential voters usually takes place, as interviewees suggested, through either the transportation of people to key political rallies, using the financial sources of the organisation, or through providing services to potential supporters of the specific debtor. During one of the interviews an interviewee argued that, one major group of people that were selected and even hired on the above basis, is the ethnic-Greek migrants, especially if they are awaiting a decision for their naturalisation. In the case of the *management of services*, *creditors* seem to have a powerful role indirectly in promoting or not the department’s image in the public, through the allocation or not of resources to the people that local politicians are accountable.

The system of *mutual support* became more evident during a session for the reviewing of applications for a green card. According to observations and an interview, *services* to clients (i.e. migrants) were given based on political or personal affiliations. An interviewee explained that through the services given to *clients*, indirectly they (i.e. other officers) remind the *creditor* of their willingness to offer services to the *debtor*:

...I am informally and in a friendly way the supervisor (in most local organisations-departments)... because the political authority is also the employing authority, and because the political authority “*uses*” in order to do her work... The other departments know that when they *serve* me, they serve the (politician)... That is how it is done. this

is the secret. What do you think? They know that I will see the (politician) at least ten times a day... (Organisation E)

#### **4.4 Organisational culture and labour control of immigrants: the cases of OAED and IKA**

The “*story*” of labour control of migrants, as the Greek case reveals, goes through those offices and state or voluntary organisations responsible for the allocation of immigrants in the Greek labour market. To unveil this story of immigration control, which is under construction, the analysis here will concentrate upon those *formal* and *informal* practices administrators follow in order to control the labouring presence of immigrants in the Greek labour market. At the outset, these formal and informal practices often appear as two separate and clearly demarcated issues, that few interviewees would even accept that they exist in the same office under the auspices of the same organisation. The Greek model of welfare administration and in particular those offices responsible for implementing labour control policies (i.e. work/residence permits), shows that there is an intermixing of formal-written with informal codes of practice, often resulting in what is described below as a “*flexible system of bureaucracy*”. In the case of immigration control, organisational structures and administrative cultures on migrants are negotiated through a complex network of authoritarian, often racist, quasi-personalized and highly politicised work environment. Traditional values are often mixed with neo-liberal welfare values, constructing a process through which migrants are being categorized and allocated to different segments of the labour market.

This above mentioned complex network of administrative practices is revealed here through two issues: the structure and the culture of immigration control. Both are linked together through the designated objectives set by the organisation and the shared social or rather political *operationalisation* of these objectives by officials.

The set up of the organisational structure and culture in relation to the labour control of migrants, is based upon small state or voluntary departments with no more than four or five officials. The majority of these officials in the study were hired on a two-year or eleven-month contracts, and as it was analysed in the previous section, these officials have little or not at all training on how to “handle” welfare cases and especially migrants’ labouring applications.

These small departments process on a daily basis, between twenty-five and seventy applications for work/residence permits or applications that may lead towards the so-called temporary visas or *Green Cards*. Work overload and the inability of administrators to regulate the flow of immigrants in offices has resulted in, as an official explained, conflicts between *clients* and officials, and the application of extra-departmental measures:

...twice a week we receive applicants for the Green Card...  
the number of people in our offices is extremely large...  
Imagine, before the legalisation programme we used to

two or three applicants a day for social welfare and now (we have) hundreds... (for this reason) we usually call the police to regulate the flow of applicants... (Organisation M)

According to the same official, the control of the “client’s” flow by the police creates administrative problems, because the latter regulate migrants according to their own criteria. The interest for the police force is to *regulate the flow* of applicants whereas for the ordinary officials the emphasis is placed on the *processing* of applications and the examination of applications, on an atomised basis, whenever the official has the time to do so:

...The police allow applicants to visit our offices although there are minutes left for closing... I usually twice a week have to stay one or two extra hours (after closing time) in order to check on their papers... (Organisation K)

Looking closely at the processing of applications by officials working at the Manpower Organisation (OAED) and the Institute for Social Insurance (IKA), the control of migrants is mostly arranged around a division of labour and a compartmentalized system of organizing tasks. Both have got to do with the way both OAED and IKA administrators organize their work and develop *techniques* for the regulation of the applicants. The *division of labour* in relation to the processing of applications is both vertical and horizontal, and tasks are allocated to officials according to: seniority, the type of contract officials have, and according to the area and/or the centrality of the office in the hierarchy of the organisation.

Figure 4.4.a shows the organisation of the division of labour at both OAED and IKA offices, and the way tasks or responsibilities are allocated amongst administrators. Given the range of activities that both offices are responsible for, the internal logic of a division of labour is based upon both a vertical and horizontal allocation of tasks or responsibilities. Members of both organisations are being divided as it is shown in Figure 4.4.a according to the different *functional area* they occupy; their relationship with the *operating process* of applications; and since we are referring to regional offices, with the *geographical location* of two organisations are. In all three issues, the division of labour follows a strict hierarchy according to seniority, where major decisions are taken by the regional directors advised usually by the departmental directors.

#### **4.4.1 Functional areas of task allocation**

Decision making is progressively restricted as one passes down the levels of organisational hierarchy, and discretion is mostly visible at a horizontal division of labour. This horizontal division is reflected amongst officers of the same *functional area*. In the case of IKA or OAED, administrators share the same *functional area* whenever they share the “*same expertise and draw the same set of resources*” (Child 1984:86). For example, according to interviewees from the IKA organisation the above *sharing* takes place between the offices of *registration*, *benefits* and *construction work* (i.e. for those applicants who work based on the reciprocity of offices and the mutual interest of

officers to serve clients on the basis of their claim. The same holds for the different OAED departments, especially between the departments responsible for hiring and unemployment benefits and those departments who are mostly responsible for the approval and the renewal of Green Cards (i.e. Work/Residence Permits).

In Figure 4.4.a these *functional areas* are bringing together different departments within IKA and OAED, and link together different organisations. For example, administrators within the registrar's at IKA, collaborate with administrators in the medical and construction work departments, whereas at the same time, as an official explained, there is a close collaboration of the registrar's office with the local police station, the central office of OAED, and various other organisations (i.e. immigrant associations and border police stations). Most members of IKA or OAED organisations are indirectly encouraged to collaborate through such *functional areas* because, as most officers explained, there is no other way to discover which are the "true" and the "bogus" welfare applicants. This "discovery", according to observations and interviews which were collected at the above offices, has less to do with separating "true" from "false" welfare applications, and probably has more to do with the *construction* of social categories according to the officials' cultural interpretations of immigrants. Some of these interpretations will be analysed in detail in the final section of this chapter (identity processes). However, what is important here is, that such *constructions* serve as *ideological bridges* not only between departments or organisations but also between officers and a *moral rhetoric* on practicing welfare control. In the case of immigrants, constructing those that should not receive a work/residence permit or other welfare benefits, is based upon a division of labour. This division of labour is organised around *functional areas of work* which in turn play an important role for the allocation of resources and of immigrant workers, to the different regions of the Athenian labour market. As an officer explains:

...We usually get in touch with other officers from other organisations in order to hire or sort out the placement of a group of workers... (this is important) otherwise we will be totally cut off from the nearest IKA office...  
(Organisation K)

An officer from IKA claimed that this inter-exchange of information between various departments and organisations is vital for the *efficient* function of IKA especially in light of migrant's applications:

...For other officers we are the "daddies"; the tax office; OAED; the local authorities; we are the "dads". They all come to us especially for immigrants... (Organisation P)

According however to observations, there seems to be in addition a second reason of why task allocation is based upon those functional areas. This has got to do with the indirect encouragement of officers, by high-ranking administrators, to increase their efficiency at work. This seems to be a serious challenge for IKA and OAED organisations, because due to the large number of applications they receive and due to red tape, officials seem to be unable to offer a qualitative service to clients and to use management criteria for the

efficient use of resources.


Instead, through *functional areas* officers establish networks on welfare resources that are based on personalized contracts, between officers of different departments and organisations, and use criteria for welfare benefits that are in line with traditional and neo-liberal notions on welfare management. The first (i.e. traditional values) has got to do with the existing informal networks of financial benefits to the officer in charge, known as *rousfeti* or corruption, which act as indirect incentives to administer or implement (in most cases), a control over the labour market. As an officer from the above organisations explains:

...We shout at immigrants, and in most cases of applications, we are tough because otherwise we wouldn't be paid by those they can afford in order to receive their permits... The person you have just visited throws them out of his office... Behaving like this...and they do not suspect him (that receives money from immigrants)... he also, like this, increases the amount of money he receives... He charges one million drachmas per favour... I am talking about serious (permits) papers like naturalizations or visas... (Organisaton E)


The indirect encouragement to bypass supervisors or to avoid the red tape at some cases, may be a traditional motivant factor because, it increases the personal involvement of officers and, as most interviewees explained, it increases the scope subordinates have for exercising control over immigrants. The link however, between different officers from different departments or organisations, has also some positive benefits for the regulation of welfare resources to immigrants according to neo-liberal notions of who is *fit* to receive these resources. In this sense *functional areas* constitute a scheme or mode of division of labour that apart from allocating tasks and resources, they serve as *mentalites* or cultural constructions, that bring together technical and moral values for the social control of immigrants. For example, at both IKA and OAED regional offices administrators build these *functional areas*: first, around who should *not* be trusted for a work/residence permit; second, around the techniques of surveillance that should be employed; and third, around the management of welfare resources.

In relation to the first, administrators seem to build their practices on *layers* of cultural beliefs that inure, especially low-rank officers, to moral judgments about immigrants in the name of technical or organisational objectives. At one of the IKA regional offices, the section responsible for the registration and income benefits for immigrants, organised work around a copy of a received threatening letter, supposedly coming from Albanians. Young officers were reminded of the threatening letter and in fact senior administrators had circulated a copy to each member of the staff who was responsible for the interviewing of welfare applicants, and was “serving” clients at the counter.

**Figure 4.4.a:** Representation of the division of labour at IKA and OAED offices-  
Regional level



**Figure 4.4.a (continued)**



The function of the circulation of such a letter, according to a departmental director, was to remind everyone, especially the newcomers at IKA, who are they dealing with. But, somehow apart from this, the creation of an almost war-situation (i.e. between officers and immigrants) had resulted in a peculiar *stability* amongst officers of different sections or departments. Junior officers, especially those who were on a contract basis, aspired the views of senior administrators and expressed a concern about their work as if they were at the war front, expecting from themselves to

do everything to protect their colleagues from “*thuggish*” Albanians. Registrars from different organisations together with different sections or departments from the same organisation, were establishing *functional areas* of cooperation that engaged different administrators with the same concern: the *welfare cheat* and the “*illegal*” immigrant. In order for these organisationally based networks of work to function, they were establishing codes of surveillance for the immigrant population. These codes of surveillance were both written and non-written.

In relation to the first, officials, especially at OAED, have established a two-stage procedure for the provision of the Green card to immigrants. The first examines the place of work, family status, country of origin, and gender of the immigrant. This codification of the applicant together with the codification of any family members that are being supported, should lead towards the issuing of a pink card. The local administrators are responsible for checking information given by the applicant and also for the decision to issue him/her with a pink card (i.e. a temporary card prior to the renewal and issuing of the Green card).

The second stage which is responsible for examining applications of renewal of the Green card, is left to the authority of a special committee at central office (i.e. usually this committee meets once a month). At both the first and the second stage, the written criteria for the provision of a work/residence permit depend mostly on the information given by the applicant, and how far this information is “*true*”, by the standards of the officers in charge. In relation to the non-written criteria, the standards that an immigrant has to fulfil, are mostly relating to the ethnic/cultural background and how far the applicant “*fits*” to a flexible labour market. The applicant will receive his/her work/residence permit based on how far is relating to values like: *flexibility/productivity*; autonomy; self-control; and activity (in relation to current economic values). These “*standards*” (that will be examined in detail in a following section) establish the main informal or non-written communication between officers of the so-called *functional areas*.

#### **4.4.2 Operating and geographical task allocation**

This above management of welfare resources takes place at both IKA and OAED regional offices through also an informal task allocation that is characterized by a linkage between officers belonging, to different compartments or sections of the same regional office. This type of linkage is described here as an *operating process*, and its main purpose is to allow the collaboration of divert expertise to allocate and regulate the flow of welfare resources according to budget constrains and according to individual assessments of immigrant cases. Such a division of labour was mostly the case at IKA regional offices, where medical departments distributed health services to immigrants, based on the interconnection of different tasks (i.e. registration of immigrants, welfare benefits office) from different sections. The medical as well as the welfare assessment of the individual costs involved in medical services, were argued in common by IKA administrators. Despite the recent refusals of junior medical doctors to provide health services to undocumented migrants, medical departments through such a task allocation ensured the political implementation of the Health Ministry policy on migrants. The logic

behind such an informal task allocation is that different sections of the same organisation are involved in and have a share of the responsibility for the health budget. Furthermore, as medical doctors explained, through an *operating process*, the control of health services is shared with others, and also instead of “*wasting*” their time and effort on caring for the “*careless*” they focus on what they consider as important cases. A gynaecologist from an IKA regional office complained that he has on a daily basis cases of abortion or medical tests on pregnancy, due to the “*careless*” (as he described) sexual behaviour of Albanian women in Athens. The answer to his “problem” was to refuse any medical tests on Albanian pregnant women. Whilst another medical doctor advised immigrants to return back to their country. Another medical practitioner at a different IKA office had the following experience with migrants:

...they have come to a new society where, I guess they must be taught the rules of this society. Yes, our rules are slightly different from their own. Our rules are tougher, insofar the *demands we have from them*. Sometimes I see some foreigners to get into trouble, I do not know the reasons, for example it has happened that someone ( a foreigner) has got into an argument with the medical doctor, they may say ( to the practitioner) “why are you not at your post; I search for you and you do not have to be here” and things of that kind. We (practitioners) see this a bit strange. For example when we (Greeks) went to Germany, we had been integrated into the society and we have complied with the rules (of that society)...  
(organisation P)


The division of activities amongst administrators who work at IKA or OAED regional offices show an interest if they are also placed in the context of the *geographical location* they occupy. Figure 4.4.b shows the organisation of tasks and of departments within an OAED regional office. The whole division of labour and the compartmentalization of activities follow a functional informal model that serves the interests of the local labour market, and in some ways the interests of the local State and voluntary organisations. The emphasis here is placed on the processing of immigrants applications for work/residence permits in relation to the markets or services that organisations like the Prefecture, the City Hall of Athens, or the Institute for small enterprises offer. This processing of applications is usually done through the interchange of information between different organisations. Officers are linked in such a way so as to respond immediately and in a flexible manner to current demands on immigrant labour. An officer from the IKA organisation stated:

...(we have very good cooperation between officers) this is reflected in the good relations we have (in particular our office) with employers (from the local region)...  
(organisation E)

This demand is usually generated out of EU or other development projects

that usually are meant to benefit Greek small enterprises or groups of young unemployed. Due to the inefficient networking and cooperation between OAED and small Greek enterprises or young Greek unemployed, immigrants are seen as the single largest, easier (i.e. in terms of control) and less costly group of people to absorb the recent funding from the EU.

**Figure 4.4.b:** Schematic presentation of the geographical location of tasks in a regional



The particular regional office that is depicted in Figure 4.4.b, has a record of “using” immigrants as a target group, for the processing of applications to the EU and for the financial backing of Greek regional projects on development. During 1995-1996, the same office has received more than one billion drachmas for the retraining of young Albanian immigrants on computers and generally on software technology. Immigrants who do not fit or are unable to contribute to this project networking or cash flow between organisations, are usually treated within the boundaries of the law, whilst others are favoured. The technique that is usually followed by administrators for such a positive

discrimination is to claim that for humanitarian reasons some are to be excluded from the legal framework of Aliens regularization. Another practice amongst officers of OAED is to claim that one has submitted his/her application prior to the end of the deadline for a work/residence permit, so that the processing of the application will continue (i.e. in most cases the usual practice against a migrant's permit, is the claim by officers that his papers are overdue).

#### 4.4.3 Types of authority

Having briefly described some “models” of the division of labour within welfare state officers a conception of how control is organised, implies also a closer look upon the way(s) administrators establish their *human conduct* with migrants. This conduct is established around an internal mode of organisation that is characterized by collaborative devices promoting a legitimating role of officers to control immigrants.

The Greek case reveals that it is not easy to independently examine formal from informal rules, often leading to a confusion between rules emanated from administrative bureaucratic structures and from values that officers share. The separation of one from another is problematic also for another reason, and that is that the legitimating role of officers is often not the result of a clear cut authority. The latter is to be developed out of consent amongst officers, whose responsibility is to control migrants activity in the Greek labour market. This consent seems, according to the study, to build upon different sources of authority that probably have very little to do with administrative hierarchy. For example, according to the analysis of interviews, the following four types of authority evoked consent, and were perceived as legitimate. In the study, these were: the *technical authority*; the authority of the *professional administrator*; authority which results from *trust* within the department or the particular section; and authority which is *externally built* and has very little to do with the organisation *per se*.

In most offices the study has examined, administrators build their everyday practices upon the sharing of common codes or values of *trust* and *cooperation*. In contrast, regulations resulting from administrative hierarchy were often seen, as bureaucratic or, as an officer from the Prefecture explained: “*the people* (in the central office of OAED) *they do not know what they are saying or doing*”. Whilst most officers saw with resentment the bureaucratic control from above, they, at the same time, expressed a consent towards following the rules given from officers with *technical* or *professional* status. The first (i.e. the technical authority) was reflected in the study through the appreciation of officers who have had an expert knowledge to guide them through practical everyday activities or responsibilities:

...Whatever I do I always consult Ms... because she knows that we are bound to make mistakes... She has her way in uncovering mistakes and to separate applicants who have applied twice (to two different offices) for the same income provision... (Organisation K)

This technical authority was mostly appreciated amongst officers of voluntary organisation that saw experts, like social workers or economic/financial and legal

advisers, as people with a legitimate right to guide the rules given from above. Similarly, in an OAED office that was responsible for the retraining of Pontian workers, the supervisor or director of the responsible department said:

...It is up to her (a junior officer responsible for youth programmes) of whether or not we will take this project... She will decide and let the *others* (implying the central office) shout... if we cannot (take the project) we will not... whatever she will decide I will follow... (Organisation E)

On the other hand, conflict is often expressed whenever rules are directed to officers from people of authority who are seen by administrators as bureaucrats (i.e. people who are given authority without being “experts” or being part of the administrative “family”). An officer complains against the rules that stem from central administrative offices saying the following:

...recently they (i.e. executive officers) appointed a new council committee... you should see what are these people... Instead of selecting people that know the job they chose those that know the least... These people select people that are going to do whatever they are told to do... (Organisation E)

Similarly to technical authority, consent is also built upon what is usually referred as a *professional trust*. For an interviewee this professionalism means:

...to rely upon someone whatever the circumstances... especially whenever there is a *crisis* and there are five-seconds to decide how to solve the problem... (Organisation E)

Professional authority is referred amongst state welfare administrators, as the type of authority that stems from a person’s ability to govern crisis, whilst for officers of voluntary organisations, as the ability to mobilize and economize on resources. To be professional, according to an officer in a voluntary organisation, one must know how to utilise perspective resources, how to apply market criteria, and how to discipline staff members in accordance with the objectives of the organisation. To continue from the above, authority seems to be more legitimate if it derives from the department or section of the same office. As an officer claimed:

...we are all here like a *family*, we *trust* each other... We know each other and we usually keep things within these four walls... We have no secrets between us, and that’s why we are able to work... otherwise (if we followed what others said) we could not do anything... (Organisation A)

Collegiate trust amongst officers of the same office and department seem to identify their

common experience of work with migrants, and to lead them towards further initiatives and an understanding of what is legitimate and what is not. This *trust*, according to officers of OAED, is important if it is to decide who should be having a priority over an interview or, special positive treatment for humanitarian reasons, what comes first or second in terms of services:

...Responsibility towards one another is the first thing... Maria looks at the names and the registration of each applicant... Costas is responsible for double checking the names of immigrants... some are registered differently from what their passport tells... I have to see that everything is in order... (Organisation K)

Finally, officers seem to trust administrators who have a respectful career in the area where they work or administer their services. This is more true of voluntary organisations and administrators that have support from grass-root community representatives or have the ability to achieve their targets. An officer claimed about his department that in the area where he is working:

...they know me and my staff (knows me) that there is no No for me (implying red tape)... if you say no to me I will do everything possible to achieve it... (Organisation E)

As the same officer explained, although he does not consider himself as an expert, interpersonal communication, to build trusting relationships with officers from other organisations, and to do what you have promised, is the key to everything.

