

PHILIP MUUS

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES

ABSTRACT. Member States of the European Union (EU) have undoubtedly changed into *de facto* countries of immigration. Since the upswing in migration in the late 1980s, net migration for the 15 EU Member States together has not been below 500,000. This article first focuses on trends in international migration (such as migration from former colonies, recruitment of temporary workers, and East-West migration) and special groups of immigrants (such as ethnic Germans, asylum seekers, and clandestine migrants). The second part of the article pays attention to immigrant settlement and migration policies, especially focusing on the European Union (trafficking and smuggling of humans, and the integration of migrants on the labour market). Detailed comparison of international migration flows is seriously hindered by a complexity of different national registration systems, and different countries display differences with regard to type and history of migration, country of origin, size of migration flows and immigrant populations.

KEY WORDS: asylum policies, immigrants, labour market, migration, statistics

INTRODUCTION

Europe changed from an area of emigration towards the New World into an area of immigration in the second half of the past century. Decolonisation, a temporary but massive need for low- and unskilled workers, wars and political suppression, the end of the Cold War, and the reunification of Germany, have led to a variety of migration movements towards and inside Europe (Muus 1993; Salt 1998; Coleman 1999). At the start of the new millennium the European migration debate is about the need for replacement migration given the rapidly ageing and declining populations, about the need for (highly-) skilled workers, about clandestine migration and the abuse of asylum, and about how to fight the trafficking of migrants. If we take a closer look at the individual 15 Member States of the European Union we witness a mosaic of migration movements and of resident immigrant populations, and a mosaic with a view to type and history of migration, country of origin, size of the migration flows and immigrant populations. This article will highlight some of the past and current trends in international migration towards European countries, and the develop-




ments in immigrant settlement, migration policies and immigrant labour market integration.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, TYPES AND TRENDS

A short definition of international migration is the movement of persons across national borders with the intention to settle in another country for a period of at least a year. Detailed international comparison of international migration flows is seriously hindered by a complexity of different national registration systems. Here we refer to the major trends and estimates given by EUROSTAT (1999, 2000) and the SOPEMI (Continuous reporting system on migration) system of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999).

Figure 1 shows that international migration towards and from the current 15 Member States of the European Union has resulted in an annual net migration (immigration minus emigration) pattern, which shows important variations in time, but has been above 500,000 for the whole area since 1988. Behind these data we find a complexity of (national) patterns. The most important will be highlighted.



source: EUROSTAT, European social statistics Migration, table A-1.
1993-1998 provisional data; 1999 estimate EUROSTAT in: Statistics in focus, population and social conditions, theme 3-15/1999

Figure 1. EU 15 total net migration, 1960–1999.

Migration from (Former) Colonies

Former colonial powers such as France, the UK but also the Netherlands and to a minor degree Portugal and Belgium, have been confronted with migration flows from their (former) colonies, partly as a consequence of decolonisation. The UK received migrants from the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent; France witnessed a massive inflow in the early 1960s from Algeria; and the Netherlands became, from the early 1970s onwards, a settlement country for a large proportion of the small population of Surinam, having already received a major wave of repatriated Dutch and others from nowadays Indonesia in the 1950s.

Recruitment of 'Temporary' Workers

In the 1960s until the 'oil crisis' in 1973 several Northwestern European states received a large number of predominantly low- and unskilled male workers from the Mediterranean countries. Portuguese, Spaniards, Italians, Yugoslavs (here from former Yugoslavia) and Greeks, along side Turks, Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians headed for vacancies on the labour markets in Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands. Each destination country had its own particular relationship with a few of the dominant labour sending countries: Germany with Turkey, France with the Maghreb and the Iberian peninsula, Switzerland with Italy and Spain, Belgium with Italy and Morocco, and the Netherlands with Turkey and Morocco. But most destination countries also received workers in lower quantities from the other sending countries. The UK recruited workers in its former colonies. Sweden received large numbers of Finnish workers, who could move easily within the Nordic free movement area. While recruitment was in most countries halted in the mid-1970s, return rates of the workers were low, specifically among workers from current non-EU countries. Many of the labour migrants from Southern European countries returned home, specifically to countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece. These higher return rates were caused by important improvements in the economies back home, the return to democracy (Spain, Greece, and Portugal) and the existing or forthcoming membership of the European Community. Gradually, Southern European countries started to show positive net migration figures, partly due to the return of the former labour migrants but partly due to an increase in migration from non-European destinations.