#### **4.4.4 Parameters influencing administrative practice**

In accordance to the officials that were interviewed, the objectives which state and voluntary organisations have, mostly focus on the ways they regulate immigrants, and the ways they interpret the presidential decrees and clauses for immigrants. The state organisations, responsible for work and residence permits, have the task or objective to regulate immigrants, that is to institute a social practice according to which there is a clarification of who *fits* the needs of the Greek labour market, and who should be excluded. This is based upon the personal beliefs, the ideology and the personal influence officials have upon other officers and upon migrants' control. In the analysis of *identity processes* these will be further analysed in relation to national, professional, and personal understanding of self and others (i.e. over here the immigrant-client). These beliefs and influence, as Kassimati (2000) argues, are reflected in the construction of *limits of tolerance* towards immigrants.

...(the issuing of work/residence permits) is given to all those who contribute to Greece (and therefore) they must

stay in Greece, those that do not contribute to Greece they must better return to their countries where they may contribute more... This is what we (officials) call clearing process... In other words slowly this *clearing* is taking place... (Organisation M)

According to another employee of the same organisation, despite the fact that there are almost two-hundred clauses for immigrants and, in addition, there are instructions on who should have a work/residence permit or not, officials practice a “*clearing up*” process by looking at the economic and social characteristics of the applicants. It should be pointed here that, according to the majority of state officials (i.e. both high and low-ranking) the major aim of the organisations is to follow the legal framework according to certain parameters. These parameters, according to an official, are:

...(first) whether or not the applicant is a family person... (second) the checking of his/her passport, and (third) his/her source of income... (fourthly) the applicant’s social security contributions... (finally) we check with border police and various police stations (throughout the country) (Organisation O)

The first parameter, as it has been explained by the same official, is crucial because, it shows whether or not the applicant: is a member of a household in Greece, can be checked (i.e. have a permanent address); is responsible towards his/her family members and “sees” Greece as a permanent settlement country rather than as a transit place. The usual term that is attached to family men is *noikokyraios* (i.e. family men concerned with family affairs and avoiding trouble), and immigrants are often seen as *noikokyraioi* whenever they follow the administrators’ guidelines without, challenging the legal or administrative order.

It is important to note here, that *trust* between officials and migrants is built around certain social characteristics that *license* the immigrants’ presence at the welfare office. Being a family person, according to officials, indicates, apart from anything else, that the applicant is accountable and has a perspective that “*fits*” the community values public administrators have. As an official explained:

...(even in the case that the applicant has not got all the necessary papers) still (if he is a *family person*) we will allow him to have the Green Card for humanitarian reasons... we know how it is... I suppose when we were in Germany as immigrants it was difficult... (Organisation O)

The second parameter is also important because, as most officials explained in various organisations and departments, welfare administrators are responsible for clarifying who is an undocumented and who is a legal immigrant. But, apart from this sorting, what most officials were actually looking for at the time of the research, was also the social/family background of the applicants. As an official explained:

...we must be certain of the social background of the

immigrant (before one issues a permit)... we have to know where they come from and what they are... We cannot allow anybody to be here (Greece) (Organisation P)

In relation to the source of income, the standard practice of officials was to search for both the type of work activity of the applicant, as well as the amount of income the applicants have. In particular, officials explained that a low income is both an indication of low status and of menial tasks performed by the applicant, as well as the inability of the latter to “*stand independent of any welfare provisions*”. Those that are out of work, or do not have an “*adequate*” income are classified by the officials as not welcomed to stay in the country. Finally, checking of the applicants’ police records in collaboration with various police stations in the areas of work and residence of the applicant, is crucial for the official because, as one explained:

...such collaboration is important because it allows us to know whether or not the applicant is the right person... Whenever I have doubts I call the police, they advise me, or even they come here and we question together the applicant... (Organisation M)

Welfare officers at most times seem to be in close collaboration with the police and together with police officers not only they check on the originality of migrants’ applications, but they also decide at the last instance, who should be expelled from the country. As a director of a welfare department explained:

...I usually know my applicants... Whenever they get arrested I search for them in the local police stations, and when I found them they get released... (Organisation N)

In most state organisations (OAED and IKA) these parameters seem to be part of the “*clearing up*” process and the *taxonomy* of immigrant to different segments of the labour force. But, apart from the above parameters of discrimination, officials categorize migrants according to: ethnic identity; type of work they exercise; whether or not applicants can be classified as economic immigrants or migrants of Greek ethnic origins, and finally, as to whether or not they comply with a flexible system of labour. This categorisation is further analysed in the part where identity is being analysed. In particular, in the following sections it will be shown *how* and *why* officers at IKA and OAED organise this taxonomy of the immigrant population in Greece. Furthermore it will be shown, that the differences which exist between officers belonging to IKA and OAED, and how national, “professional”, and personal constructions of the *self* and “*others*” organise officers work in relation to immigrant-clients.

The *ethnic identity*, as it will also be shown later, plays a significant role for the issuing of work/residence permits, and according to officials (especially those in state organisations) it carries social characteristics that are central to the regulation and control of immigrants. Throughout the research, officials categorize Albanians, Rumanians, and in general Balkan immigrants, as the least “*desired*” type of immigrants, because they are mostly “seen” as “*pirates*” who “*steal*” welfare resources, and become

involved with criminality.

On the other hand, Pakistani and Indian immigrants are considered to be economic migrants, who contribute a lot to the agricultural economy and follow the legal and administrative guidelines of officials. The racial taxonomy of immigrants seems to sustain a racialised categorisation of the type of work immigrants get involved in. For most officials in state organisations, there seems to be an *internal logic* of why especially Albanians are either out of work or they do not have an accepted level of social insurance contributions for a work permit (i.e. this is one million drachmas in social stamps). According to an official, Albanians mostly seem not to “care” for either having a permanent job or ask from their employer to not withhold their IKA (i.e. social insurance) stamps. This is attributed mostly because of their “*undisciplined nature*” and their “untrained” work ethic. For an OAED officer Albanians seem to be:

...a tough *herd*. They (Albanians) are not disciplined, and they are canny. Not clever... (Organisation M)

Another OAED officer is much more descriptive in his racial and ethnic categorisations arguing that:

...immigrants from India or Africa are different from others (immigrants from Albania). Their difference is visible. I will give you an example. There maybe a group of immigrants from India waiting under the sun from early morning and in front of them are the Albanians, they (from India) will wait for the Albanians and they will come. If a more “coloured” come (to our office) - I use the term *coloured* within inverted commas - from Nigeria or Congo, he will *function* in a disciplined way and even, in a civil way... (Organisation K)

In a similar fashion a young trainee from a local job centre which is situated inside a regional OAED office further explains:

...The Albanians and the Rumanians know very well their rights as well as their obligations and they are quite *sceptical* in front of the civil servant. They, most of the times believe that they are entitled something more which is not given (by the officers in charge). They have a good knowledge of the Greek language and their spoken Greek is perfect. Nevertheless, sometimes they complain that they have not acted according to the (letter of law) because they do not understand well the Greek language. The Albanians and the Rumanians are hard to convince... the Bangladeshi immigrants are calmer, more civil, and they *follow all the instructions* that officers will give them... (Organisation A)

In relation to the classification and allocation of migrants in the Greek

labour market, most state and voluntary organisations categorise migrants as follows:

...There are three categories of migrants: first, citizens of the EU, with whom we have no problems... second, the Europeans who are non-EU citizens, and (third) the Asian population. From those who are not citizens of the EU, we have communication problems due (a) to the *psychosynthesis* of these people and (b) due... to (their educational) background (with)... the Asian people, Koreans, Chinese, we have no problems of communication. We have communication problems with the Indians, Pakistanis and generally with the Muslims (due to)... their educational background... (Organisation P)

This brief description of the different categories migrants “*belong*” to, has very little to do with the formally stated *discourse* on migration and the separation of migrants according to some “traditionally” followed characteristics (i.e. whether one is a refugee, economic migrant, legal or illegal).

There seems to be in front of us a “*powerful new practice*” (Culpitt 1999:56) of categorisation, that distinguishes migrants according not only to the place of origin and its technological and/or social development in relation to the EU, but also according to their relation with how far they embrace the new management of work.

The *techne* of such a categorisation rests on the development and legitimacy by the “*experts*” of a *coded language* and of values that separate people. For the administrator, the migrant appears to be by definition, a member of a *porous group of people* that has multiple identities, more than one citizenships, proliferates different socio-economic values and has a diffused sense of loyalties. The migrant is often seen as a cultural *threat*, representative of a group of people, who through his/her “*porous life*”, challenge and threaten with obliteration: the imaginary cultural characteristics of the Local Community and the values of a flexible global labour activity. Governments and administrators, as Castles (2000) argues, have to establish a control of labour markets through practices that regulate people. This is achieved through the establishment of practices that define immigrants according to how far one is visible (i.e. his work and presence is easily controlled) by authorities, and is identified as part of the new welfare and work criteria. This definition process is explained here through the analysis of the images officials have for immigrants.

#### **4.5 State-welfare officers and images about immigrants-clients**

In the previous sections the analysis has concentrated on the main economic and cultural ideas, guiding the division of labour and shaping the practices organisations follow in order to implement immigration *control* policies. The development of the latter, emerges at a time of economic transition of Greece’s political and social infrastructure, due to global market changes and due to the deregulation of labour practices. This ongoing transition of Greece, seems to affect the way welfare organisations (i.e. IKA and OAED) organise their “*services*” towards the immigrant

population in Athens, often leading to a kind of welfare management.

According to the government, this welfare management aims at: *increasing Greece's integration with global and European financial and political alliances*, and doing everything possible through *restructuring* and *deregulation* so as to *achieve the first aim* (Verelis, Paschalidis, Christodoulakis, 2000). Thus, according to the views of the government, welfare management constitutes a kind of internal control mechanism based upon a new set of values, activities and technical systems. These are in a sense designed to bring together *traditional* and *new* practices, and to allow individual administrators to maximize their potentials and to act according to mutual (i.e. individual-market) interests.

Administrative officers according to the views of the government, are not only "*called*" by global market changes to safeguard citizens' interests, but also to steer their own-market energies so as to adapt personal work to productivity demands and to a system of flexible market changes. For the government (Simitis 2001), immigrant labour presents a major chance for welfare organisations and for employees. This is to integrate "*foreign*" labour into the system of flexible economy. At the same time an administrative management that is open to labour market changes and shifting values concerning the use of immigrant labour, is thought to be central for Greece's transformation. If the above represents the governments intentions, then it follows that welfare officers' work occupies a central role in Greece's economic and political transition. Immigration control constitutes a "*mode of thinking*" in progress, and for its establishment it has to rely heavily on the *professional, personal* and *class-ethnic* alliances, officers hold with their organisations and with their "*clients*".

The notion of the welfare control of immigrants as it has been shown earlier, is based upon a new *corpus* of administrative regulation that brings together traditional (i.e. party clientelism) and market practices and bureaucratic with personal interests. According to Verelis et al (2000) the junior minister of the Ministry for Public Projects, this notion of control rests on the employee's *understanding* and *ideological agreement* that: socio-economic progress depends on the personal initiatives officers take for the implementation of market objectives. In addition, officers together with the executive administrators of their welfare organisations have the "*duty*" to create a new "*yardstick*" according to which they could "*measure*" the "*extend and results of their work*" (Verelis et al 2000: pp. 40-41).

According to the "*manifesto*" of the government, the adaptation of Greece into the global capitalist regulation, could only be achieved if employees and public organisations (i.e. like IKA or OAED) adopt a new set of work criteria. These criteria are: the individual's *participation* and *personal involvement* in the re-modernisation of the country; the development of an appraisal system of individual *competitiveness*; and the development of systems, that safeguard the interests of local and global labour markets through *adaptation*.

Greece's transition, has unleashed new *paths* of regulation and together new dilemmas for welfare officers on *what, how, and why* to control welfare services. In particular the immigrant labour force is seen as a challenge by both officers and the government, on how far organisations and staff members adapt to National and global economic challenges. Through the implementation of immigration control both the government and organisations (i.e. both public and of welfare orientation), are actually

observing not only how far immigrants are regulated, but also how far employees respond towards the new market demands. Both the issue of immigration and of implementation of immigration policies, seem to be tied together by a system of administrative regulation that *stresses* the importance of personal administrative involvement in the implementation of policies. However, as it will be soon discovered through the analysis of interviews, officer's implementation practices and the Greek government's policies are not linked in a linear fashion. The two seem to respond to wider cultural and economic initiatives taken at a global and local level, and in the case of officials' immigration control seems to reflect a response on their part of how they perceive transformation. Their perceptions certainly guide implementation practices, but not as the government would have wished them to be.

For the above reasons, this section will concentrate on the identity processes of welfare officers from mainly the social security and manpower organisations. The analysis will focus on: *National, Professional* and *personal* identities. That is the life-narratives of officers on how they construct their "*community*" and ethnic membership in relation to immigrant labourers and immigration in Greece. Furthermore the analysis will concentrate on how welfare officers from the two above organisations, see their work, and how they "*discover*" themselves, in relation to immigrants. Personal identity is examined combined with professional identity. This is done because in the research it has represented part of officers' understanding of everyday work. It should be noted, however, that the analytical emphasis is on the *process* of identity and therefore national, professional and personal identities of welfare officers are seen as they are being constructed, dissolved and re-constructed, according to human relationships and social activity. Part of these relationships and social activity has been analysed in the previous sections, which demonstrated an understanding of the *ways organisational culture* amongst officers, of different organisations and departments is being produced.

In the section that follows identity aspects are analysed separately here for practical reasons, and in no way represent necessarily three distinguished aspects of identity. In actual fact, one's sense of identity in real life looks more like a series of "*episodes*" and reflections of circumstances and events, and any ordering of these is important for the "*viewer*" rather than the "*protagonist*". All three aspects of identity are usually combined, but they are distinguished here in order to highlight the different understandings officers have for themselves and others.

These three aspects of identity are examined in order to see how far and in what ways the implementation of control policies on immigrants is influenced by the *perceptions* welfare officers have for this group of people. In particular, the hypothesis according to the IAPASIS project is that these *perceptions* are partly influenced by: the socio-economic status of immigrants in Greece and the way(s) officers perceive Greece as an immigration country, and the access of immigrants to civil and economic rights.

Both are thought in the case of Greece to be influenced by certain factors such as: ethnic-national identity, work/professional issues, and issues of personal development and of the self-image of officers. The latter, personal identity, is seen here as a relational aspect of officers' understanding of their role into the Greek society, that comes as a product of national and professional identity. The essence of this section is to analyse identity processes amongst officers, that lead: towards the *classification* of immigrants and furthermore their *allocation* to the Greek society and the local labour

markets. Both are thought to determine the implementation of immigration policies, the relationships between officers and immigrants, and the relationship between different agencies of immigration control. However, all three aspects of identity, as it will be shown, provide a cultural perspective of how officers come to define immigrants in Greece in a particular way, and how they relate themselves to the implementation of immigration control policies. The last part of this section's analysis concentrates on the micro-practices of immigrants' control by officers, and on how they discriminate against certain categories of immigrant labourers.

#### **4.5.1 National identity and welfare officers**

The activities of welfare officers in relation to immigration policies are shaped and directed by many different factors. In the previous sections the analysis has focused upon the *structure* and the *organisational culture*, central to the work of officers at two case welfare organisations. Through a focus on IKA and OAED organisations the analysis has up to a point, shown the *paths* followed for the construction of *informal*, *unintended* and sometimes conflicting policy practices, usually followed by employees responsible for work and residence permits. Central to the above *exposé* has been the understanding that the different symbols attached by officers on their work (i.e. in order for the latter to explain their work) are relational to an organisational culture, that is both responsive to internal and external influences, and in particular to organisational structures.

Through an emphasis on *individual abilities*, *market criteria* as well as *party-political* relationships, the previous sections have addressed the first question of the study, which is: what kind and how organisational culture(s) affect various organisations and the implementation of immigration policies by officers. Following from this, and being partly based upon Nichols, Eldridge (1999) and Burawoy's (1982) theoretical studies on *work cultures*, this section will focus on the second question of the IAPASIS project. That is: to discover the part played by identity processes in the interaction between public officials and immigrants.

The analytic concern here is to examine the *process* through which welfare officers detect, combine and present the different factors or parameters that construct their perceptions about *immigration*, *migrants* and the latter's *role* in the Greek society. In this sub-section the identity discussion will address these three aspects in turn, focusing on the "*bases*" welfare officers rest upon in order to *classify* and *allocate* immigrants and material resources.

All three aspects are being identified here as parts of a major theoretical discussion concerning national identity. For some, national identity is seen as an "*obvious*" parameter through which a group of people identifies and distinguishes itself from another. In our case, our reference to national identity discussion is done through a reference to *immigration* and the group of people that is commonly identified as *immigrants*. For the purposes of our analysis the issue of *national identity* is not seen as "*obvious*" or "*fixed*", but rather is taken here as something that is loosely defined and it is our concern to discover its *context* and its *use* by officers in their relation to immigrants and the policies they implement for the control of the latter.

A *brief excursus*, therefore, into the different accounts interviewees

present shows that: national identity is a varied expression of different, sometimes conflicting and sometimes not, values about how officers perceive immigration and immigrants. In relation to *immigration* and Greece as a country of immigration, *IKA* and *OAED* officers establish their own understandings, restricting attention to issues of *welfare control* and *immigration policy*.

From the very beginning of the analysis of the welfare officers' national identity processes, the attachment of the concept *national* to the *identity* issue, was seen as something that must be exercised with great care. Through the analysis of welfare officers' interviews this caution has been further validated. Interpreting oral expositions of what abstractly here is referred as "*national identity*", is a generality that may lead towards further generalities. Such general and sometimes vague understandings may not allow one to understand how and in what ways officers formulate their perceptions about immigration and immigrants in Greece. Furthermore, by following a generalised understanding of the national identity of officers, one may be misled to think that Greek officers value their relation with other people in terms of fixed values.

According to the interviews presented below, the issue of national identity takes different meanings according to the *social context* officers are situated and related to. First of all, for a large number of officers a reference to national identity seems not to imply the *nation* but rather, the *state* of Greece. As it will be shown below, most officers referred to *immigration policy* implying indirectly the *political-economic* significance immigration has for the Greek state. At the same time, the use of the term "*country*" is limited in most interviews, and whenever it is used it reminds one the importance of the administrative state to regulate and control the activity of people in it. Second, the issues of *control* and of the immigrant *use*, seem to be the most common themes amongst officers of *IKA* and *OAED* organisations. For *IKA* officers, immigration *control* and *use* of "foreign" workers a direct effect upon insurance contributions and the separation of welfare legitimate recipients from welfare "*cheaters*".

...immigration was something inevitable for Greece and for every country for that matter... a migration policy should not lead (towards) the *opening of borders* (a correct migration policy) should be how *we use* the *foreigners* from the moment they arrive in Greece...  
(Organisation N)

For the above officer a correct migration policy should take into consideration: National priorities, security aspects, and a welfare resource management. According to the above interview, the focus in relation to immigration is on the: control of the flow of immigrants and the "*appropriate*" *use* of immigrant labour force. The reference to the issue of *open borders* probably indirectly criticizes the foreign policy of the conservative junior-minister that ended the cold-war between Albania and Greece, during the early 1990's. In the case of another *IKA* officer from a central administrative department, a similar line of thought has been pursued, exemplifying the significance for an officer to be responsive towards public concerns and organisational objectives.

... We make sure that they (i.e. immigrants) comply with the organisation's insurance policies and they contribute

to the Greek society... (Organisation K)

In contrast for an OAED official *immigration*, is perceived by another officer, as something that combines both *control* and the *economic use* of immigrant labour.

... in order to have a better immigration policy, I mean by this the better *control* of foreigners, *they* have to work somewhere, (and) because they do not meet the *criteria* of the employment of the public sector, the *private corporations* are the only way (for them to find work and be controlled)... (Organisation A)

These *criteria* are defined, by the same OAED officer in charge of implementing immigration policies, as follows:

... immigration is important for the labour market (in Greece) because from the side of private corporations they can discover *cheaper labour -hands*. Not in *humiliating* prices, as it happens in Korea and every Eastern country, but instead of paying a Greek Drhs 11,000 why shouldn't they pay Drhs 6,000 an unskilled (worker), a *foreigner*... (Organisation A)

Immigration control in Greece seems to fulfil another important task, that is to direct immigrants to the appropriate jobs. A relationship between ethnic-background, employment, and immigrants' division of labour, seems to reflect part of the way officers perceive the immigrants' role in Athens. These three parameters are directly or indirectly referred by officers here as probably a "*necessity*" of the Greek state to exercise effectively its social control powers. This is reminding one, the important *role* officers have in the Greek economy and the political sphere. From the analysis however, the officers seem to answer four important questions. These questions are: *why* control is central, and *what kind* of *use*, should immigrants have in Greece? For whom this *use* is necessary, and how do officers define a *good use* of the immigrant population?

... because of my job experience I am occupied with Pakistani, Indians, Syrians, Albanians, Bulgarians and Russians etc. There is a division of projects according to the *race* of each worker. Pakistani, Indian, Syrian are very good for factory work, in addition Indians are very good I do not know why with green-houses and everything that has to do with the cultivation of land. The Albanians, give them stones to break, give them construction work, they are perfect. The Russians, Bulgarians etc are good for baby-sitting, for domestic work... (Organisation P)

The above perception of the use of immigration and of immigrants is further illustrated in another interview taken from an OAED junior officer responsible both for Green Cards and the employment of immigrant labour. The evaluation of immigration and of

immigrants while is limited to the use of immigrants by the private sector of the Greek economy, it is directing our attention towards how welfare officers perceive their “national” identity. The latter seems to be partly-identified with both the *economic* and *social insurance* contributions, immigrants through administrative control provide to the Greek society.

... to begin, the *information* I usually give to the *foreigner* when I give him the Green Card is: *work as much and as harder you can*, collect as many possible IKA-stamps, it is to your benefit, indirectly I contribute to the job placement (of foreigners) at the private sector. The foreigner looks for a job and is occupied with himself and his insurance (contributions)... (Organisation P)

For OAED officials control is central because it is seen as part of their “professional” identity (which will be analysed in the following sub-sections) but also because it seems to allow some sort of matching between labourers and the local labour markets. They perceive their “national role” as people who are responsible for combating unemployment and provide their “good” services to local employers. In most cases, OAED officials took pride when they were asked to explain the above, arguing that: “we are here to protect the local market from unemployment, due to immigrants, and to serve the *public* by sending immigrants to the available jobs” (Organisation A). For the same officers, a “good use” of immigrants in most cases implied an identification with the employers’ needs, and with their supply of the “appropriate” or the most “suitable” workers. In addition, the private sector seemed to be perceived by officials, as the driving force for the development of Greece.

It is interesting to note that the spontaneous promptings of both IKA and OAED officers correspond with the organisational culture and the division of labour their organisations seem to establish, and that the construction or discovery of a sense of “national” identity is reflected above in the form of an *administrative consent*. Through the comparison between IKA and OAED officers, one comes to recognise the importance “professional” and personal aspects of identity play in the formation of officials’ perceptions about immigration and immigrants. The officials come to explain their sense of national identity in terms of administrative state regulations, and the *process* or *path* of discovery and measurement of the implementation of these, is analogous to the *results* the implementation of policies has. The notion of *use* here, reminds one that the aim from controlling immigrants is not as one may have assumed, that is integrate or even assimilate immigrants into the Greek society. Instead, the officials’ concern is to satisfy the current public and market needs. These, in turn vary according to the officers’ professional/personal priorities and how they see or identify with their administrative duties and the Greek society. In contrast to what it is usually assumed, these “duties” are not fixed or transmitted from above in a mechanistic way. In most interviews officials present their perception of immigration and of immigrants as a result of optimising relations between the public and private sectors of the economy. Officials are keen to remind everyone that they are a “special group” of people that care and respond to the interests of the public and of the different sectors of the economy. But the interesting issue is that this “care” and “response”, for IKA officials is centred around issues of

*insurance*, the use of resources rather than taxation or other monetary concerns. This maybe a reminder that officers in contrast to OAED and administrative officials in Great Britain and Germany, construct a sense of identity based on *corporatist* as well as *liberal* notions of welfare management (Lash and Urry 1994: 176-181; Jordan, 1987). Instead, OAED officials see immigration and immigrants as part of the further development of Greece's labour market. Their sense of identity is linked to the labour use of private employers, and their role seems to be linked with a sense of responsiveness towards the national-private interests. This understanding is further analysed below, through the presentation of officials' views on the significance and meanings the Greek society and the local environment have for their sense of "*national*" identity, and the for ways they perceive immigration and immigrants.

#### **4.5.1.1 The Greek society and adaptability**

Officers in welfare organisations are daily exposed to a number of value-added cultural symbols one of which is *Greekness*, the *European Union*, *technological-economic systems* of development, as well as systems of *consumerism* and of *individual* success. Probably there are more cultural issues which employees at IKA or OAED are being influenced by and come into confrontation with immigrants, and thus derive their own views about their national identity and the identity of others. Welfare officers however, responsible for immigration control, despite the cultural issue they are mostly influenced by, they usually (according to interviews) follow two important value-added symbols that, as it is shown, often direct them towards a discriminatory practice. These are: the importance they attach on their ability to *identify* and *supply* the *Greek labour market* with the *necessary* labourers, and the *cultural values* they follow in relation to the *supply* and *consumption of welfare services*.

If one pays a closer attention to interviews, would easily notice that "*clients*" are being discriminated on the basis of their *adaptiveness* to the Greek labour market and in particular of their ability to follow the *new regulations* for receiving welfare benefits.

An officer explains these two above points, when asked: "*what does this manpower organisation do for "clients" who are immigrants in Greece?*"

... We co-operate with the following organisations: the police, *we* refer to places for the reforming of individuals, prisons etc. in Greece and outside Greece... and after we talk of the borders and the services that exist there... to continue we, as a service, we see (check upon) whether *they* (foreigners) work or they are not working, if they *contribute* to Greece or not, if they are *documented*, that is whether or not their stay (in Greece) has certain benefits for Greece. We try to ensure the best for them, as far as we can, without of course to *injure* our (i.e. national) interests. So for this reason another way to check upon foreigners is through checking with the social security organisations... we are talking about IKA and OGA (social insurance organisation for farmers). If a *foreigner* is working we check with his social insurance office, which

validates that he/she is working and *contributes...*  
(Organisation M)

The issue of *adaptability* to global-local interests is the issue for another welfare officer from OAED organisation. According to his views the issue at stake is the *synchronisation* of the Greek society with new demands, but more than everything, the adaptability of the individual, the organisation, and of the Greek society to the new demands.

... to begin, why should the Greek society differ from the English society... society is not *static* but is something that *reformulates* itself bit by bit and different necessities *formulate* a new (i.e. society), new things that relate to the *person privately*, the general organisation of the *public sector* or of the whole *society*. Whenever we refer to the *Greek society* we see change of things. This is the *Greek society...* (Organisation E)

The issue of *adaptability* represents the argument against immigrants' relation with the Greek society. The officer below describes immigrants as both *short-sighted* in terms of cultural influences, and also as *culturally homogeneous*. The immigrants' fixed *dressings* and *religious* beliefs signify, an *autonomous, unregulated* style of living. But whilst this may not pose a direct threat, what is more threatening is the independent presence of immigrants in the Greek society, and the *uncertainty* this may generate amongst Greek people about the boundaries between cultures. From the interview below being distinctive today is more important than sharing or accommodating *different* beliefs. This *distinctiveness*, however, as the officer implies, is retained by the immigrants and is referred here as "*short-sightedness*". This probably happens because it unsettles the existing cultural hierarchies and certainties of *who should accommodate what*. On the other hand, it could also mean that immigrants are "*short-sighted*" because, they preserve their cultural distinctiveness, which is based on *third-world* life styles and religious dogmatism. Immigrants are viewed as not free-subjects from *local/home* objects and images.

... The "*Alien*" coming into Greece of course influences our civilisation and brings his own culture. Let me say something: it is a bit *short-sighted*. They cannot live so easily with our mentality, in our own culture... logically it influences first our culture and he is influenced by *us*. You do see the *alien*, the Indian, let's say, to come (at the office) with the *turban* on his head, to live here for ten years and not to have taken it off from his head. Of course this has got to do with *religious beliefs*, but this is culture... (Organisation K)

#### 4.5.1.2 Mobility-adaptability and the sense of identity

“National” identity and the officers’ perceptions about immigrants seem to be interrelated, but what is important to note here, is that this interlinkage relates the officers’ ability to synchronically change together with the changes taking place at a societal level. But this *synchronic change* is a *process*, and is not something that could arrive instantly. Officers find *change* as an important aspect of their relation with “others”, but this relation is complex and often necessitates *time* and *space* in order to take place. More specifically, it seems that officers identify with their country according to a kind of *cultural capital* and the manpower *adaptability* of both themselves and of immigrants to the new labour market criteria. For most interviewees, discovering one’s country membership goes through a *process*: of discovering what is *new*, and how to regulate or control the flow of new demands to the right people; how to *internalise* a culture of continuous adaptability; and *how to control* those that may *not* share the same values.

... Can I bring you an example from the immigrants? When the borders opened and the immigration flow started, an immigration flow to Greece began... (at the same time) a *new* demand was created for the control of immigrants. The Greek society was forced to create a *new* system of control for the control of immigrants. This was a *change of our* society. We were *forced*, to begin to *co-operate* with the immigrants, to *accept them*, and from the side of the government, to control immigrants... If we separate the government from society (what is left) is the citizen, it what I have said *we were* (civilians) forced to accept them, to hire them in *our* jobs, to *co-exist* together with the immigrants, with whatever this means (coexistence). I imply *racism, persecution*,... it is too early to accept *them* as *they* may want to be accepted by us. There has only been two-or-three years of control of the immigrants... It is too early to accept them. I mean not to *insult* them, I mean not to *send them away*, I mean not to *ridicule them*, and not to say, for example, here “*look this is an Albanian*”... Here even the Greeks, due to Greek mentality, *we* haven’t accepted one another. How far could (we accept) a foreigner... (Organisation M)

The issue of *mobility* and *adaptability* seems to be at the core of an identity-discussion involving officers and immigrants. The issue of purified identities and of nationalism may still be there, but a racist discourse today seems to be more associated with a view on *cultural capital*. The basic argument for officers is that immigration control is necessary because it provides “*us*” (i.e. the Greek society) with a *safety net* against those that are not sharing *European* and “*developmental*” values. The *essential* difference between those that do share those values from those that do not, is guided according to how far one accommodates individual, market and consumer values. But how could welfare officers recognise that these values are most important in relation to other values? To answer this question, the research has further concentrated on the

differences immigrants have (i.e. according to officers), and what these mean for the welfare officers in charge of the implementation of immigration control. In most cases, welfare officers asserted their role not by contrasting their identity to the identities of “*uncivilised*” and *barbaric herds*” of immigrants. Rather they asserted their role(s) through a process of contrasting their life-plans and images with the identity Greek people used to be associated with in the past. What most officers expressed, was a desire to leave the past behind, to *de-traditionalise* themselves, and to distance from both the “*foreign pariahs*” and the Greek “*backwardness*”.

... these people (i.e. immigrants) are so much culturally behind... the way they think,... the way they dress... everything is backward... So it reminds me when I was reading History (i.e. at school)... and remembered how it was to live in a *Sarai* (Turkish word meaning the house of the commander in charge of a region, in Greek it implies a poverty-stricken home with a large family)... how they lived in Turkey, feudalism... that people would sleep on the floor on carpet-rags, fried onions in order to eat... so, we look every day in neighbourhoods over here especially if you come on the outside... and pass by their homes (i.e. where immigrants live), you will understand what a low civilisation means... (Organisation O)

Another IKA officer sees immigrants in the following manner:

... You do see a society (i.e. Greek society) that moves forward... it has technology... its civilisation permits a kind of technology... You see people around you to *move on* with life... and the dad (i.e. the father of second generation immigrants) as soon as his kid becomes eighteen years old, instead of sending his son to the University, instead of advising his kid to fight, to study... he send it to the farms to work... (Organisation O)

For a young employee at an OAED office, mobility/immobility and the issue of “*backwardness*” asserts her role as a controller of immigrants in Greece through a process of contrasting her life with that of her family. As she explained, immigrants are people who identify a lot on issues of *family*, *housewiving*, and eating habits, with *elders* in Greece, something that “*makes one wonder*”.

... In the family. Immigrants live according to this way (i.e. traditions) my grandmother likes this way and she does the same (i.e. with Albanian immigrants). For example, she eats the same type of food that immigrants made (i.e. in the rented accommodation the grandmother provides)... (my raw models) are some figures from history that shape the *present* and the *future* that we live *now*... to tell the truth from a personal view I have *no raw models*. I did not like to say that: “this will be my *raw*

*model*” ... nothing has *pushed me* to say that I have this raw model. (except) an *economic raw-model*. I would suggest a foreign country, for example, *Switzerland*. The living standards, culturally is the highest country for me. Both economically and politically... (in relation to work) my raw-models are the private enterprises, I am talking about large corporations of global fame, examples are “*Stillers and Dinners*” ... they operate perfectly... perfect organisation, departmental division, high-low ranking (hierarchy)... (Organisation N)

The brief analysis above has shown that, there is a *discriminatory* process according to which officers at IKA and OAED organisations *categorise* and *allocate* immigrants to the Greek labour markets and various welfare services. These processes have mostly to do with issues like: the *state’s control* of immigrants, the role *local communities* will play in the transformation of the Greek society, and a kind of *cultural capital* that measures officers’ and immigrants’ *adaptability* to the market and cultural changes the Greek society undergoes.

Officers’ perceptions of immigrant groups seem to be strongly influenced by both their structural socio-economic position in the current transformation of the Greek society, and by the migrants’ *perceived* relationship to this transformation. The structural economic situation and citizenship status of immigrants in relation to the ongoing transformation, seems to be a *strong* motivant according to which immigrants are being categorised by officers. This in turn is influenced by officers’ perceptions of Greece as an immigration country, the presence of immigrants in the local community and the access of immigrants to civil and economic rights. In turn, these three issues seem to be related together, through officers’ roles in the process of transforming Greece, and through the deployment of cultural criteria. The latter “*measure*” immigrants’ relationship and *suitability* to the current demands of the economy and of the Greek society. This leads us to the next issue, that of the local environment and how officials perceive the immigrant population.

#### **4.5.1.3 The significance of the local environment**

Apart from the issues relating to work and the racialized division of labour, immigration into the country has also benefits for the local communities. Officers at local IKA or OAED departments argued that immigration has contributed towards the financial development of local authorities. Both junior and high-ranking officers shared a common perspective about how immigrants have provided local authorities and small communities with the opportunities to develop a number of services for the accommodation of immigrants.

... the *foreigners* came to Greece. They had to stay somewhere... we gave our homes for rented accommodation, population wise the number of people that live at a region has also increased, the number of people that stay in a local district contribute economically into the development of the locality, the (development) of

the (local) *people*, they (immigrants) pay their bills to the local authority, for example their water bills... (Organisation M)

Paradoxically, immigration and the flow of immigrants into Greece, for a number of officers who work and live in small districts, is seen as something that has positive economic effects for the development of the local community. *Difference* and the presence of the “*other*” is viewed as something that sells and allows local people to thrive from their involvement with services that in the past (i.e. before immigration) would have been almost impossible. What the above interview presents is a kind of *strategic management* of immigration and immigrants, where the officers’ sense of identity goes through a process of discovering a “*precise fit between goods and services*” (du Gay 1996:122). The officer is there to secure this *precise fit* between immigrants’ *use* and services to the local community. His/her role is almost perceived as that of a mediator between the state and local community levels of economic activity.

For another officer immigration and immigrants are perceived as follows:

... If we think now that an *Alien* wants to be insured with OGA (i.e. farmers’ insurance organisation) has to go to the appropriate local authority that his employer belongs and he is insured. this is a contribution (i.e. of the local institutions to immigration policies). Second, the local police stations, if they don’t exist I don’t think that a central organisation would have provided us with the information a local (organisation provides us). The local governments assist to the direct control of *aliens*... Whenever there is a division of tasks you can easier *control* your job and the man with which you co-operate (i.e. the immigrant)... (Organisation K)

From the above interview, the *micro-environment* of the local community seems to be an essential component of what officers identify as an immigration policy. For the latter to become successful for the local people and for society, the local authorities have to be actively involved in a kind of strategic management of *alien people*. Information should flow between local and central government departments, and the official has the duty to ensure and encourage such a flow.

The *commodification* of immigration is an aspect that has emerged into different interviews, but in the case of local or community level has an additional meaning. Immigration is not only seen as an aspect that extends or contributes to the development of the local market place, but also as an aspect of re-asserting or prolonging the material and authority base of local authorities, and thus of small communities. The emphasis of the above interview is on the *local* dimension, where *otherness* in the form of immigration is sought in this case for its exchange value, and also because it contributes to the revitalisation of the local community, through the revitalisation of the local government.

But, whereas at the outset this “*commodification*” of *immigration* is more or less obvious, what seems to be “*paradoxical*” is the use of the term or notion of *local people*. For the officers who have used the notion of *people* to explain their perspectives on

immigration and immigrants, probably represents a cultural-political force. This force, according to officers, should have the ability to implement immigration policies. But how state officers come to recognise or visualise local people as a legitimate political force for the implementation of immigration policies? There is an explanation that is both anthropological and sociological at the same time. The officers who have referred to the *local people* work in small departments inside regions of rather “homogeneous” and *traditional* peasant communities. They themselves when asked, identified with the so-called *Arvanites* community of Albanian origin, and they see an *opposition* between central-”national” or state interests and their community interests. When they referred to the *people* they seemed not only to refer to the people who identify as *Arvanites*, but also they implied that *power* should be directed to those who according to Greek history and politics have suffered various forms of ethnic, linguistic, or other forms of *marginalisation*. The reference to *local people* probably implies that: officers identify with a general group which according to them has suffered exclusion from political decision making.

To clarify this point further, what officers probably implied is that apart from any antagonisms that may exist between local-*Arvanites* communities and the Greek state, the transformative powers of the Greek society should be based on the actual *place* where they take effect. The *local place* becomes a home ground where transformation process, through its conflicts of interest (i.e. between state/community or *locals/foreigners*) is tested and is responsible for the construction of subjects transformative identities.

#### **4.5.1.4 Immigrants and the new “moral threat”**

It would be difficult at this stage of the research to provide coherent answers, but it seems that despite the economic value of immigration for local communities, officers see the presence of immigrants as a legitimation of some form of plurality and of cultural diversity. Such a plurality or cultural diversity seems to be “threatening” not because it does not assert traditional or old roles only, but rather because it is challenging a new morality. This “*new morality*”, is culturally defined as an attempt to assert Greece and the local community’s role in the global-local transformation of the economy, and of the society as a whole. For quite a number of political representatives in Greece, immigration is seen as an economic adventure that has benefits and dangers. One such danger is the “*dillusion*” of the “*nation’s cultural value*” system (Triantafyllidou, 1999). Especially at a community or micro-environment level, the immigrants are usually perceived as “*newcomers*” that threatened the moral order of the locals because any contracts between the locals and the immigrants would seem to impair the social status of the “*older residents*”. In a social order, as Elias and Scotson (1994) have implied in their study on community relations, that is centred around competition of economic and political resources and mobility of status, any close conduct with a new group of people leads to conflicts. In the case the analysis is examining, the “*moral threat*” is defined as the threat to new morality: that is the active involvement for the improvement of socio-economic circumstances.

The *new morality* is based on *ambitions*, the advancement of the *individual* (i.e. this will also be reflected in the analysis of professional and personal

identity) and what Mill on *Representative Government* once stated: “the human will that struggles with natural powers and tendencies, not that which gives way to them” (Letwin 1998:332). For welfare officers, this disillusion would probably take place if Greece continues to accept and legitimise migrants who cannot contribute, due to their work and life-styles, to the restructuring of Greece. Thus one could suggest that for welfare officers the “*moral threat*” of immigration and of immigrants comes not because they *legitimise* plurality and cultural diversity as such, but because they *de-legitimise* new economic and social values. Thus one could possibly argue that central to the issue of national identity and officer’s perception of immigration and immigrants in Greece, is that of a specific type of culture that identifies and directs people not only to the “*right*” jobs but also to “*right*” *welfare services* and “*social rights*”. These according to officers, should contribute to what Greek people usually refer when they speak of *eksinchronismos* (i.e. re-modernisation). Alongside the remains of an “*old*” *cultural ethnism* according to which officers were prejudiced against immigrants or foreigners as they usually referred to them, a new type of *cultural belief* distinguished the two groups of people. This may have to do with a kind of *cultural capital* that seems to be depending as an array of things like: *dressing codes, habits, mobility plans* etc. These in turn, have a significant dimension for officers because they determine whether or not immigrants contribute to the advancement of Greece, and whether or not they are capable of *adapting* to *eksinchronismos* or they (i.e. immigrants) bring a culture that is characterised as *traditional, collective* and *labour oriented*.

... (they are not all realists) that is because they do not care what the Greek society is doing that are part of it, or in relation to the *processes* we tell them to follow... You see them being here for years and they haven’t even changed their style of dressing even if they see most Greeks around them, and they live differently... (Organisation K)

What the above interview explains is that immigrants are perceived as a category of people that are not active, ambitious in the Greek society, and they are not taking part in the current transformation nor they follow the administrative regulations. They are “*not realists*” not because probably they do not see things as they are, but because they do not show any zeal to change. To be *active* and *pro-change* is certainly seen by the officer above as something that defines today’s morality, and the membership of an individual into society. Anyone who wants to be considered as a real “*citizen*” or part of a society according to the interview above has to strive for perpetual advancement of his material and spiritual abilities. This advancement goes through a change of life styles and a “*vigorous*” thinking that seeks to *ascertain truths* rather than being captive of ethnic-traditionality and religious fundamentalism. Appearances, the exhibit of traditional dressing, codes, and the *bending* of immigrants to their community affiliations, probably signify a *threat* to an administrative order.