Family Reunification

Migration from former recruitment countries, specifically from the Maghreb and Turkey, continued after the recruitment policies were halted. Migra-

tion continued under a new heading. Those who were allowed to stay chose a more permanent stay and many of them opted for (partial) family reunification in the countries of destination if policies allowed them to do so. Later this follow-up migration was, and is still to be, seen among their adult children who may bring their marriage partner over to the country of destination (family formation).

Asylum Seeking

In the mid-1980s most of the Northwestern European countries experienced a new type of migration that within a number of years increased to become a major potential inflow of immigrants. Individuals from problem areas all over the world started to apply for asylum in Europe. Figure 2 shows that a number of countries within the current EU received a disproportional share of all asylum seekers. Germany was and to a certain extent still is, the dominant destination country for asylum seekers. The other important destination countries in the EU are France and the UK, and population-wise, smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden (see Table I).

Interestingly, we can note not only a disproportional share of asylum seekers between EU countries; but also that the country of origin of asylum seekers differs greatly between those countries (Böcker and Havinga 1998; UNHCR Statistics 2000). In 1999 the top two countries of origin of asylum seekers for a number of European destination countries still shows important variations (see Table II).




Figure 2. Asylum requests in 15 European countries, total and some selected countries, 1985–1999. Source: EUROSTAT, Demographic Statistics, data 1960–1999; for the years 1985–1998; EUROSTAT Statistics in focus-Theme 3-15/1999; first estimate for 1999.

TABLE I

The relative proportion of asylum seekers (year 1998) in the population of receiving EU Member States (1–1–1998) (per 1,000 inhabitants).

Receiving country	Asylum seekers in 1998 ^a	Population at 1–1–1998 (rounded) ^b	Asylum seekers 1998 per 1,000 inhabitants (1–1–1998)
Belgium	21,965	10,192,300	2.2
Denmark	5,699	5,294,900	1.1
Germany	98,655	82,057,400	1.2
Greece	1,990	10,511,000	0.2
Spain	6,639	39,347,900	0.2
France	22,374	58,726,900	0.4
Ireland	4,530	3,704,900	1.2
Italy	6,940	57,563,400	0.1
Luxembourg	1,709	423,700	4.0
Netherlands	45,217	15,654,300	2.9
Austria	13,805	8,075,400	1.7
Portugal	355	9,957,300	0.0
Finland	1,272	5,147,300	0.2
Sweden	12,844	8,847,600	1.5
United Kingdom	46,015	58,185,000	0.8
<i>EU-15</i>	<i>288,757</i>	<i>374,582,800</i>	<i>0.8</i>

Source: European Communities (2000).

^aAsylum seekers: Belgium: excluding dependent children; Denmark: excluding applications outside Denmark and rejected applications at the border; Spain: excluding dependents, 1998 estimate; France: excluding dependents and some accompanying adults; Ireland: rounded figures; Italy: excluding dependent children, rounded figures; Austria: 1998 estimate; EU-15: 1998 estimate.

^bPopulation: France: calculated on the basis of the 1990 census; Austria: calculated on the basis of the 1991 census; United Kingdom figure for 1–1–1997; EU-15: estimate.

Ethnic Germans

A specific case should be made for a major migration flow to Germany: the 'return' of ethnic Germans. Under Basic German law, former German settlers and their descendants in Central- and Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union are entitled to German citizenship upon arrival in Germany. The lessening of emigration restrictions for these categories in the weakening East Bloc caused an important upheaval with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans, starting in the late 1980s and reaching a peak of nearly 400,000 arrivals in 1990. Since then the yearly numbers have gone down, but have remained at over 100,000 yearly.

TABLE II

Top 2 countries of origin of asylum seekers per selected European destination country in 1999.

Receiving country	First country of origin (in percentages)		Second country of origin (in percentages)		Total asylum seekers (absolute)
Austria	Yugo. FR	34	Iran	17	20,130
Belgium	Yugo. FR	13	Romania	5	35,777
Denmark	Iraq	28	Slovakia	15	6,467
Finland	Slovakia	49	Poland	10	3,107
France	China	17	Yugo. FR	8	30,833
Germany	Yugo. FR	33	Turkey	10	95,331
Netherlands	Afghanistan	11	Iraq	9	39,300
Spain	Algeria	16	Romania	12	8,405
Sweden	Iraq	32	Yugo. FR	16	11,231
Switzerland	Yugo. FR	64	Iraq	4	46,133
UK	Yugo. FR	20	Somalia	11	71,415

Source: UNHCR statistics 2000; provisional figures (www.unhcr.ch/statist/0002euro/tab05d.htm).

EU-Migrants

This category of migrants usually gets much less attention from researchers and the media because of its supposedly less problematic character. The increase in the free movement rights for EU citizens within the European Union does not seem to have led to a major increase in mobility within the EU. Simon (1990) concluded that the high mobility figures within Europe of the 1960s and early 1970s have not been reached since then. Recent figures (1997) on the relative proportion of EU citizens in the total immigration and emigration of foreigners in EU countries, show that immigration of EU citizens is relatively important in Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland and Portugal (all more than 50% of all foreign immigrants), but also that the return of EU citizens is far above that of non-EU nationals (EUROSTAT 2000). Most EU countries have migratory relations with neighbouring countries.

Highly Skilled Migrants

A minor flow of migrants consists of highly-skilled personnel, both from within and outside the EU. It is partly made up of intra-company transferees, moving within transnational corporations. Its economic significance outweighs the small numbers involved (Salt 1998). Recently, the numbers of high-skilled migrants from non-EU countries have increased in a number of European countries. Available data are scarce, but for the UK in the 1990s

there was a noticeable upward trend in permits for the highly skilled (OECD 1999). The Netherlands experienced an increase in work-permits for non-EU foreigners at the end of the 1990s, and whilst the numbers may be small, new types of immigrants become visible such as ICT experts from countries like India and South-Africa (Muus 2000). The German Federal government approved a plan (green cards) in July 2000 to allow 10,000 ICT experts from non-EU countries to work in Germany for a maximum of five years under specific conditions. If necessary, an additional 10,000 will be allowed to enter the country (*Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14-07-2000).

Clandestine Migrants

Part of the migration to Europe takes place outside the official channels. Restrictions on entry for most of the non-EU countries in the fields of work, asylum and family reunification have reduced yearly net migration figures for legal migrants. The same restrictions may have pushed some potential migrants into irregular migration heading for clandestine jobs often in the informal part of the economy and/or to a clandestine stay with legally resident family members or compatriots. Some of the clandestine migrants may have arrived legally, but by overstaying the allowed period for a temporary visit they become illegal; asylum seekers, whose asylum claims are not acknowledged may become illegal immigrants if they do not obey the decision to leave the country. Southern European countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece, relative newcomers as '*de facto* countries of immigration', have specifically become attractive for clandestine labour migrants. The presence of clandestine job opportunities in the informal economy has attracted many. Migration regulation lags behind the restrictive policies of the other EU countries with a longer immigration history. The introduction of new admission laws in the 'new' countries of immigration is repeatedly carried out in conjunction with major regularisation programmes. Since 1986 four major regularisation programmes have been launched in Italy, the last programme of 1998/1999 introduced a quatum of 300,000 persons; the first major regularisation programme in Greece (1997/1998) led to 375,000 applications (if compared to an officially recorded labour force in Greece of 4.3 million) (OECD 1999). Regularisation programmes in Spain concerned 108,000 persons in 1991 and 21,000 in 1996 (OECD 1998).