A junior officer from O.A.E.D gives her impression of immigrants in the Greek society as follows:

... their aim is to return back home rich to their own country, because if they had another objective they would

have come to Greece and study at the University.. they would have contributed in another sector (of economic activity), let's say they would have finished their degree and they would contribute at the appropriate sector (of the economy)... (Organisation M)

For the above interviewee, immigrants are a group of people that heavily invest on their day to day survival and material gains. Living like a “*hermit*” or constructing life around daily survival is an indication that there are no further ambitions for the advancement of *oneself* and the country that has hosted this person. The officer above perceives immigrants as almost “*piratic herds*” that come to Greece, improve their financial position, and return to their country to invest there all they have accumulated in Greece. This finding comes very close to a recent research by Triantafyllidou (2000) on the political discourse of immigration, where: immigrants are also implicitly accused for refusing to intergrate because their main objective is to save money and return to their home countries” (Triantafyllidou, 2000:9). The implications from immigration and the presence of immigrants in Greece are further discussed below, when an officer from the IKA organisation is explaining what the “*new moral threat*” is all about.

... the negative issue is that of *foreigners* (in Greece) and of their behaviour (in terms of culture), because *we* (i.e. the Greeks) are *people* that easily *we* accommodate, easily *we* accept (cultural) influences... (Organisation P)

For the above interviewee immigrant labour is seen as a group of people that intrude into the Greek culture, and the possible “*danger*” from this is the dillusion of Greek people’s cultural homogeneity. Another employee adds to the above issue that:

... I believe that they do not accept so much the Greek culture (Greekness). They simply have to co-exist with (us) and all these cultural values that exist here... (Organisation P)

In the two interviews above, what is clear is that both officers clearly see as a moral “*threat*” the possible dillusion by immigrants of the Greek culture. Both present Greece as a rather homogeneous, non-multicultural society, and immigrants are being perceived as almost “*foreign elements*”, that either would have to become assimilated or if not, they will pose a “*danger*”. This understanding of “*moral threat*” explains a kind of *ethnism*, where the issue of cultural purity, racial or ethnic homogeneity, directs one’s thoughts about immigrants. But the question which both interviews pose is not on this ethnism only, but also on how immigrants may “*dillute*” or culturally influence Greek culture.

According to another officer from the IKA organisation immigrants, especially economic immigrants, are thought to be (i.e. because of their *status*) people who may economically and culturally *destabilize* the *order* and *hierarchy* of the Greek society.

... They are people who are poor, they come here don’t pay their insurance, steal and get involved with criminal

activities... We are not a multicultural society, the Americans want *us* to become like them... (Organisation P)

Immigrants are clearly perceived as a *threat* due to: their socio-economic status and their everyday behaviour. Poverty and criminal activities are seen as two aspects that utterly describe the position immigrants are, and as by an intuitive insight, they explain the nature of immigrants. Both are presented above as almost a causal necessity of unregulated immigration or of a flow of economic immigrants into the country, considered to be less advanced or less prepared to respect the Greek customs. The type of moral influences officers recognise as potential threats to the Greek society have to do with *disorder* or more precise with the *order of people in want* and in “*moral decay*”. This is probably a reminder of the administrators’ role that in a changing society, issues of internal control and state legislature, become even more pertinent with one’s national sense of identity. For administrators, the moral threat is mostly an *administrative threat*, which in turn is defined not only by Greek customs, but also by a kind of cultural categorisation of people according to how they behave in relation to officers and procedures. If this reflects part of what the officers above have implied, then it follows that immigrants are seen as a possible “*threat*” because they may either expand their wants and/or their unregulated behaviour. The “*moral panic*” for a Greek administrator is to have to face, on a daily basis, *demanding clients*, or a type of clients that demand without even being full members of society and without going through the bureaucratic procedures. The worst scenario for an IKA official is to have to confront “*clients*” that claim benefits without “*respecting*” both the formal rules and the informal codes and practices officials “have fought so hard to establish”. “Angry crowds” of clients are often perceived as the worst possible “*nightmare*” for officers, who have been used to bureaucratic, traditional inertia, off the record procedures, and who have been promised by the government a flexible and less welfare demanding place of work.

To manage “angry clients”, both IKA and OAED organisations have responded with the introduction of more clauses, regulations that guide the contact of officers, a method and a system on how to guide and inform clients for their welfare benefits. Already the government has introduced a major policy on administrative contact between officers and clients (i.e. see the discussion in the first section), and many more according to ADEDY (i.e. administrative association) are underway. For officers, therefore, the worst possible scenario is that of the reinstatement of bureaucratic controls, that limit what earlier the analysis identified as traditional and flexible management of office work. When everything seems to be leading towards the personalisation of bureaucracy, the upward mobility of civil servants and the continuation with informal practices, civil servants are afraid that the uncontrolled flow of immigrants into the country is going to upset and destabilise their own roles and social conditions in the Greek society. According to an OAED officer this fear is explained as follows:

... (because of much work and increasing regulations) we look like Albanians... our status is slowly reduced. The only difference we have with them is that we vote in elections... (Organisation M)

For officials, therefore, it seems that what they are also afraid is that the wave of immigrants will be accompanied by a number of regulations, that will limit further their “*spontaneity of conscience*”, their cultural understanding of their work, and their ability to participate and benefit from a flexible management of administrative office. If by a flexible management one understands more *personal freedoms* from state control, and a kind of entrepreneurial management of services as well as the sharing of financial benefits with the private sector, then the coming of destitute, poor clients is translated (i.e. by officials) not only as an administrative burden, but also as an economic burden. In other words, if administrative consent so far was based on a kind of corporatist/party-favouritism system, where *officials* were “*asked*” to “*sacrifice*” their *will* and *consciousness* and become active supporters of political-state regimes in return for job-security and informal practices, now this seems to change. What the government asks from civil servants is to “*sacrifice*” in a sense, their pay or job securities for a more *entrepreneurial* kind of administrative management and in return for *higher status* and *financial benefits*. This latter promise is increasingly put under question and into a test every time officials become overloaded with more work because of immigrants and because new regulations are being introduced. This is constraining the officials’ role within the limits of the old system of administrative practice. Unending queues of poor immigrants that cannot communicate in the informal language Greek administrators have used so far, and who cannot be easily *used* by the real *clients* of administrators (i.e. local authorities, corporations, etc) are certainly a “*threat*”.

A similar understanding about national identity and immigrants, derives from a doctor of the IKA organisation, who is himself an immigrant. He argues that:

... Unfortunately (immigrants) have no respect for Greece. When I first came to Greece from Jordan I was behaving politely to the Greek people and the Greek-state. They do not behave polite, here. If they do not like (Greece) then they should return back to their own home country. The best country for one to live is over here. I am thirty years here. They should respect the “*bread*” they earn...  
(Organisation P)

For most interviewees immigrants are seen as people that mostly come from countries of “*lower*” civilisation and they contribute negatively to the cultural development of Greece. The interviewer above has argued that only Northern-African and Middle-eastern immigrants have something positive to contribute to Greece, whilst other Greek officers have argued that Polish and European immigrants contribute positively to Greece’s cultural development. Insofar, however, as the majority of immigrants from Eastern-Europe and the Balkan states is concerned, employees persistently argued that:

... They (i.e. immigrants) have no contribution towards Greece’s cultural development... they may come to this country, but what they bring from their own home country is *not good*, that could contribute to ourselves...  
(Organisation M)

Like the interviews presented in the previous sections, so too in relation to national identity, most officers identify immigrants with a *low culture* but this is not the only point of their racist discourse. In addition they identify certain ethnic groups: as immigrants who contribute either negatively or positively towards Greece's cultural development. There is an ethnic categorisation of immigrants. On what, though, does this categorisation depend?

For sometime now political analysts in the country have seen the racial categorisation of immigrants by the media and various other organisations, as a product of racial hierarchy that follows a *nationalist* and an *economic* ideology of discrimination (Papademetriou 2000). The first refers to a mythical understanding of the racial/cultural purity and superiority of the Greek people, often believed to be inherited from the Ancient Greek civilisation, whilst the second refers to a *taxonomy of cultures* according to the levels of technological - industrial development each country has achieved.

The evidence coming from the analysis of interviews, does not suggest that a racial hierarchy of immigrants by welfare officers is not a product of both a nationalist and a modernist ideology (Psimmenos 1999). But this is not the point, rather the issue is why immigrants are being discriminated despite the levels of technological advancement their home countries have? Furthermore, the issue is not the discriminatory discourse *per se* but instead, the *paths* this discourse follows, in order to be constructed into a value, and categorise immigrants opposite to what a "modernist-technological" thesis on racism is suggesting. For example, most interviewees have argued that people coming from the Far-East or Middle-East is not the problem but, rather the opposite. They find immigrants from the Maghreb or the mid-East as *quite welcoming* in Greece, and at sometimes officers express their "likeness" towards ethnic groups of immigrants from regions with "*low*" levels of economic and technological development. If therefore the level of development of different countries is not the only variable, according to which officers construct their *taxonomies* and *discriminate* against immigrants, then what is? An answer to this question will probably provide the present analysis with valuable issues in relation to the *paths* officers follow to construct their views about the immigrant population and about their own national identity.

It would be rather difficult, if not scientifically premature, to suggest here that a complete answer exists. What the interviews show is that: *first*, officers discriminate against immigrants, *second*, this discrimination varies according to the ethnic background of immigrant labourers, and *third*, that this *ethnic taxonomy* is also culturally based. But for officers this culturally based taxonomy is not necessarily dependent only upon myths and ideas about Greek ethnic superiority in relation to civilisation and technological advances. What appears from the interviews is that the maxims of officials' ethnic discrimination and prejudices are being related: first, to a kind of xenophobia and anti-multicultural feelings; second, to a racist supremacist discourse; and third to a division that is related to the roles administrators have. Immigrants are thought to be an additional bureaucratic burden, that will negatively influence the *status* and *personal interests* of officers. Clients are usually being categorised into different types of people to be served, and according to the officers' organisational culture and a national sense of identity, immigrants are being discriminated on the basis that they are more *demanding* and less *passive* towards regulations. A further analysis of the issue will also be pursued in the section concerning the professional and the personal sense of

identity of officials.

#### 4.5.2 “Professional”/work identity and the definition of immigrants-clients

In the analysis above, the centre of attention has been that of “*national*” identity processes and their role in the interaction between officers of IKA or OAED and immigrants.

The academic concern here, is relating to matters of work and in particular to aspects of “professional identity” and how the latter influence officers’ perceptions about immigrants. Such an academic concern has wider implications for Greece, because it is being related to the restructuring and the role social work or welfare offices play in the Greek economy (Kassimati, 2001). For Kassimati (2001) in her recent work *Domes kai Roes* (i.e. Structures and Flows), the extension of welfare services and of local government, “*procedure*” an array of new *professions* that are being related to administrative bureaucracy (Kassimati, 2001:122). Similarly to the previous sub-section, here too the analysis will focus on the processes or paths of identity formation. In addition, the interaction between officers and immigrants as before it does not follow a fixed or stable route. Instead it is the product of *negotiations* and *value judgements* amongst officers, of how they view their work, insofar as the *categorisation* and *allocation* of immigrants and welfare resources are concerned. In turn this depends much on the employee personal involvement in the control of immigrants. This *personal involvement*, as it was shown earlier, is an essential part of a flexible organisation, where employees, in order to respond to an economic and political transformation, they must be “*absorbed*” into the rules of a market economy. Individual responsibility and a sense of “*freedom*” and “*autonomy*” from central or bureaucratic regulations are thought by the Greek government to be an answer to Greece’s flexibilisation or *eksynchronismos* programme (Verelis et al, 2000). The “*manufacturing*”, therefore, of an identity of work is clearly a priority for the government’s plans for the restructuring of public services in Greece. But, as it was also seen during the analysis of organisational culture and of the tasks employees follow, this *identity* of work it is not “*manufactured*” from above only, but also from below.

In the previous sections it was indicated that, what so often has been referred to as the *flexibility of administrative practices*, it is also a continuation of party-informal practices, as well as a sense of “*unity*” or “*purpose*” of low-rank officers at work. The immigrants, through their presence, provide officers at IKA or OAED organisations, a sense of what Burawoy (1982) refers to as: “*prestige*”, sense of “*accomplishment*” and of “*pride*”, for exercising control in the Greek society (Burawoy, 1982:89-90). In the previous section, this “*consent*” at work was clearly produced through the combination of traditional bureaucratic and more market oriented criteria of work. In addition, the work of officers, at both IKA and OAED, was constructed around the understanding that officers had to confront, apart from central office management, a new “*threat*”, that of the “*foreign clients*”.

The presence of this “*new threat*” in the previous sub-section was related by officers to their state and community identities, as well as to their understanding that controlling immigrants is central to the economic and political development of Greece.

The deployment of a kind of *cultural capital* according to which officers categorise and measure immigrants' adaptability to Greece's transformation, was clearly shown to relate to the ontological priorities officers give to the economic *use* and *distribution* of immigrant labour and of welfare resources in Greece. For them, this new "threat" is not generally described as the "*foreigner*" but rather as the "*foreigner*" who carries a kind of behaviour that questions existing power relationships and "threatens" the cultural and work values of transformative practices. More specific, as a *threat* for administration control and for the status of officers.

In order, however, to understand and explain the role(s) played by "professional"/work identities in the interaction between officials and immigrants, the analysis will focus upon the processes or paths "responsible" for the construction of these identities. These *processes* or paths of discovery have been indirectly identified here as: first, the process of "*autonomy*" from guidelines and legal rules often identified here as *experience*, and second, the upholding of a definition of the immigrant "*client*", based on work/ethical standards.

#### **4.5.2.1. "Autonomy" from guidelines and legal rules**

One overwhelming issue, that derived from observing and interviewing officials at IKA and OAED organisations, was that: their work is constituting a synthesis of "*objective*" and "*subjective*" elements, and that aspects of professional/work identity cannot be examined as if these two were independent or separate from one another.

The construction of an *organisational culture* and of officials' identity is certainly based upon the way organisations and officials' work are structured. But it is also based upon the everyday interaction between officers and immigrants and the "*subjective*" experiences that officials derive from such an interaction. Part of these "*objective*" elements, apart from the division of labour and the allocation of officers, is also the policy-framework officers at IKA and OAED organisations are implementing. This *framework* is made up from the legal and general policy guidelines, officers usually follow in order to do their job. But this *framework* is not as many would assume: a *given, fixed and free* of subjective interpretations. In most of the cases examined, it needs to be "*translated*" from a *legalistic* and *codified* language, to an actual officer-friendly method and system of daily control. For *officers* at IKA and OAED this "translation" entails apart from a legal/organisational understanding, a *social* understanding of *how* best to implement certain policies or categorise people. According to most officers in charge of immigrants' control, what is implemented is *not* the legal framework, but rather the *translation* of it, which in turn it is transformed into applied practices.

To understand *who deserves what* or *how much*, front-line officers together with high-ranking officers, emphasise the need for some sort of *autonomy* from outside interferences or scrutiny. This need for *autonomy* is explained here by officials as something that is: generated through the difficulty they face in understanding legal documents, matching general guidelines to individual-client conditions, and formulating an organisational/"professional" understanding for the implementation of immigration policies.

The use of "*experience*" or of a body of knowledge, is not only valuable because it allows officials to operate on a daily basis at their work and to understand *how* and *what* amounts of services are going to be allocated, but it is useful because it

indicates a sense of identity amongst officials in the practice of immigration control. How officers “*stand*” in relation to immigrant *clients*, provides them with a sense of *belonginess, accomplishment, pride or prestige* as well as with a *tool of translating guidelines to actual practices*. Experience here plays the role of a “*skill*” and of *codified language*, according to which officers avoid or try to avoid scrutiny, from state or outside interferences, and construct an understanding of how they relate their office work. The claim of the necessity of experience for the implementation of immigration policies, provides officials with a major way through which their “professional” and personal self becomes involved and tries to benefit from the control of immigrants.

#### 4.5.2.2 The use of experience

According to interview accounts, officials explain the necessity of such “*experience*” differently, but in most cases the recurrent theme is that: *the legal framework and the general policy guidelines are not “enough” for deciding on welfare services, and for the provision of work/residence permits to immigrants*. In addition, *experience* is used by officers as a tool that manifests their ability to “*guard*” state and the private sector’s interests. This becomes quite essential especially for officials who see their status and job threatened from lean management and the private-service operators. An OAED officer from the Athens regional office has suggested that:

... We do not have one guideline... We do not have specific... *We do have a line*, but it is *not straight*. It depends on the case (i.e. of the *client*)... *We could go (to different directions)...* *we do curves*, we have the freedom... experience is important always... It is because you have to do with quite a lot people, with different understandings... experience counts, because you do have to enter into his psychology, in order to get hold of his *secret button*, so that you become able to regulate him... (Organisation A)

In the interview above what is made clear is, that officials follow in addition to some general guidelines, their own perceptions of what constitutes the “*proper*” translation of immigration control. The interview suggests that officers have: to “*bent*” guidelines, so as to fit their understanding to the individual client-case. The officer in charge of implementing immigration policies has argued that experience matters because, it is intrinsic to the objectives of officers-client relationship. Through the accumulation of experience the officer in charge, is able to “*see*” behind the surface of the immigrants claims, and unveil his/her “*true*” motivations and needs. Thus, what the officer above implies is that controllers of immigrants do not only exercise a collective control of work/residence permits but they also exercise what Tilly and Tilly (1998) have suggested in their study of *work under Capitalism*, an individual/atomised control over “the *dispensation and consumption* of a whole class of goods and services” (Tilly and Tilly 1998:29). These goods and services in the case of OAED, are work/residence permits and the allocation of immigrants to different sectors of the economy and to various jobs. To do exactly this, officers have to get into a position where the *client* is not able to withhold

any important information.

For a high-ranking officer of the IKA organisation, legal clauses and guidelines are all written documents that need to be *translated* by officers. However, because very few understand, as they claim, these written documents, individual employees usually resort to experience and their own codes for policy implementation.

... There are guidelines that begin with Presidential decrees, that we have talked about, and (in addition) the 341-342 decrees, that came afterwards, and some interpretive clauses. These are written documents. But I am not advising you to read them, because nobody can read them. You will understand (nothing)... (Organisation K)

In the case of a high-ranking officer of the OAED organisation, there are difficulties in understanding written documents and interpreting them “*correctly*” but “*in no case*” this constitutes a kind of *discriminatory informal policy* against immigrants.

... There are no discriminations. Against no one... there could be conflicts during work (between employees and immigrants), but there has never been a discrimination. Now if there has been a good looking (female) immigrant and an (official) has *used* her a bit more than the usual, that’s fine. She was good looking... (An officer) has to understand the *construct* called legislation of immigrants, to understand the whole *net* and to do it with simple procedures. Without having to occupy many people without having to tire employees, immigrants, and to promote a *correct picture* (image) outside the organisation. Not to tell you about *security*, in the last instance... We have asked them to have a hospital-certificate two years have gone. Now *they* give them a *Green card*. Who can tell me that he (the immigrant) has not infected with AIDS... has it got a meaning that this (i.e. Green card) “*toilette paper*” was given in time? These will be heard by your professors in the University, they are going to ask: *who is he*, is he really the?... (Organisation A)

In the interview above the officer reveals five main uses of “freedom” from bureaucratic-state control and from hierarchy. In all five the use of *experience* plays a central role for handling immigrants and the various services given to them. But more important than anything else, the officer connects his work and “professional” experience with a sense of identity that is responsive towards the current transformation. This is done by seeing officers-immigrant transactions as “exchanges” that necessitate personal commitment and status compensation. The first thing one is noticing is, that the officer is using a rather sexist-discriminatory way to explain how *discretion* maybe positive for individual officers and why such a gender discrimination should after all be considered as part of the

“good” things that may happen to one working at OAED. The experience of *sexual harassment* is seen as part of the work one is doing, and the word *use* has a meaning in an environment where compensation for one’s duty is understood as a *freedom* of movement and as a combination of personal and of organisational commitments.

The second issue that the officer claims, is that the implementation of immigration control is the outcome, the result, of various personal translations and transactions between officials and immigrants. For officers, immigration policies are considered to be *mental constructs* that come out of performed combinations of the existing legislature and personal understandings. Control is the outcome of *simple* operations the officer is using, permitting himself to intervene at all different levels of the implementation process. In addition, through the implementation of control the officer is expecting himself to perform work in a way similar to that of a professional where all parties involved (i.e. except the immigrants) engage in a *mutual trust*.

This leads to the third issue, which is reflecting a better understanding of how officers derive their sense of “professional” and work identity. This is through the process of a mutual negotiation of their services between the labour market and the organisation. Goods and services are allocated according to the ‘*responses*’ officials receive from employers or the public opinion, outside the organisation. The way this takes place will be further analysed in the following sub-sections, but what seems important here is that for officers immigration policies are the product of *negotiations* and are implemented through some sort of a feedback officials receive. The emphasis is not on the provision of services, but rather on the quality of those services according to the *recipients* of those. Furthermore, the use of the notion of “*correct image*” (i.e. fourth issue) shows officers’ concern with aspects of work and why officers through experience and accountability perform in the first place their work.

The central incentive for the official above is the ability to perform as desired but, this is also an incentive for the organisation. Personal involvement compensates the organisation through officers’ ability to promote or establish a correct/professional understanding of OAED employees’ work in the Greek society. This takes place through officers’ immediate built up of practices which are responsive and flexible towards society’s demands. How is this possible in a bureaucratic organisation? The official explains that a responsive and flexible organisation of administrative practices is not possible if officials at OAED are dependent on procedures and upon the performances of other organisations. *Time* and *place* do matter and independence to ask for the right papers, is essential for OAED’s work performance. This probably could be achieved if officers have greater freedoms and if the organisation acts independently from what other organisations do (i.e. fifth element). The use of *experience* becomes central here because the officer probably implies that in the daily transactions between officials, the state, and immigrants, the first are or should be responsible for setting the *limits* of quality and volume of goods and services, because officials have only a clear understanding of how best to *negotiate* immigration policies. The latter appears to be in the “*eyes of officials*”, an outcome of *responsiveness* to unanticipated problems, and as such only the official has or should have in a flexible society the right to refashion agreements, and the provision of services between producers and recipients.

The same officer argues that procedures or guidelines are under question for him. What matters most, apart from whether one is suspected of having AIDS, is the

aspect of immigrant penal status.

... The procedures and clauses for the legislation of immigrants could be different. These are under *review*. But not the *penal status* of immigrants... take it (the penal status) from the computer files find who has one and *collect him...* (Organisation A)

What the above interviews show is that gender and the status of immigrants are some of the social attributes that may influence officials' perceptions. Apart from the evident discrimination against immigrants what seems relevant here is the context in which these attributes are used. For the above officer, gender and the penal status of immigrants or even the health condition of the latter clearly indicate the need for a more *particularised*, atomised approach for regulating immigrants. He in a sense explains that generalised guidelines are appropriate, and instead there is a need for a more flexible and individualised policy framework. This probably points towards an understanding of the centrality of officials' "subjective" or experience oriented practice of their work. The officer is reminding the interviewer that: without officers' assessment of the individual immigrant's case, there cannot be a correct implementation of immigration policies. What the above officer probably do is to confirm the validity of *experience* and officers' ability to "*translate*" policy frameworks into actual practices.

But although this is clearly shown in the above interview, what is less clear is the way the interviewer develops his argument. Unlike others, the dichotomy between centrally guided rules and officers' experience is presented here in a *synthetic way*. For him, aspects of immigration policy are not just aspects of *implementation* but rather aspects of *decision making*. He perceives the legalisation of immigrants as a process that goes beyond the conventional application of *rules*. This is achieved through *synthesizing* together the different parameters that influence legalisation. This *synthetic approach* seems to be not only the characteristic of everyday practice amongst officials, but it seems also to be intrinsically more satisfying.

How do officials achieve this *synthetic approach* that allows them to decide about the immigrants' status in Greece?

For an officer at an OAED office in the outskirts of Athens, the officers are *implementing social policy*, but:

... The *social policy* that is *implemented* is *different* for every employee, because everyone perceives the concept of social policy differently, according to his way. There are employees that follow the letter of the law, and others that are *flexible* according to their *will* and *conscience...* The orders that come from the Ministry of Labour for different issues... most times are opposite (in conflict) with the beliefs of each employee. It depends from the educational level of each employee. Of course, no one can escape from what they order him to do... For example, a colleague was sending to skill-retraining seminars people, that had an English language Proficiency and a knowledge

of computers... I reacted to this... (Organisation K)

The same officer explains further that *will* and *consciousness*:

... it is not something which is against the law, or in excess of the law, but (it is something) that intervenes there, where the Law “*forgets*” its humanistic nature... (Organisation K)

According to another OAED officer, legislation on immigrants is perceived differently by different organisations and different employees of the same organisation.

... Welfare organisations act differently towards immigrants. This has got to do with the different procedures being followed for the legalisation of immigrants... When the immigrants receive their *certificate* for their residence permit, the local authorities tell them that they are legal and they can work. But at OAED offices, *we* have the order not to give them an employment card (if they are unemployed) but only if the permit cards are issued. This means that up to the moment their residence cards are issued immigrants cannot work *legally*, but only *informally*... (Organisation R)

This above interview refers to the different problems that exist already between organisations, officers and local authorities, because of the implementation of *Law 2910/2001*. According to this recent legalisation programme, immigrants can file an application for a residence permit with the local authorities, but it is yet undefined as to what extent immigrants would also be capable of enjoying equal labour rights to those of Greek workers. That is at least up to the date immigrants would receive their residence permit, which according to the Law this is unspecified. However the issue here is, that officials use their experience to implement not the law but rather its perceived relation to specific departments or organisations. It is upon the employees’ “*discretion*” or judgement of how and in what case the Law is applicable to individual immigrants. But as various interviewees have demonstrated, this “*discretion*” or *judgement* by officials, is usually the product of a *synthetic approach*, which in turn is based upon *objective* and *subjective* understanding of what should a social policy for immigrants be. This *synthetic approach* became more obvious when an official was asked to explain in detail: *how immigrants are directed* by OAED officials to the “*right jobs*”.

... The formal criteria according to which one, through the OAED, finds a job are filed with the computers. These are: *qualifications*, *previous work-experience*, and *age*. When one asks for a job, then all his characteristics are entered into the computer, and it is responsible for matching (the applicant) with various appropriate jobs in the whole of Attica region. This is *an incomplete* and *one-sided* system. After (using) the computer operations what

is needed by the employee is to *have a synthetic ability*, an ability to *combine* things, so that he becomes able to *put together* qualifications and age, and *appearance*, something (appearance) which computers cannot recognize... (Organisation A)

This is reminding what an IKA official said when asked about implementing welfare services towards immigrants:

... Welfare services are difficult to be defined. They are practiced on a daily basis by different employees (at IKA) through the everyday *interaction* and *communication* with *people*... (Organisation P)

One may argue that the implementation of immigration policies depends upon “*objective*” - legal policies, and upon “*subjective*” - mediations. The latter appears to be reflecting how officials see their jobs, the meanings they give to their work and professions, and how they identify with the job of the officer in charge for controlling immigrants. These, as we have indicated above depend partly on the way(s) officials *construct* the *autonomous* role of their “professions” in welfare services. In relation to immigrants, officials seem not to neglect objective-legal procedures but to override them in a way, through the establishment of decision-making approaches that rely heavily on their *mediations* about the welfare control of the immigrant population. These *mediations* in turn, depend also upon the definitions officials give to their work situations and their welfare clients. The analysis that follows concentrates on those definitions about immigrants and on the ways these definitions construct the upholding of work/ethical standards according to which officials implement immigration control policies.

#### **4.5.2.2 Defining the immigrant - “client”:IKA**

Having analysed above the ways officials construct their professional necessity to be *autonomous* in some ways from legal restraints, and to be able to decide on matters of social policy, a study of the ways they *build* their identity in relation to clients will be undertaken here. This identity is built through the *definitions* they give to immigrants and through the formation of what earlier we referred to as *work/ethical standards*. Both seem to be part of officials work/“professional” identity processes and both seem to influence the ways officers implement immigration policies.

Unsurprisingly, what was shown above was that officials see their “profession” certainly more than officers who are implementing policies. According to their accounts, their role is to *construct* welfare policies about immigrants, not just to implement general guidelines. These constructions however depend on the ways officials see the immigrant population in relation to the economy and their own work/ethical standards. As it will be shown below, a reference to the economy and to work/ethical standards seems to be central for officers understanding of both their profession and their role in the Greek society. Until very recently it was thought that administrative officials were mostly an extension of the party-bureaucratic system of the government’s official line. However, as we show earlier, this seems not to reflect the complete “*story*” of

administrative life (Sotiropoulos 1999) in the country. Officials are not only “*couriers*” of the government’s policy plans, they are also *subjects* that actively take part in the transformation of the Greek economy. This becomes even more evident in an economy that seeks the *personilisation* and *flexibility* of administrative organisation through the deployment of values and policies that are market oriented, and necessitate the entrepreneurial control of immigrants. For many, this would immediately imply a mechanistic accommodation on the part of the employees, of all market oriented values and government policies. This seems not to be what is suggested here. Instead, by focusing on the aspects of *experience* and of employees’ *synthetic approaches* towards immigration control, the analysis points towards the social significance and centrality of what it has being referred earlier as *mediation*.

The employee’s sense of “professional”/work identity seem to be produced through conflicts, through *negotiations*, that bring to the fore-front the relevance of both structures and agents in the processes of identity. In other words, what probably officials say through their accounts, is how they *interpret* and come to relate *themselves* in relation to *flexibility*, *accountability*, and the new roles they face at the workplace and generally in the Greek society. These are here reflected in the ways *they* define the *other*, the immigrant - “*client*”, and this is because the *other* usually defines how one stands and relates to a group of people and to work situations (Salaman 1986; Mouffe 1991; in du Gay 1996: 156).

Interviewees have provided the research with different definitions of the immigrant - “*client*”. For the purpose of analysis, these different definitions seem to be linked closely with different processes through which officials construct their sense of professional identity. In accordance to the themes IKA officials mostly have referred to, definitions are being constructed in relation to a universalist/citizenship approach towards the *use* of the term “*client*”, and the upholding of *work/ethical standards*. Taking together the cases of IKA and OAED officials, it seems that there are different definitions of the immigrant - “*client*”, that suggest important sifts in the ways employees construct their sense of identity in relation to their work and “professional” situation.

In the case of IKA officials, the *shape* of the definition of the immigrant - “*client*” seems to follow a *universalist* understanding of *social rights*, and a *departmental solidarity* route. In relation to the first, most officers have explained that their duty is to provide services to people irrespective of their *status* or *ethnic background*. Having said this, most IKA officers have referred to their “professional” identity as employees that do not have the right to “*discriminate*” , but they have the duty to assist working people with their insurance issues.

... I see *them* (the immigrants) equally, as I will come to see a Greek. If I can help *them*, I (usually) do. I do not discriminate if the man (in front of me) I *serve*, is a Greek or a *foreigner*. For me, he is an insured man...  
(Organisation K)

For the IKA officials the immigrant - “*client*” is more or less perceived as an additional “*burden*” because they claim that they are under-staffed and *they* cannot provide to *all* that quality of services they may have wanted to offer. Furthermore, they *see* immigrants as not one category of people, and they usually discriminate according to the ethnic

background immigrants have.

... We cannot generalize about all immigrants... I do not know. Immigrants, especially Albanians have some kind of aggressiveness against employees and against the IKA organisation, let's say. If you say (to them) that: "You cannot take this, you do not have benefits, you do not have the right to claim any welfare benefits..." the first the (Albanian) will do is to attack you, to be abrupt, to start shouting, because he pays (contributions) and IKA doesn't give him what he asks, without thinking that a Greek, let's say, may pay all his life (insurance contributions) and may not be entitled to even one benefit. Instead, the Egyptians, Pakistanis are much more polite, Indians are always smiling, very calm people. Albanians are...and not to say that you cannot communicate with them, to understand what you tell them... Albanians have said that *we* should speak Albanian in order to communicate... (Organisation P)

In most interviews officers from the IKA organisation saw Albanians as a kind of *demanding* and "*uncivilised*" *client*, who disturbs the continuous flow of work and of the "professional" conduct between officers and "*clients*". *Ethnic* categorisations seem to follow a line of thinking that is discriminatory against particular groups of people on the basis of whether they follow or exemplify a *passive* or an *aggressive-demanding* attitude, towards IKA and employees.

... The only thing that you could say (about immigrants especially Albanians) is that their behaviour, honestly, the majority are quite *uncivilised*, not to say anything more... (Organisation K)

Explaining this, most officers have resorted to the need for a better work organisation. This implied a shift in the *mentality* of public service management, from that of providing services in order to satisfy the "*bulk*" of clients, to that of having time to spend on each individual-client, according to the different necessities of the case. The immigrant-client is thought to be a case on its own.

... (I ask for) organisation. Better organisation. Staff, because when there are only two people in a department and you have no time to finish with the existing (workload) of today, think about the (workload) from yesterday, there is no time for all those that have being accumulated. Even if your cooperation with your colleague is good. You do need the appropriate time... *People* do not understand this. Everyone that comes to the front-desk wants to be served. Cannot understand what kind of problem you may have with the *workload*... (Organisation K)

Another official from the same department has argued that:

... the whole thing has got to do with how much *conscious* an employee is about his job. For example, I cannot see a *human being suffering* and tell him “go I cannot serve you”. I cannot do it. It’s a matter of consciousness for each people... (Organisation K)

The problems of serving the *client* as fast as possible and in the best way, are also depicted in another interview, where the interviewee “*asks*” indirectly for the *modernisation* of IKA, and a relaxation from the work-load an officer has to go through.

... IKA is the largest insurance agency in Greece. The organisation is not just simply an insurance agency, but it *produces Social Policy*. When directly or indirectly, IKA has six million *clients*, fifty-per-cent of the Greek population... the fact that you enter an organisation and you do not even see one computer... it means that since it was established (IKA) 1939, from December 1939 that IKA was founded up to today *we* use pen and paper... if you do not study at least one hour per day, the different clauses... if you do not study you will not be able to work and if you work with preparation you are bound to make mistakes... (Organisation P)

The same officer explains that if it wasn’t for the above problems, clients would have a better communication and services. She adds however, that according to her understanding of work/“profession”, the building of *trust* between immigrants and officers is a prerequisite. According to her understanding, the *client* must show *trust* to what the officer says, because otherwise it would be difficult for the latter to understand and assist the immigrant in whatever ways.

For IKA officers the recurrent themes, in relation to the definition of the immigrant-client, have mostly circled around the issue that all services should be based on a non-discriminatory flat-basis, where those in need are served according to their needs and entitlements. However, the immigrant is mostly seen as a *problematic client* mainly due to behavioural attitudes. The IKA officers are seen, especially Albanians, as clients that are *unfit* to be served. This is mainly for two reasons. *First*, because officers are not properly equipped to handle large numbers of clients without the proper number of staff and technical support; and *second*, because immigrant *clients* through their demands and overuse of resources threaten the continuation of the organisation. Together with the so-called “*uncivilised attitudes*” of some groups of immigrants, officials at IKA see the latter as rather *unfit* to be served, especially without resorting to a better administrative management and better conditions of work. For most IKA officers, the immigrant-*client* is mostly identified as a group of people that put an additional strain on the “professional”/work relations between officers and IKA. These strains have to do with: *language issues* and *attitudes* of specific ethnic groups, as well with the time and effort that is spent (by officials), trying to discover whether an immigrant has a legitimate claim

or not, and how best to *use* the manpower and material resources of IKA.

#### 4.5.2.4 Defining the immigrant-“client”: OAED

In the case of OAED, one is confronted with a slightly different sense of “professional”/work identity officers have. Working through the various definitions of the immigrant-“*client*”, the research points out towards a *particularistic, individual-based* process of constructing officers’ relationship with immigrants. Both seem to present an important *shift* in the ways officials see their work in relation to immigrants and the ways the *notion* of “*client*” is used.

Officials working at OAED departments responsible for work/residence permits, seem to derive or construct their collective “professional” identities through the deployment of a rather *fragmented, fluid* and *circumstantial* perspective of immigrants. To describe this here, one has to answer the following three important questions which officers themselves usually ask themselves. These questions are: *what* is the *problem*, that the professional OAED officer identifies as his/her main concern; *who* is the “*client*”; and *how* the two above questions yield a cohesion amongst officers in their relationship to immigrants. In contrast to IKA, front-line officials at OAED set their *problem* at work mostly around the facilitation of services in relation to their *competence* to: satisfy the “*needs*” of the organisation they belong, as well to serve the needs of the local labour market. Their “professional” sense of identity seems to derive from, not (as in the case of IKA) from a *bureaucratic-service* oriented *ethos* based on *humanitarian, flat* understanding of *necessities*. Rather, their identity seems to derive from a *process* of setting themselves in line with a new *public service image*. This is reflected more through, the *use of managerial attitudes*, in order to *stand out* as *competent* people to enforce the objectives of the market and of the organisation.

... (the problem) for OAED as a public agency is to search for jobs for both Greeks and *foreigners*. We do have many examples of employers who ask only for foreigners. Whenever a *foreigner* comes here searching for a job we can find him one relatively easy... (Organisation A)

The above objective is further analysed by another employee who describes the *problem* more in terms of implementing a kind of *matching* labourers to the necessities of the local labour market. This is done according to her, through the enforcement of *cultural criteria* that are in a sense *fluid, circumstantial* and determined by the definition officers follow to describe immigrants and by the negotiations they have with the state and private employers.

From Table 4.5.2 the taxonomy of unemployed workers at a local OAED office, show the ways officers use their discretion to define and categorise clients. What is particularly interesting, is the way they define immigrants, refugees, and immigrants and of course, the ways they separate the different categories of unemployed. The reason however, for presenting this table here (i.e. which was constructed out of interviews and computer files), is not only to show how immigrants are being defined by OAED officials, but also to show what appears to be a simple taxonomy of the unemployed turns to be an economic-work related taxonomy that is based upon political and cultural

criteria. Emigrants, refugees and immigrants are not classified according to their *work status*, or according to some sort of entry visas or other state certificates, but instead according to the way officials perceive different clients. The categories of emigrants, refugees and immigrants are not fixed at all, and any differences between the three are not sharply defined. The process that is usually followed to define one as an emigrant, refugee or immigrant, is conditioned by the negotiations that will take place between officials and unemployed; what the official thinks is a priority or central to the claim the client is filing, and certainly the latter's economic/political status. Especially in the case of emigrants, refugees and immigrants, classification is done in the last instance, and it is quite innovative. For OAED organisation, there are no definitions of the above three categories, and officials are left more or less on their own to decide how one will be classified and whether one's claims will be processed or not.

**Table 4.5.2 : Taxonomy of the unemployed according to OAED officials**

	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4	Category 5
	Young	Dismissed	Emigrants and refugees	None	Withdrawal
<b>OAED's definitions</b>	someone who has not got an unemployment card before	someone who has been dismissed	no clear definition	someone who does not belong to the earlier categories	someone who has left his/her job voluntarily
<b>Officials definitions</b>	someone who has not worked before	as above	These two categories are put together. people are being categorised under this list sometimes because they have left their country voluntarily, and other times because they left their country for <i>religious</i> or political reasons. There are no definitions of: refugees, immigrants, emigrants	someone who is an immigrant	someone who has not got an unemployment card and he has no right for unemployment benefit

This is further substantiated through what an officer has claimed at an interview,

... The *cultural criteria* that each employee is using differ according to the individual employee. But if these (cultural criteria) have been enforced by employers, then

they are *used* by all employees. For example, there was an advertisement that said: “We are *asking for a worker, well dressed, non-smoker and not to be an Albanian*”, another said : “*Two men are needed for a Petrol-Station, not foreigners*”. Quite a lot employees, feel that it is their *obligation* to choose the most *decent and well dressed* (workers) people and send them to vacant jobs, so that they do not become *ridiculed* in the eyes of employers as well as in their own... (Organisation A)

An example of the above cultural criteria is presented in the following interview:

... Immigrants’ knowledge of legal aspects is not strong so as to create a *problem*. They are not informed, but the difficulties come from a lack of education, their *psychosynthesis*. For example, we have no problem with the citizens of the EU, even if they are informed about the Greek legislation. They are *convinced* with everything we advise them. Whereas the Albanians are “*God help us*”. Most times they behave (towards them) in a violent way. *We* do not mean a physical violence, but rather *psychological* (they also respond with psychological violence)... they sit there and cry, like women. You should only have appetite for this (behaviour)... In general lines *we* have this *problem* of psychological violence.. (Organisation A)

It is clear in this interview that what constitutes a *problem* for officers is some immigrants’ behaviour (i.e. in this case an ethnic group) and their questioning of the official line. But it is also clear that one method used to “*convince*” immigrants of what is the correct policy for them, is psychological violence. In one OAED office, the method of psychological violence was used almost as a fundamental mechanism for separating those that according to officials deserved a work and residence permit. “*Crying*” or “*begging*” in front of officers was almost seen as a sign of weakness, and as a behaviour that accompanies someone who has withheld vital information from the officer in charge. According to observations in one OAED central office, *crying* is interpreted by officers as not only an improper behaviour but also as a behaviour which indirectly provides the officers with some sort of “ethnographic evidence” of the applicant’s unsuitability for being in Greece.

For a high-ranking officer, the main concern for officials and the whole OAED organisation is the issue of employment, and the *regulation/control* of immigrants according to the needs of the labour market. For him the *professional identity* is constructed through how far one employee is successful in regulating and allocating immigrants to the *right jobs*. What is interesting in the interview, though, is that the officials use a managerial-liberal vocabulary to describe their sense of profession in relation to immigrants. Unlike IKA, officials are stressing the fact that their sense of professionalism results from the process of discovering how far the immigrant at the front-

desk is *useful* to the labour market, and how far this *usefulness* legitimises one to receive a Green card or any other benefits from OAED.

... (My job) in essence is employment. All other duties...follow. Main concern is employment and to achieve this, there are “*sattelites*”. The local services that provide unemployment benefits, that is the alternative solution if you cannot find them a job (immigrants)... job centres are there in order to find, to do the *matching* between *supply* and *demand* (i.e. markets). The Alien offices (i.e. according to the recent law 2910/2001) are there in order to *find* which *Aliens* are *useful* to *us*. Are they all? Are *we* going to keep them all? What are we going to do?... (Organisation A)

The above interview is expressing professional identity through the “*lens*” of the new initiatives of the government to *flexibilise* and market orient public administration. What the above officer does is to explain what the analysis has already shown, that immigration control is a matter related to the Greek labour market and the *use* of immigrants as a cheap labour force. The formulation of the officer’s sense of identity seems to be tied with this understanding. But, whereas this relationship is obvious, what seems less obvious is the *process or paths* followed by the officer to arrive at such a relationship.

One could easily argue that what the Manpower organisation has always done is to try to allocate the “*rights*” workers to the *right* jobs, categorising the first and responding to the demands of the latter. What appears to be *new* in the above statement is the officer’s “*decisiveness*” to intervene in the process and to *get things done*, leaving behind a more traditional approach. This in the case of Greece, has roughly been associated traditionally with civil-servants’ *inaction*, and the latter’s emphasis to *follow* “*blindly*” usually the options and recommendations of the government. According to the high-ranking officer above, a critical involvement, and an approach based on direct decision-making seems to express at least part of his sense of identity with his “*profession*” and/or work situation. However, at the near end of the interview, the officer explains further: that “OAED should not be related with other public services” (i.e. Police, Ministry of Justice) and, if “we want things to get done”, there must be “a relative” fragmentation of immigration control and distribution of services to different agencies. The officer’s sense of identity seems to evolve around a *departmentalised* and *fragmentary* notion of the civil-servant. This was also obvious in the section where *experience* and *autonomy* was discussed, but over here is presenting an interesting turn. This turn is identified probably with an emergent professional identity that is tied to the specific department the officer is working (i.e. employment section), and to the specific type of control the officer is implementing on immigrants. This type of control is concerned with the employment of economic immigrants.

... We cannot discuss about employment and to have economic immigrants and (allow them) to be handled by the Ministry of Justice. Which economic policy? Which economic immigrants? With what kind of staff and what

kind, say it, *outline*, justified papers, inspection of labour, whatever, and which social policies?... (Organisation A)

For a front-line officer the above *discovery process*, is her main sense of identity, that both actively involves her with the transformation of the Greek society. At the same time, this seems to be reconciled through a kind of *communitarian* approach for the social control of immigrants. As she explains in a very simple way:

... (my contribution) is to control the *aliens* for you. I register which you have, which you do not, what each one is doing. That's my contribution. I assist towards the control of *aliens*. Because the local authority, or society, or the *local society*, it can be as a local society, but there are others behind, that will *support* her from behind. How is this support done? With the *control of aliens*. So, I check on immigrants' use more. Because if I sense something (suspicious) I have the *responsibility* to inform the local society where the immigrant belongs. So, there is a *give and take* between myself, the Greek citizen, local society, and the *Aliens department* (the Police)... (Organisation P)

Undoubtedly what the interviewee above is stressing is an image of "professional" identity that is engaged not only with the management of resources and the responsiveness to OAED's objectives but rather with her *accountability* and *personal responsibility* to the "*local society*". This is a reminder of the theoretical argument pursued by Johnson (1983) in his explanation of "*management in government*", where the "*new*" professional identity of public officials is shaped within the boundaries imposed by entrepreneurial and civil duties.

In line with Johnson's thesis, the interviewee above shows an understanding of her professional identity as something that is constructed out of a sensitivity towards the local society, other public bodies (i.e. local authorities or the police), and through the projection of her *role* as a *custodian* of public interests and of the *values* she follows. In this sense, the pursuit of immigration control, probably recognizes the "*limits*" of economic or flexible management and is rather trying to combine public and private interests and efficiency together.

This almost follows from the discussion in the previous sections, in relation to *organisational culture* and the active response or involvement of officials in the transformation process of public services. An understanding that officials relate to their *profession* and *immigration control*, and hence to the implementation of immigration policies, seems to follow a much more complex line of thought than sometimes is assumed. For example, in the IKA case, the *bureaucratic ethos* seemed to explain officials' sense of identity through the preservation of what Weber called: the officers' *distantiation* from the *struggle of power*. Their professional sense of identity seemed to be constructed around a sense of duty towards public services, that expressed the officials' innermost convictions, that one has to *stand above parties* (i.e. personal or political interests).

In the case of OAED, officials' personal or political interests seem to stand alongside the latter's role in office. However, what seems here interesting is, that "professional" identity is visualized as a *mediation* between public opinion, local community and the state organisation. This *mediation* here is not exhausted in translating OAED's economic or management policies into immigration policies, or immigration policies into market objectives. The officer in charge seems to construct a perspective of her professional situation through her direct commitment towards economic and civil responsibilities. This is achieved through combining OAED's objectives with political interests, and in turn this is probably best achieved through the personal commitment of officials with a *struggle for power*. This probably implies here, that the officer implements immigration control policies through a *consent* that allows one to identify personally with the objectives. This of course is in line with the organisational structure and culture the analysis has examined so far, and furthermore explains the process through which the implementation of immigration policies in Greece go through. This is done through the combination of traditional party-political/bureaucratic and flexible/managerial policies. In addition, it seems that the introduction of entrepreneurial norms in the Greek public service, especially in the case of OAED's officials, probably is not in conflict with officers' public service ethos. The opposite is true, according to organisational culture and officers' "professional" identity processes, the latter are being expected by both government and the organisation to be involved with political interests and personal choices. In actual fact, despite the degree of *alienation* demonstrated by the interview below, for transformation to happen in Greece, officers are expected by the government to take pride and to identify with the objectives of work. But they are not expected to take public administration into their own hands and certainly not to do as they feel. This is extremely important because theoretical understanding sometimes reduce a complex network of identity processes to a mechanistic one-way, top to bottom relation. For some, what the government argues is seen as a *value* that is *mechanistically* accommodated by officials.

In line with the above argument, another OAED official explains his sense of identity interrelation to his "profession"/work situation as follows:

... Culture without *human beings* cannot exist, and I am a human being who through *my own* way I create *civilisation*. Beginning with a culture, from the way I write that may express a culture, up to my job and which I offer over here, it constitutes a culture, or the way I speak to *aliens*, or, the way I use the *aliens*. That is my work contribution... I haven't being occupied with the *civil-society*. It is not my concern, first comes, I don't know, maybe I am selfish, (first) comes *me* and then society. When I was, let's say, at third grade of gymnasium, I was interested in *social change*, to change the government, to change everything, to live in a better society... this moment I am not interested. I don't believe to have achieved anything, nor (I believe) that I will succeed in achieving anything in the future... (Organisation A)

What the above interview "moderately" expresses is that for the given officer the

construction of a “professional” identity is defined in terms of *individual* and *personal* interests. Collective political identities are seen as almost either a *thing of the past* or as *utopian*. For her the basis of all, is the *individual* human being, who through actions, communication, and the *use of Aliens*, creates “*civilisation*”. *Social change*, according to the same officer, no longer has to do with putting first society and the people in it, but rather it is seen, as something that begins with the *self* and the ability to change the social environment for the individual.

In fact, what is interesting in the above interview is the way she actually sees her work as something fragmented from the civil-society pointing probably towards a *new ethos* of civil service. Civil society is, according to the interview, something that is made out of people’s *mobilisation* and *participation* in social change. The officer above is expressing her concern and belief that, collective action is something that probably no longer answers important questions, instead individual action is thought to be the only thing left. According to the interviewee, *individual action* and *personal concerns*, are the only things left for one to understand his/her “professional” *self* and to shape things for one’s benefit. The struggle for power correctly is “*translated*” by the officer as the struggle for personal power, almost as a politician or a businessman would have argued. It is interesting that this above “*translation*” is based upon what du Gay (1996) calls *boundary crossings* in the sense of identity, amongst public administrators. These *boundary crossings* between the identity of entrepreneurs, politicians, and office employees according to du Gay, formulate an “essential component of many public-sector reforms currently taking place across liberal democratic societies” (du Gay 1996: 188).

The above ideas, however, are presented by du Gay as almost axiomatic for officers’ sense of identity, and therefore the only sociological importance for one is to “*discover*” how far and in what ways officers follow or not the new discourse of public management. But such a mechanistic understanding of identity construction is often the product of a one-sided view of organisations. Officials relate to their identity in connection: to their conditions of work, their pay, the management’s view, and their life-stories. They usually develop a sense of identity through what Brown (1999) called a complex network of *negotiations* and *confrontations*, that contextualise their actions within an environment that is changing. Their actions are not given or prescribed from above, but usually develop out of their understanding of how they relate to the transformation and the organisation they belong. If one pays attention to the context the above officer explains her self-interest, then the fact is that her sense of professional identity develops out of her perceived disability to change society. If “*boundary crossings*” followed a linear process, where officers accommodated uncritically what their governments proposed, then surely officials would think that through the implementation of immigration policies they would solve Greek society’s problems. For the officer above the opposite is true. In an *insecure environment*, where people cannot collectively change society, only one thing is left: to *survive*. It is *alienation*, that is reducing the public concern of an officer, and not *concensus* with the government initiatives. When everything else has “failed“, the only thing left for the officer seems to be the “professional *self*”. This however, has to be discovered, tested, re-defined, especially when everything else is changing.

### 4.5.3 Work/Ethical standards and personal identity

As it was indicated above, officials are becoming implicated in the administrative “game” of controlling immigrants, thinking that office work is also an extension of their conception and practices of personhood. This of course is not the first time such an idea is presented here. Through the analysis of organisational culture it has been explained that the Greek case is very interesting because party-political interests or else personal favours, informal practices of recruitment, and a semi-private-public network of work, promotes personalised attitudes towards office work. Traditional and informal practices coupled with a new administrative ethos for the flexibilisation of the economy, provides probably the best environment for the development of what was referred in the first sections as a system that personalizes bureaucracy.

To go further, the analysis here will concentrate not just on the personal aspects of professional identity, but rather on those aspects that seem central and embrace officers’ understanding of their *selves*, their clients, and relate to a redefinition of officers’ relation to work. These have been jettisoned through an administrative *ethos* that is referred here as *work/ethical standards*, and according to interviews it is made of values referring to: *activity*, *flexibility-productivity*, and *self-control*. These values according to officials from both IKA and OAED, motivate their work at offices, and define the importance for the control of immigrants. At the same time, as it has been recognised by officials, these values and how immigrants stand in relation to them, provides office work with a sense of “mission”, that is no longer seen as the mission of the organisation, but rather as the *mission of the individual officer*.

Such a “mission”, as it will be shown, is not suggesting here that either the values are fixed or that officials have accommodated uncritically what the government or the organisations define as *eksinchronismos*. In the previous sections and sub-sections the analysis has offered good indications that officials’ *responsiveness* to the flexible organisation of public services goes through many channels that even come into conflict or simply demand a more participative management of welfare services. This is more obvious in cases where officials felt that an impersonal alienated style bureaucracy is endangering their status and hierarchies the Greek society. In the case of work/ethical standards and the cultural values applied by officers for the implementation of immigration control policies, officials seem to present us with their own idea of flexibility in public administration. This is put forward through explaining their perceptions and by defining themselves as active participants of an organisation, and immigrants as a porous group of people that challenge not public service but rather the active role of public servants. In fact, one possible explanation of why certain ethnic groups are being discriminated more than others is also because they challenge the *empowerment* of civil servants, and because they push for a flat-based impersonal type of bureaucratic control.

*Insecurity*, *unstable positions*, and a sense of government’s *flattening of differences*, seem to motivate employees to construct a sense of identity that projects an array of work/ethical standards according to which officers define their own selves through the definition of immigrants-clients. This is especially true for junior members of the administrative offices of IKA and OAED. In actual sense low-rank officials have presented themselves in contrast to immigrants as people who are *active* members of

society and whose *activity* represents to an extent, their work and ethical value of how one should live his/her life in Greece today. Their understanding of the importance of this value seems from interviews to be conceptualised through what they come to understand from the immigrants they serve.

... Immigrants are not active... I don't know whether this is ascribed or achieved, they have a fear to be actively involved (with economy and society)... (Organisation N)

For another junior administrative officer from OAED, the value of activity is more or less defined according to how far one (in this case an immigrant) is working hard enough to be a member of society. For the interviewee, in order for one to be a member of society he or she has to enjoy social rights, and these rights should only be allocated to those who work hard.

... No one comes (to Greece) to sit at *Cafeneio* (i.e. coffee shop) or to work part-time and not to do anything else... They come to work, as they themselves (i.e. immigrants) say... *They* do not come to enjoy the *sun*, nor the *sea*, the *summer*, they come for a specific aim... For this reason, *we* give them the necessary documents to legalise them in Greece. This is the most important criterion (i.e. according to myself) and for the organisation the same... those that work stay, those that do not go... (Organisation M)

“*Work hard and do as many things as you can*”, seems to be the motto behind active membership in society. According to this, immigrant-clients who follow other values are defined as *bogus* or *welfare cheat-clients*, that “*steal*” the benefits from other clients and use resources that are reserved for. For one not to be a *bogus* or a *welfare cheat*, he or she has to recognize his or her *personal life* in such a way so as to depend more on *self* and the abilities/willingness to work. The active member of society in contrast, is one who stands on his/her “*own feet*”, without *passively* accepting economic dependencies or not continuously striving for something better in terms of material gains. Competition and learning how to survive in a “*cruel society*”, are two main issues of active membership that defines one's relationship to self and his/her sense of “professional” identity in relation to immigrants.

... I am trying to organise my life as best as I can. To stand and to depend on my own feet. And this should be done by everyone. Even if someone gets married that does not mean that she has to (stop working), for the husband to cover his wife. You are a human being and you do not know what will happen. You do have to learn to live standing on your *own feet*. To learn to *survive* in society. Society today is extremely *cruel*. I am saying this because I have been working since I was sixteen, and I know what is happening... (Organisation M)

In contrast to immigrant clients, the same officer argues that:

(to be an active member means that) I work since I was sixteen. I worked wherever I could work. I can tell you that since my sixteenth birthday I could live on my own. I got a job in the factory, where my mum was, later on, in different local organisations... and now I am still working ... (I am an active member because) there is *realism*. *Realism* exists because it is not that “I leave home and I go to my job, leave my job and go to my college”. At night I go for a coffee, I come to meet and understand people, I relate to people so realism is a must. You see things as they are. Except if you are *alone* (and you care for nothing) ... you live for enjoying yourself, and you do live (as if you do not care) to have some *things* (i.e. material things and educational credentials) for yourself, in this sense you do not have any realism. For me there is. I am for myself quite a realist (in relation) to intrapersonal relations, my college, everything... (Organisation M)

*Realism*, that is what “*exists*” out there, and what “*need*” to be achieved, is seen as an essential ingredient of the active membership in society. But for the officer above, this is mostly measured through one’s participation in a complex network of relationships that spring from and surround different expressions of social life. According to the value system of the interviewee, hard work is not the only prerequisite one has to fulfill for the *self* and *others*.

*Communicating* and *educating* as well as *enjoying* yourself, is seen as connected with *work* and certainly it is something that “*deserves*” public attention, and even public assistance. On the other hand, *leisure* or *enjoying* yourself alone is rated as something that does not contribute to the advancement of one’s self. This is because the individual is not striving for higher-better achievements in life, and in turn, this represents a withdrawal from *competitiveness* and *targets*. Leisure on its own probably reflects an essential component of *private life*, and as such it should be left to the private sphere or individuals. The same is almost true if one is only concerned with his or her economic or material survival. To work hard without attempting to do other things, is explained as a disability of one to integrate with the work/ethical standards of the Greek society and the hierarchy of values officers have.

... Immigrants have, a little bit, withdrawn from *life*. They exist in a continuous struggle to make possible to stand on their *own feet*, how to do best for their families... They do not have further aims... (Organisation E)

#### **4.5.3.1 Personal identity and flexibility/productivity**

In relation to flexibility and productivity, most high and low-ranking officers from both organisations have argued that working at office with quite a lot

immigrants, “pushes” one to continuously solve problems, to work more efficiently, to understand that they (i.e. immigrants) are essential both for the *self* and the employees’ “*professional*” identity.

... without wanting to boost myself, as soon as I came to this job I discovered that I am, maybe, a perfectionist, I am, and for this reason I am so strict with the girls they work over here and tasks must be done in the right way on time, so that we would be better, to serve people better. And for this reason I believe that... everything must be done on time... *Rationality*, I want everything to be organised... *Rationality* means organisation, I want everything to be organised, to find everything I want on time,... to be in their place... For my contact with (i.e. immigrants) *them* I cannot tell you for certain whether or not they are *rational*. Except the examples I see that they put their papers in a paper-bag, instead of taking care of them like their eyes... they forget their passport at home when they should have had it with them... (Organisation K)

Discovering the value of *flexibility* and *productivity* goes through the “*rational*” organisation of office work, and the way immigrants are disciplined. This *rational* organisation of office work, despite what Wallerstein (1983) has argued about the development of capitalism and the administrative system in it, for the above officer the term is applied in a different way. “*Rationality*” here, is linked to *activity* and the *ability* of the officer to shape conditions of work, so as to “*bend*” the bureaucratic organisation to the latter’s will. *Making things work* for the individual official, probably represents what the “true” value of *flexibility* really is. It should be noted, that according to the civil-servants’ association (i.e. ADEDY) the government’s plans to reform administrative services in light of global and local market necessities, is seen as a move that further centralizes office work and decision making into the hands of the Ministry of Interior. For the individual officer therefore, the value of *activity* is connected with the value of *flexibility* and *productivity* through the shaping of a personality character as Mill in *Representative Government* would have argued, that struggles against the “*evils*” of the past. This is done through his/her *active* character (Letwin 1998) and participation in the transformation of the economy. Another officer has related the above value with *racial/ethnic* characteristics arguing that:

... some nationalities... have both flexibility and productivity. Some others (not)... these are... *ethnological* characteristics. The Slavic (nationalities) are productive. Of the ex-socialist countries... (Organisation P)

In the case however of most front-line IKA officials, *flexibility* and the issue of *productivity*, were mostly related to immigrants and the discussion of cost-cutting, high-performance, and strict regulations that govern the relations between officers and clients. As it was also shown earlier, the value of *flexibility* was mostly linked to IKA officers

understanding that they should be able to have a fully computerised office infrastructure, a well organised division of labour, and the ability to throw their emphasis on individual cases, concentrating more on the entitlements a client is making. By doing this, IKA officers have more than once claimed that: an *impersonal* and *scale* oriented administrative management of welfare services, produces serious “*strains*” on their professional and personal relations with each other and their clients.

... (at present) there is not any flexibility, because you cannot avoid certain things... (like) *sensitivity* to help one as much as you can. The benefits department is (a department) that you should have great *sensitivity* in relation to people. Those that usually come are ill, they have gone through surgical operations, with cancer, knocked down by accidents... (Organisation K)

Another officer has argued that:

... When you are working at a calm, serene place you will also return calm at your house. When you are not at place and you have to serve fifty and one-hundred people every day and your stomach is ready to “*break*” and your mind rings “*bells*”, it is only logical that you will transfer all these back to your family and into your personal calmness (i.e. life)... (Organisation K)

Officers’ inability to concentrate on particular clients creates an additional problem. This problem is linked with not being able to discover easily those who are *welfare cheats*. The notion of “*welfare cheat*” here is used in the sense that some clients are not entitled certain benefits, and through their “*illegal*” claims they use resources that are there to benefit those that have a “*real*” need, and have contributed to the Greek economy.

... (immigrants) should not demand, they should know their rights. Because there are rules and rights. Not I am coming here (i.e. IKA) and (the claim) should be done. When one comes to me with a “*broken finger*” and nowhere can be fixed, and he came from Albania... These are *demands*... if they don’t like it they should return back home... they should respect their “*bread*” (i.e. what the Greek society gives them: work)... (Organisation P)

In relation to OAED officials, the above argument seems to reflect their “*chief target*”, which is to *decentralise authority*, based on the values of flexibility and productivity, creating a system of “*entrepreneurial government*” based on the individual officer. The latter through flexibility and productivity, would be able to secure the progress of those who know better to categorise and allocate resources and those who deserve (i.e. in this sense, the clients) to be assisted and freed in their socio-economic development from a way government’s control policies.

For the officers of the above organisation, there is flexibility and

productivity, during the implementation of immigration policies. Officers have claimed in almost most of the interviews, that by enforcing an *informal* practice on immigrants not only they enrich their abilities to manage human resources, but they also understand the importance and centrality of personalised managerial and behavioural skills. From the analysis above this was shown most in the way officers argued about the role: experience, will, and conscience, play for the implementation of policies on immigrants. This is further illustrated, in the way officers see the role personal initiatives and their “*sensitive character*” play for their “professional”/personal identity and their work practices.

... Employees (i.e. from OAED) every time, according to their education and their sensitivity, they cannot bring themselves into the position of the immigrant, and to listen to him, and many times whenever an immigrant comes to the office and asks for something, they treat him as if he is *invisible*... One day a Pakistani-mum came with her baby and her husband, and they started to complain, to shout in Greek. After a while, since I asked her to explain to me (what was wrong), I gave her child a treat, which was looking at my computer, the mother explained to me that her husband has been made redundant from his job and the employer for three years has not insured him, and has not provided him with a redundancy-certificate... When I heard this I called immediately the labour inspectors, and I did send them (there) so that they would finally satisfy their demands... (Organisation A)

According to the views of another officer from the same department:

... I support the institutions, I shape the institutions. I will grow my children according to the institutions. There is interrelationship between an individual who lives in a society and the institutions (the individual) cannot exist without the institutions of the Greek society, so too the institutions cannot exist without my own contribution... (This is achieved more efficiently self control). At the beginning when I was at the organisation I must say that I was becoming easily quite irritated. My *self-control* was *zero*. It was not existing. This of course was due because I did not know the procedures, I did not know what solutions could I propose... I did not know what kind of *treatment* a particular *Alien* should have (according to his/her problem), that's why I was shouting. I am not hiding it I was shouting, and I was quite irritating to *them*. Later, however, when I learned the procedures, and *tried to get deeper to the procedures*, this means that I am trying to *find solutions* further than the problem... (Organisation A)

In this last interview, administrative organisation is reflected as a combination of personal, and a work related sense of identity. The overlapping between the two, is being

here reflected in the *use* and *definition* of the notion “*self-control*”. The latter is an aspect of an organised behaviour that is learned at office and is beneficial both for the officers’ efficient work and personal development. However *self-control* as a personal-work value is used here, to provide an example of how the possession of it allows one officer to apply flexible methods of immigration control. In particular what the above officer argues is that self-control is measured through the extent to which others (i.e. high-ranking officers and clients) will decide the disposition of an official’s effort, and will intervene in someone’s judgement. Self-control is being related to *autonomy*, the possession of *experience* and professional/personal abilities, in order to avoid a kind of *proletarianized-bureaucratic* control by the state.

#### 4.6 Concluding Remarks

The above long essay on the paths of administrative control has begun its journey with a discussion on the reasons that make the implementation of immigration policies a central issue, and why immigration control policies do matter for the government, public-welfare organisations and state officials.

Through a detailed analysis of the impact organisational culture(s) has upon implementation processes, and of the IKA/OAED officers’ identity, in the interaction between themselves and immigrants, this essay has exposed some of the reasons that answer the question why implementation does matter. It became more than clear that *implementation* matters *differently* to different actors (i.e. the government, organisations, officers in charge). For the government it is more or less an exercise of establishing a mode of thinking and a system of control that supports its plans to modernise and reformulate welfare services and administrative conduct between organisations, officials and the labour market. For organisations and officials, implementation matters as a “*network of collectivities*”, that through *practices* institutions and officers define their new role in a transformed society. As Runciman (1997) argued, institutions and people through *practices*, they in a sense get drawn into a kind of reciprocal behaviour that mutually recognise shared notions and beliefs. In our case of IKA and OAED, implementation matters because what officials and administrative departments are in a sense got involved into is more a kind of “*act*” that on the one hand *protects* or *defends*, and on the other *promotes* images and ideas.

In relation to the first, organisations and officials seem to be involved in a kind of practice that protects the administrative role of civil servants in the changing Greek economy and at the same time “*shields*” administrators against the terrors of a flexible economy and of the order or “*disorder*” of welfare recipients (Berger, 1973). Through the manufacturing of a new *consent*, officials present us with a “*reality*”, their *reality*, that is capable both to organise the sense of purpose, pride and the role of officers in the process of implementation, whilst on the other hand to remind the government and the Greek society that the implementation of immigration policies in a flexible economy depends on the part played by actors. This is the second issue, and for most part of the analysis the actors involved have reminded, in their own ways, that the *flexibilisation* of the market economy, constitutes both a *challenge* and a *chance* to become active players: as controllers of the new order and as government-entrepreneurs of the labour market.

The initial sections of the analysis above, have concentrated on what here

has been referred to as *organisational culture*. The making of an *organisational culture* is presented here as a complex network of processes involving structural and cultural *negotiations* between officers and institutions. Internal labour-markets, the division of labour, the external-local environment are all major contributors towards the building of an organisational culture. They seem to be responsive towards a market philosophy about welfare services, and in particular immigration labour control, and they seem to be dependent upon a personalised understanding of bureaucratic rules and the “*need*” to implement immigration control policies. In order to do their “*job*” and regulate the flow of immigrants in Greece and to allocate resources and “*foreign*” labourers into the Greek economy, officers depend heavily on their social and economic interaction with the organisation they belong to and the local markets. A kind of personal, party and financial incentives, seem to motivate officials’ behaviour to implement discriminatory and quite racist policies, which according to their opinion safeguard the Greek society against the incoming-strange “*theat*”. This is the moment in the analysis that the issue of *consent* became central. For Greek administrative officers the issue is not whether or not they work *efficiently*, or whether they follow the letter of the law, but rather why they are taking part and control immigrants at all. An answer to this, will eventually provide an answer also to the question of whether or not and why (i.e. the reasons) implementation policies matter.

The analysis of *organisational culture* and in particular the role played by *consent*, has led directly to the second issue that is being discussed here: that of identity processes. In the sections that examined national, professional and personal images of self and others, one recognizes the importance that they play in the interaction between officers and immigrant-clients.

Throughout the analysis of national identity processes, one is reminded of the importance of the hierarchy values present in a society that undergoes a rapid modernisation and is exposed to global-local economic changes. *Change, mobility* and *adaptability* together with the issue of the role of *local communities*, are almost “part and parcel” of the flexibilisation of the Greek economy. Beneath everything, officials *categorise* and *allocate* resources and immigrant labourers in the Greek economy according to their understanding or how they see themselves and their in-group affiliations. This becomes even clearer in the sections concerned with the analysis of the “*professional*” and personal identities of officers. In the new economy, officials strive to create a body of knowledge, and an *autonomy* that will allow them to take active part and will legitimise their role in the market economy of the country. The *definitions* of the *immigrant-client* is for officers something more than a rational definition. It is a way to establish their role and to impose their *ideas* or *reality*, of how the new economy should be organised. This is the central tenet of the last part of the analysis: the personal identity process. In front of the IKA and OAED desks, the officer implements his/her social policies on immigrants, sometimes in line with the rules of the organisation, most of the time independently or even antithetical to those rules. Whatever is the case, the official through his/her *taxinomic* policies and ideas, reminds not what is legal, but rather what is the *customary framework* for the preset implementation of immigration control policies. In addition, he/she is reminding why this *customary framework* must be followed and what should the new role of welfare administrators be in the new economy.

**APPENDIX**



**8.** Which are the directions often followed for the offering of services to immigrant groups at your section/department (e.g. organisation/procedures, administration, services/welfare, training-employment)?

**9.** Do you take part/Have you taken part in Programmes-Seminars, and which are those?

**B.**

**10.** What is your opinion concerning the following:  
(e.g. as far as working at your section/department is concerned)

(a)cooperation:

(b)internal/external networks:

(c)initiative:

(d)flexibility:

(e)procedures:

(f)information:

(g)evaluation:

**11.** How important is your own experience for the achievement of your section/department?

**12.** According to your opinion, in what way and to what degree do your working space and the duration/type of your employment influence the offering of services to immigrants?

**13.** On the part of the immigrant groups, what, do you think, makes working at your section/department easier or harder?

**14.** If you had the ability to impose some operational rules to immigrant and to employees, what would these be?

**15.** Are there any organisations/institutions that influence the operation of your section/department? If yes, how? (refer to specific cases)

**C.**

**16.** Which is the procedure followed for the approval of services to immigrants by your

section/department?

**17.** According to your opinion, which are the most and which are the least important criteria for the approval of services to immigrants?

(a)Most important

(b)Least important

**18.** What should be taken into consideration for the approval or refusal of services?

(a)Approval

(b)Refusal

**19.** Based on your everyday contact with immigrant groups, which are the characteristics (negative or positive) that influence the offering of services:

(a)Negative

(b)Positive

**D.**

**20.** What is the contribution of the following organisations to immigration policy?

(a)state organisations:

(b)business organisations:

(c)local governments - unions:

(d)voluntary organisations:

**21.** What should the immigrants take into consideration, concerning the Greek society?

**22.** What is the immigrants' contribution to:

the labour market.....

the local community.....

social institutions.....

cutlure.....

ideal models.....

**23.** What do you think of the immigrants in terms of their:

Activity.....

Flexibility-productivity.....

Autonomy.....

Rationality.....

Self-control.....

Realism.....

Trust.....

Friendship.....

Expectations-goals.....

Morality.....

**24.** Do you have anything else to add or suggest?

.....  
.....  
.....

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahrne,G. (1998), “Civil Society and Uncivil Organizations”, pp.84-95, in Alexander,J. (ed): *Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Institutionalization*, London, Sage.
- Alexander,J. (ed) (1998), *Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Institutionalization*, London, Sage.
- Allen,M. (2000), “Ideology Counts”, pp.177-204, in Levin,M. (ed): *Cultures of Control*, Amsterdam, harwood
- Alvesson,M. and K.Sköldberg (2000), *Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research*, London, Sage.
- Andreski, S. (ed) (1983), *Max Weber: on Capitalism, Bureaucracy, and Religion*, London, George Allen and Unwin.
- Argyris,Ch. (1972), *The Applicability of Organizational Sociology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Bauman,Z. (1998), *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Oxford, Polity Press.
- Bauman,Z. (1998), “Parvenu and Pariah: heroes and victims of modernity”, pp.23-36, in Good,J. and I.Velody (eds): *The Politics of Postmodernity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Bauman,Z. (1999), *Culture and Praxis*, London, Sage.
- Beniger, J. (1986), *The Control Revolution: technological and economic origins of the information society*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- Berger,P. (1963), *Invitation to Sociology: a humanistic Perspective*, London, Anchor.
- Berger, P. (1973), *The Social Reality of Religions*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986), “The Forms of Capital”, pp.241-258, in Richardson, J. (ed), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the sociology of education*, New York, Greenwood.
- Bourdieu, P. and J. Passeron (1991), “Social Reproduction through Education”, pp.216-222, in Worsley, P., R. Brown et al (eds), *The New Modern Sociology Readings*, London, Penguin.
- Brochmann,G. and T.Hammar (eds) (1999), *Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies*, Oxford, Berg.

- Brown, R. (1992), *Understanding Industrial Organisations: Theoretical perspectives in industrial sociology*, London, Routledge.
- Brown,R. (1995), *Prejudice*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Brown, R. (ed) (1997), *The changing shape of work*, London, Macmillan.
- Burawoy,M. (1980), “Migrant labour in South Africa and the United States”, pp.138-174, in Nichols,T. (ed), *Capital and Labour*, Glasgow, Fontana.
- Burawoy,M. (1982), *Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labour Process under Monopoly Capitalism*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Cambetta,D. (1998), “Concatenations of Mechanisms”, pp.102-125, in Hedström,P., R.Swedberg (eds), *Social Mechanisms: an analytical approach to social theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Castles,S. (2000), *Ethnicity and Globalization*, London, Sage.
- Castles,S. and G.Kosack (1980), “The Function of Labour Immigration in Western European Capitalism”, pp.117-138, in Nichols,T. (ed): *Capital and Labour*, Glasgow, Fontana.
- Chambon,A. (1999), “Foucault’s Approach: Making the Familiar Visible”, pp.51-83, in Chambon,A., A.Irving, L.Epstein (eds): *Reading Foucault for Social Work*, New York, Columbia University.
- Child,J. (1984), *Organization: A guide to Problems and Practice*, London, Paul Chapman.
- Chtouris,S. (1997), *Metaviomihaniki Koinonia*, Athens,Ellinika Grammata.
- Cini,M. (2000), “Reforming the European Commission: Discourse, Culture and planned Change”, pp.1-23, in Hosli,M. et al (eds): *Institutional Challenge in the European Union* (forthcoming), University of Michigan Press.
- Clegg,S. and D.Dunkerley (1980), *Organization, Class and Control*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Cohen,R. (1997), *The New Helots: Migrants in the International Division of Labour*, Oxford, OPS.
- Cohen,S. (1974), *The elasticity of Evil: Changes in the Social Definition of Deviance*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
- Cohen,S. (1987), *Visions of Social Control*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Cousins,C. (1987), *Controlling Social Welfare: A Sociology of State Welfare, Work, and Organization*, Sussex, Wheatsheaf.

Crouch,C. (1999), *Social Change in Western Europe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Culpitt,I. (1999), *Social Policy and Risk*, London,Sage.

Dingwall,R. (1997), “Accounts, Interviews, and Observations”, pp.51-66, in Miller,G. and R.Dingwall (eds), *Context and Method in Qualitative research*, London, Sage.

Dingwall,R. and P.Strong (1997), “The interactional study of Organisations a Critique and Reformulation”, pp.139-155, in Miller,G. and R.Dingwall (eds), *Context and Method in Qualitative Research*, London, Sage.

Dobbin, F. (1994), “Cultural Models of Organisation: The Social Construction of Rational Organising Principles”, pp.117-143, in Drane, D. (ed), *The Sociology of Culture*, Oxford, Blackwell.

Dovey,K. (1999), *Framing Places: Mediating power in built form*, London, Routledge.

du Gay, P. (1996), *Consumption and identity at work*, London, Sage.

Eldridge,J. (1999), “Culture at Work”, pp.97-109, in Beynon,H and P.Glavanis (eds): *Patterns of Social Inequality*, London, Longman.

Elias, N. and J. Scotson (1994), *The Established and the Outsiders*, London, Sage.

Foote,C. and A.Frank (1999), “Foucault and Therapy”, pp.157-89, in Chambon,A., A.Irving, L.Epstein (eds), *Reading Foucault for Social Work*, New York, Columbia University.

Foucault,M. (1977), *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*, London, Penguin.

Frow, J. (1995), *Cultural Studies and Cultural Value*, Oxford, Clarendon (ed).

Gattiker,U. (1990), *Technology Management in Organizations*, London, Sage.

Gouldner,A. (1954), *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, New York, Free Press.

Grint, K. (1994), *The Sociology of Work*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Hadjimichalis,C. and D. Vaiou (1990), “Flexible labour markets and Regional development in Northern Greece”, *Internation Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol 14, No 1, pp1-24.

- Hall, S. (1992), "Cultural studies and its theoretical legacies", pp. 277-294, in Grossberg, L. et al (eds), *Cultural Studies*, New York, Routledge.
- Hall, S. and P. du Gay (eds) (1996), *Questions of cultural identity*, London, Sage.
- Hanagan, M. and Ch. Tilly (1999), *Extending Citizenship: Reconfiguring States*, New York, Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hetherington, K. and R. Munro (eds) (1997), *Ideas of Difference*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Horowitz, I. (ed) (1979), *Power, Politics, and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Jenkins, R. (1992), *Key Sociologists: Pierre Bourdieu*, London, Routledge.
- Johnson, N. (1983), "Management in government", pp. 185-198, in Earl, M. (ed), *Perspectives on management*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Jordan, B. (1987), *Rethinking Welfare*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Kandylaki, A. (1996) *Male Youth and Sexual Abuse*, Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Bradford, Department of Applied Social Studies, University of Bradford.
- Kapllani, G. (2000), "Ta vasana ton Alvanon metanaston mesa apo ta radiokymata tis ERA-2", in *AIM articles - Greek Helsinki*, Athens, pp. 1-4.
- Kapsalis, A., K. Mponidis, A. Sipitanou (2000), *H eikona tou allou/geitona*, Research Unit of School Book/Georg-eckeit institut, Unesco, Athens, Typothito.
- Kassimati, K. (2001), *Domes kai Roes. To Phenomeno tis koinonikis kai epagelmatikis kinitikotitas*, Athens, Gutenberg.
- Laclau, E. and Ch. Mouffe (1985), *Hegemony and Socialist strategy: towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London, Verso.
- Lash, S. and J. Friedman (eds) (1992), *Modernity and Identity*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Lash, S. and J. Urry (1994), *Economies of Signs and Space*, London, Sage.
- Lazega, E. (1997), "Network Analysis and Qualitative Research: a method of Contextualization", pp. 119-139, in Miller, G. and R. Dingwall (eds): *Context and Method in Qualitative Research*, London, Sage.
- Lefebvre, H. (1976), *The Survival of Capitalism*, London, Allison & Busby.
- Letwin, S. (1998), *The Pursuit of Certainty: David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart*

- Mill, *Beatrice Webb*, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund.
- Levin, M. (ed) (2000), *Cultures of Control*, Amsterdam, Harwood.
- Moffat, K. (1999), "Surveillance and Government of the Welfare Recipient", pp. 219-247, in Chambon A. et al (eds): *Reading Foucault for Social Work*, New York, Columbia University Press.
- Mouzelis, N. (1967), *Organization and Bureaucracy*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Namenwirth, J. and R. Weber (1987), *Dynamics of Culture*, Winchester, Allen and Unwin.
- Nichols, T. (1999), "Industrial Sociology and the Labour Process", pp. 109-119, in Beynon, H. and P. Glavanis (eds), *Patterns of Social Inequality*, London, Longman.
- Page, E. and V. Wright (1999), *Bureaucratic Elites in Western European States: A comparative analysis of top officials*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Panagiotopoulos, N. (ed) (1999), *Pierre Bourdieu: Glossa kai Symboliki exousia*, Athens, Kardamitsa.
- Papademetriou, Z. (2000), *O Evropaios Ratsismos: eisagogi sto Filetiko misos*, Athens, Ellinika Grammata.
- Parker, S., R. Brown, J. Child, and M. Smith (1967), *The sociology of industry*, London, Unwin Hyman.
- Parton, N. (1999), "Reconfiguring Child Welfare Practices: Risk, Advanced Liberalism and the Government of Freedom", pp. 101-131, in Chambon, A. A. Irving and L. Epstein (eds): *Reading Foucault for Social Work*, New York, Columbia University Press.
- Peck, J. (1996), *Work Place: The Social Regulation of Labour Markets*, New York, The Guilford Press.
- Poole, R. (1999), *Nation and Identity*, London, Routledge.
- Popper, K. (1974), *The Open Society and its Enemies: Volume 2, Hegel and Marx*, London, Routledge.
- Psimmenos, I. (1999), *Metanastefsi kai Ergasia*, Athens, National and Kapodistrian University.
- Psimmenos, I. (2001), "Ergasia kai Ratsismos", pp. 1-23, in Kassimati, K. (ed), *Phenomena Koinokikis Pathogeneias se Omades Koinonikoy Apokleismou*, Athens, G. Secretariat for Greek Emigrants (in press).

- Ringer,F. (2000), *Max Weber's Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences*, London, Harvard University Press.
- Roberts,I. (1999), "Richard Brown and British Sociology", pp.10-20, in Beynon,H. and P.Glavanis (eds), *Patterns of Social Inequality*, London, Longman.
- Runciman, W. (1997), *The Social Animal*, London, Harper Collins.
- Sabel, Ch. (1984), *Work and Politics: the division of labour in industry*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Sardar,Z. (1998), *Postmodernism and the Other: The new Imperialism of Western Culture*, London, Pluto.
- Sennett,R. and J.Cobb (1993), *The Hidden Injuries of Class*, London, Faber and Faber.
- Silverman,D. and F.Gubrium (1994), "Competing Strategies for analysing contexts of social interaction", *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol.64, pp.179-98.
- Silverman,D. (1997), "The Logics Of Qualitative Research", pp.12-26, in Miller,G. and R.Dingwall (eds), *Context and Method in Qualitative Research*, London, Sage.
- Simitis,C. (2001), "PM speech towards the work-groups that constitute the network for the exchange of opinions and ideas for the Progressive Governance of Twenty-First Century", paper, Athens 19 March.
- Smith,G. (1970), *Social Work and the Sociology of Organizations*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Sotiropoulos,D. (1999), "A description of the Greek Higher Civil Service", pp.93-32 in Page,E. and V.Wright (eds), *Bureaucratic Elites in Western European States: A comparative analysis of top officials*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Sztompka,P. (1999), *Trust: A sociological Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, S. (1997), "'Empowerment' or 'Degradation'? T.Q.M. and the service sector", pp. 171-202, in Brown, R. (ed), *The changing shape of work*, London, Macmillan.
- Thompson, P. (1990), "Crawling from the wreckage: the labour process and the politics of production", in Knights, D. and H. Willmott (eds), *Labour Process Theory*, London, Macmillan.
- Tilly, Ch. and Ch. Tilly (1998), *Work under capitalism*, Oxford, Westview Press.
- Triantafyllidou, A. (1999), "Immigration in a New Host Country: Greece and the

Rhetoric of Exclusion”, *International Migration Review* (forthcoming).

Trantafyllidou, A. (2000), “The Political Discourse on Immigration in Southern Europe: A critical analysis”, pp.1-19, in Chrysochoou, X. (ed), “Political integration of Minorities:”, *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, special issue (under review).

Triantafyllidou, A. (2000), “A Theoretical and Methodological Introduction to the study of Organisational Culture”, *Internal report for the project IAPASIS*, Florence, University of Florence.

Triga, V. (2000), “Organisational Culture of European Independent Agencies”, Unpublished introductory paper for a Ph.D. Thesis, Florence, European University Institute.

Tsoukalas, K. (1995), “Free Riders in Wonderland; or, of Greeks in Greece”, pp.191-223, in Conostas, D. and Th. Stavrou (eds): *Greece Prepares for the twentieth-first Century*, London, Johns Hopkins University.

Tsoukalas, K. (1999), *Kratos, Koinonia, Ergasia sti metapolemiki Ellada*, Athens, Themelio.

Turner, S. (1997), “From governmentality to risk”, pp. ix-xvi, in Petersen, A. and R. Bunton (eds): *Foucault, Health and Medicine*, London, Routledge.

Vaiou, N. and C. Hadjimichalis (1997), *Me tin raptomichani stin kouzina kai tous Polonous stous agrous*, Athens, exantas.

Verelis, Ch., G. Pschalidis, N. Christodoulakis (2000), *Zitimata Eksychronismou*, Athens, Kastaniotis.

Wallerstein, I. (1983), *Historical Capitalism*, London, Verso.

Watson, T. (1980), *Sociology, Work, and Industry*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Weber, M. (1947), *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, New York, Free Press.

Weil, P. (2001), “Immigration Policies in developed countries; a comparative Approach (Europe-North America), paper, conference for the *Progressive Governance of Twenty-First Century*, Athens, 19 March.

Williams, R. (1977), *Marxism and Literature*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For a more theoretical analysis of both the objective and subjective mechanisms for controlling labour migration in Capitalism, see Castles and Kosack (1980). The first is referred here to the political economy of capitalist production, the techniques, the fordist system of organisation, whilst the second is referred to the manipulation of the indigenous working population. According to both authors, the rise of racialist and xenophobic ideologies and the decline of class consciousness are some of the most important effects of what they call *subjective* mechanisms in the control of labour migration. For a discussion of the effects on both indigenous and migrant labour from the imposition of new control mechanisms see also, Burawoy (1980). For Burawoy the state represents a third factor (i.e. the first is the demographic importance of migrant labour, and the second is the differentiation of the domestic labour force) for the regulation and control of the labour market as well as for the reproduction of migrant labour.

The term *normalisation* here, denotes the ability to “*accommodate*” the principles of economic action and accumulation. The term is applied in a Foucauldian sense of critical study of the processes by which society and administrators bring people into line with the hegemonic regimes of social control. Studying the effects of administrative practice over people, Foucault identified three major aspects that contribute towards the reproduction of society: *normalisation*, *discipline* and *governance*. Normalisation is referring to the *paths* of *categorisation* that objectify the subject and its behaviour, whilst at the same time is constructing bipolar dichotomies of self and others and is responsible for multiple divisions of the first and of the second. The term is used in an ideal way and as a strategy of power over people and is exemplified through two strategies: (a) the definition of the abnormal in contrast to the normal; (b) “...the clinical criteria for candidacy in the abnormal are expanded until the normal is defined out of existence or at least relegated to the margins. The normal remains less as a reality than as a therapeutic ideal, the objective of a technology of the self. *Normalisation* becomes the self-evident ideal that supports a technology, and the technology self-evidently requires therapeutic assistance...” (Foote and Frank 1999:164).

<sup>2</sup> see Isaac 1992:47 in Dovey, K. (1999), there are two forms of power identified as important: *power to* and *power over*. The first (following Rorty’s understanding) is relating to the capacity one has to “*achieve some end*”... The “*capacity*” to imagine, construct and inhabit a better built environment is what we mostly mean by empowerment... (Dovey 1999:9). In contrast, power over *others* is defined as the capacity (i.e. of administrators) to limit in this case the empowerment of *others*.

<sup>3</sup> the functionalist understanding is that culture is providing with a *blueprint* of how society develops, adapts and integrates its members to a given pattern maintenance, it does see *culture* and *society* in harmony and equilibrium. Instead, we think that this *close fit* between *society* and *culture* is a *functionalist myth* argued forcefully in Parsons AGIL scheme. Deviations from the norm (Cohen 1974) conflicts and the pursue of collective interests that may contradict certain business and certain groups of labourers in the labour market is a more realistic understanding of organisational culture insofar as the control of the immigrant labour force in the Athenian Market (Namenwirth and Weber 1987; Cohen 1987).

<sup>4</sup> Contingent workers, according to Peck (1996), are workers who have “looser” relation with the labour market, and are usually used at the last instance for covering employers’ needs, and/or workers who are exempt from wage-labour (not based on free will), and are defined by an expected irregular work behaviour and the way they are seen by public officials. According to Hinrichs (1985 p.38), this contingent status “...is reflected in worker identities”. Ascriptively defined groups who are granted access to non-waged subsistence are “characterised by a “*broken*” social identity (because their) conduct always appears to themselves (and to the labour market partners) in the light of their alternative role to which they can always switch for rationally justifiable reasons...” (see Peck 1996:43-44)

<sup>5</sup> According to Edwards (1979), labour control is identified through the analysis of *simple*, technical and bureaucratic regimes; Friedman (1977) has seen labour control through a shift from “*direct control*” to “*responsible autonomy*”, and for Burawoy (1985) labour control is represented through a shift from the *politics of production* and the *despotic regimes of early capitalism* to the *hegemonic regimes of management* (see Peck 1996:36)

<sup>6</sup> According to Dingwall and Strong (1997), the new organisational theory is mostly centred around Meyer and Rowan’s (1997:345) understanding of Weber’s analysis. They argue that...societies such as ours have various established devices - “building blocks...littered around the societal landscape” - for translating social into formal organisations. These blocks constitute the elements whose incorporation is a necessary

condition for legitimating organisational activity. Many of them take a legal or paralegal form... (Dingwall and Strong 1997:142).

<sup>7</sup> private conversation with emeritus Professor R.K. Merton (1999) on “how to study Social phenomena”; for Mills C.W. see the edited collection by Prof. Horowitz (1979). Mills tried to bridge the gap between macro and micro sociological theories by shuttling between levels of abstraction following a two-step act of Research pp.553-68.

<sup>8</sup> for the use of metaphors like the *City* and that of *Organisations* see the analysis provided by Cohen, S. (1987); Chambon, A. et al (1999); and the seminal work of Foucault, M. (1977): *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*.

<sup>9</sup> see Namewirth and Weber (1987) and in particular the study on *organisations* by Clegg and Dunkerley (1984). Both authors stress the importance to orient research around the structure of organisations to individuals and groups the latter control, rather than organisations *per se*. Much help for the understanding of organisational structure has been here Therborn’s (1978) *What Does the Ruling Class Do When it Rules?*... The state is composed of a system of apparatuses as a type of formal organisation... distinguished by its specific functions. What are these? Therborn says that they are “coercive defence, political governance (by supreme rule-making), administrative management (by rule-application), and judicial regulation of a given social formation”. These are to be conceived “as a formally bounded system of structured processes within a global system of societal processes...” (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1984:491-92).

<sup>10</sup> *Operating structures* or operating procedures are important here because they clarify the devices used for immigration control and the ways tasks are to be performed. see Child (1984).

<sup>11</sup> The interview guide has focused on how information about immigrants are collated; used to control their status; how the public officials reach a decision; what characteristics are used for migrants’ classification etc.

<sup>12</sup> For an analysis of difference, same and of *symbolic power* see Hetherington and Munro (1997). Both authors argue the importance of the process of identity, of a member of a community doing the right things in order to become a member. They note that manufacturing pathways of membership into the *global community* or the European community is not starting at Brussels but rather at the local environment through the manufacturing of divisions and subdivisions that helps create and preserve identity and a multiplicity of social spaces for people (Munro 1997:18-19).

<sup>13</sup> According to the analysis of Ahrne (1998), both state and voluntary organisations, apart from the issue of *ownership* are founded around three basic issues: Access/distribution of resources; a division of labour; and social control. In relation to the first, resources and the way these are handled, characterize much of the way members are affiliated to an organisation and, hence, the culture that characterizes officials’ work and motivation to control immigrants. In relation to the second issue, a given division of labour, according to Ahrne, implies a set of rules that regulate affiliation of members and coordinates their activities in a bureaucratic or hierarchical manner, or both. Finally, the third issue has got to do with the object of labour, which is to control officials and immigrants.

<sup>14</sup> Cambetta’s (1998) thesis in his article “Concatenations of mechanisms” is that mechanisms interact with one another in society forming what the author calls as “concatenations of mechanisms”. His example of the stability of the Italian academic institutions is very relevant to the study of control in public and voluntary organisations. This is because it does focus upon the social mechanisms involved in producing social stability through reciprocity and the emergence of “self-serving values and beliefs” that justify officials’ behaviour on a personal (other than rationality) basis.

<sup>15</sup> For Burawoy (1982), the internal labour market of organisations is realized in order to secure and obscure the ways through which surplus value is extracted and appropriated from the work of employees. Burawoy is suggesting a number of ways through which surplus value is secured. These are: (a)the internalisation of some of the features of external labour market (i.e. Competitive individualism); (b)the concentration of *mobility* at the level of production; (c)through fostering a commitment to organisational goals which is achieved through confining ambivalence (i.e. at the work environment) “within narrower limits” and expanding a number of choices for employees and management.

<sup>16</sup> The issue here suggests that the labour power of employees has to be turned into labour for an organisation, through the practicing of certain regimes of control which on turn translate power into actual work at the production level, and at the same time accomplish the ideological regulation of workers. However, these regimes of control, as it is shown in the actual study, cannot be analysed in separation from either external or internal influences to the work environment. Between Goldthorpe’s (1966) study on “*Orientations to work and industrial behaviour*” and Burawoy’s (1982) “*Manufacturing consent*”, Nichols

(1999) and Eldridge (1999) suggest a middle ground: where the work of employees is seen as a product of global-local interrelationships, and organisational culture is inseparable from issues of community, citizenship rights, and the manifestation of inequalities in capitalism.

<sup>17</sup> “badges of ability” as Sennet and Cobb argue, in the Greek context are not translated into skills or the ability to do something but more as the ability to know, to control people and resources. Respect is given more to those who are able to use and transform their immediate environment, be it financial or social.

<sup>18</sup> By the term *allocation*, the analysis implies here those impersonal practices that are socially structured and are responsible for what we usually call *matching* between jobs and workers. This *matching* process is left to the welfare administrators who set the criteria for immigrants’ work and residence permits, and attach to immigrants cultural and economic characteristics, that define in turn their exemption or inclusion in the Greek labour market.

<sup>19</sup> According to the project’s requirements, the formal practices are identified here as that of: hierarchical or egalitarian character within the organisation; the division of tasks; the personal or impersonal character of authority; and the type of discretion allowed formally. On the other hand, informal practices are being identified here as: the non written codes, shared by fellow members of the responsible for the control organisations.

<sup>20</sup> Efficiency seems to be more related with *informal* networks established within administrative type of work rather than formal-bureaucratic organisation schemes, see in addition the work of Mouzelis (1967) and of Smith (1970).

<sup>21</sup> For a theoretical analysis of similar studies on medical practices in public administrative places see the analysis offered on the NHS by Cousins (1987). For a more historical analysis of the medicalisation of management or the establishment of control around the *body politic* see the analysis of Allen (2000) and how bureaucracy practices surveillance and control through the application of medical terms in a fashion that resembles an industrial plant management, see also Jordan (1987) and his critical analysis of the welfare system.

<sup>22</sup> For Weber, in his *Economy and Society*, there are four types of human conduct that is orientated to the behaviour of others: (a) a purposive rational action; (b) a value rational action; (c) an affectual action; (d) a traditional action.

<sup>23</sup> According to Turner (1997) and Moffatt (1999) this new management of welfare rights aims: at the adaptation of internal administrative systems to the technical and economic systems of flexibility; and at the “*political protection*” of those that administer the “*flexible society*” from those that are the *clients* of welfare. A new administrative logic governs welfare officers that regulates according to the values and systems of the global market (Culpitt 1999).

<sup>24</sup> For a further analysis of welfare and economic systems of control, see Beniger’s (1986) socio-historical account of the links between bureaucracy and corporate management at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Geertz’s (1964) seminal understanding of how cultural phenomena are linked to ideology. Geertz has suggested the need: ...to define the meanings of control and its modes as well as to explore the relationship between ideologies of control, the historical circumstances in which they arose and changed, and the shifting sociology of those adhered to them... (Levin 2000:x).

<sup>25</sup> This concern in opposition to *synthesis* is to make explicit the officers’ *constituent bases* upon which national identity and perceptions about immigrants and immigration are constructed. *National identity* is a sociologically complex understanding of one’s reference and identity with a group of people and unlike common beliefs it is the end product of a long process rather than the beginning of officers’ *affiliations*. see: Coxon and Davies (1986).

<sup>26</sup> For a further analysis on the notion of people and its oppositional nature to the power bloc of the state, see Laclau, Mouffe (1985), as well as Hall (1992). For an analysis of the relation between community and a welfare system of services see Jordan (1987), *Chapter six*.

<sup>#27</sup> For a closer understanding of *culture* and *community* of sameness and exclusion, see the works of Williams (1977) and Elias and Scotson (1994).

<sup>28</sup> For a further understanding of the term *cultural capital* see the work of Bourdieu (1986) and Bourdieu, Passeron (1991), as well as the works of Frow (1995) and Lash and Friedman (1992). Cultural capital is relating to the knowledge/information and systems of production that welfare officers *use* for the control of welfare resources. *Cultural capital* here refers to that form of capital that is embedded in the work of a specific group of people, like officers, which enables them to categorize and control immigrants according to material and cultural criteria and aims for the reproduction of power and social dominance. This *dominance* is useful for the implementation of the economic transformation project. see also Hall and Paul

du Gay (1996), Panagiotopoulos (1999) and Jenkins (1992).

<sup>29</sup> According to Matthew Arnold's work, *Culture and Anarchy* p.132, Hellenism is supposed to be based on the *spontaneity of conscience* as opposed to *strictness of conscience*. For the latter *obedience* is the fundamental idea, see Letwin 1996:355.

<sup>30</sup> This seems opposite to a bureaucratic understanding of work based on rationality and on the rule of procedures and of experts.

<sup>31</sup> One major benefit that officers have always demanded is an increase of their status and income according to their productivity and job tasks. In a sense, even according to public opinion what differentiates public from private organisations is the flatness of incomes and status the first enjoy.

<sup>32</sup> see the different reports on racism in Greece presented by Papademetriou (2000:298). According to the above study, racist discourse in Greece has racial religious and political elements. In the case of extreme right-wing parties, racist discourse is usually expressed through a reference to Hellenic superiority to other races and through an anti-Semitic practices. Papademetriou points towards the existence of a noticed discriminatory discourse often used by public officials and leading towards the further *institutional* discrimination of minorities and immigrants. This is contrary to article 5-paragraph 2 of the Greek Constitution and comes also in conflict with major ratified international conventions on preventing racism. In addition see the recent study on the images of the "other", by the research unit of the Aristoteleian University of Thessaloniki (Kapsalis, Mponidis, Siptanou 2000). Triantafyllidou (1999) refers also to the way immigrants are being perceived by Greeks. In her recent research study which is about the *rhetoric of exclusion* she concentrates on the ways xenophobia is manifested and re-structured around cultural rather than territorial issues.

<sup>33</sup> According to History and political theory, people from the Orient, for example, have always been considered with envy by public administrators because they have been considered passive and a lesser threat to administration and to society. According to Mill's "*Representative Government*" p.144, administrators have favoured passive people because: "Passiveness of our neighbours increases our sense of security, and plays into the hands of our wilfulness". But according to Mill, this is how moralists have viewed certain races. With the development of Liberal ideology, passiveness was turned into a kind of menace that presented a "threat" for the administration of civil society. Mill notes that "*passiveness*" is negative because: the "person who never stirs and lacks many advantages possessed by others is more of a menace because he regards his successful neighbours with *hatred* and *malice*"... (Letwin 1998:332). For a more recent critical approach towards liberalism and the welfare state see Jordan (1987). In *Chapter five* Jordan analyses the issues of *freedom* and *equality* from state control and how the project to achieve the first does not come into conflict with the issue of equality.

<sup>34</sup> The term "professional" is usually reserved for categories who have established: a specialised body of knowledge, have specific work/ethical standards, retain their autonomy from outside scrutiny and control, see Brown (1992), Parker, Brown, Child and Smith (1967), and Watson (1980). However, in the Sociology of work and industry, the study of "*Professions*" is being dividend, apart from the theories generated around *orientations to work*, *action* lead theories, and the investigation of the *Labour process*, between three main questions: *what* occupation is considered a *profession*; which group is *more or less* a profession; and finally, whether or not profession is an occupation or "a means of controlling a profession", Parker et al (1967:143). For our analytic purposes here, the term "*professional*" identity is used with a caution meaning more a process of discovering a sense of identity that resembles that of professional person, rather than an ideal type which has *fixed* or *stable* characteristics. Officials at IKA and OAED undergo a "*professionalisation Process*", discovering their occupational and personal freedoms and competitors. This process is essential at times of economic and political transformation, where existing work conditions, roles, and identities undergo a general questioning. See also Kassimati (2001).

<sup>35</sup> In actual fact, transformation according to du Gay (1995) is a response to the perceived economic, political, and social changes. See du Gay and Salaman (1992) and their analysis of the *discourse of enterprise*. "*The discourse of enterprise* fundamentally contends that, due to external environmental developments, we are witnessing the erosion of bureaucratic and hierarchical control and regulation both inside and outside of work organisational life. Furthermore, it is suggested that this is necessary to enable individual, organisational and nation-state development and prosperity within a rapidly changing global context"... Taylor (1997:173).

<sup>36</sup> For Burawoy (1982) the so-called manufacturing of consent is considered vital for both management and workers. In the case of management, the active involvement of workers in the implementation of

production policies obscures and simultaneously ensures the continuous generation of surplus value and of exploitation. In the case of workers, Burawoy argues that the active involvement of the workforce generated a sense of work identity that in a way compensated (psychologically and socially) workers for their everyday negative experiences of labour. There are three stages in Burawoy's argument: first the advancement of the notion of *factory regimes*, second the distinction of *market despotic* from *hegemonic regimes* that control social relations at the workplace, and finally the development of what he calls *hegemonic despotism*. see also Brown (1992) and Thompson (1990).

<sup>37</sup> Cultural capital values are also seen as central for the discussion of officers' definition of immigrant clients, and of the sense of identity with their work situation. see the analysis in sub-sections 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.2. We refer here to a *kind* of cultural capital simply in order to express a caution over the widespread, uncritical use of the term.

<sup>38</sup> This comes very close to Strauss et al (1963) "*negotiated order*" thesis, but over here in the context of welfare organisations Child's (1984) "*strategic choice*" approach is also relevant. Officials negotiate the control of immigrants through *conditions* that ensure their interests. However, Salaman's (1979, 1984) view on organisations offers a more critical perspective. In this case, power relations, the political and economic environment as well as the significance of identity processes are significant, see the analysis on the above, Grint (1991).

<sup>39</sup> For a theoretical analysis of *trust* in organisations and the "*dialectics of control*" see Taylor (1997) and Sabel (1984). In relation to the second, it seems that service organisations move towards a kind of an administrative system where officers may in some ways determine *what work is to be done and how* (Sabel 1984:210). Having said this, *trust* relationships seem to be here employees goal, rather than an organisational formal policy.