The presence of clandestine migrants in the countries where no opportunities exist for major regularisation, is by definition a wild guess. 'Gues-timates' vary between 5–10% of the legally resident foreign population.

East–West Migration: Unlike the Expectations

The gradual disappearance of authoritarian communist regimes in the former East Bloc countries and the final dismantling of the Iron Curtain went hand in hand with a sharp increase in East–West migration. High immigration into Germany (1989) led to wild speculations among other Western European governments about unprecedented massive migration from the East towards their countries. These fears and expectations never materialised, partly because the *Aussiedler* immigration to Germany is a specific German issue that cannot be transplanted to other countries, partly because of the restrictive admission policies of Western European countries, and partly because of a lack of existing migration patterns and a much lower desire than expected to leave the country of origin. Some migration took place to other Western destinations such as the USA, and surpassed European destinations. The migration patterns that arose are much more complex and partly take place within Central and Eastern Europe by people whose origins lie there. Salt (1998) distinguishes the development of three distinct migration regions in Europe: Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe excluding the CIS countries, and the CIS countries. In Central and Eastern Europe an increase in short-term, short-distance movement across state-boundaries is reported. Salt (1998) quotes Okolski (1998) who distinguishes temporary labour migration westwards, intra-regional flows of workers, inflows of workers from developing countries, inflows of highly skilled workers from Western-Europe, return migration, and ethnic migrations to Germany, Israel and the former USSR. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have become the unintended end stations of migrants on their way to Western Europe, a type of migration often labelled as transit-migration. The wars in the former Yugoslavia have to be mentioned specifically, having caused major refugee flows inside the former Yugoslavia and towards other mainly European destinations.

IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT AND MIGRATION POLICIES

Foreign and Foreign-born Population in the European Union

On 1 January 1998, according to EUROSTAT estimates, the total foreign or non-national population of the 15 EU Member States was 19.1 million of a total population of 375 million. The number of EU citizens among the non-national residents is estimated at 6 million, the remaining 13.1 million have a non-EU nationality. Germany (7.4 million), France (3.6 million) and the UK (2.1 million) have the largest non-national popula-

tions. Relative figures show that the share of the non-national population is above the EU average (5.1%) in Belgium (8.9%), Germany (9%), France (6.3%), Luxembourg (34.9%), Austria (6.6%) and Sweden (5.9%). Low proportions of non-national population are found in Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Finland (all between 1.5% and 1.8%). Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK show medium shares of non-national population (between 3.0% and 4.7%).

The composition of the non-national categories shows important variations between the Member States of the EU, as may be expected from the different national migration histories. In Germany 2.1 million Turkish nationals reside; in France 1.4 million nationals from Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia; in the UK 0.3 million nationals from Bangladesh, India or Pakistan reside (EUROSTAT 2000).

Figures on nationality do not necessarily tell the whole story about the presence of immigrants and their descendants in a country. Immigrants from former colonies may already have been in the possession of the nationality of the mother country. Naturalisation by definition has an impact on the size of the non-national population. Clarke et al. (1998) have investigated the available data on naturalisations in the 15 EU Member States, and have arrived at an estimate of increasing numbers of naturalisations between 1980 (102,000) and 1994 (227,000). This increase seems to have equal pace with the increase in the total non-national population. Belgium and France are excluded from these figures due to a lack in the time series. Change of nationality decreased among EU nationals, while it increased among non-EU nationals. In the area of the EU and EFTA countries 1.9 million people acquired the citizenship of their country of residence between 1986 and 1993. Among them were 0.4 million EU/EFTA nationals and 1.5 million non-EU/EFTA nationals. The top three countries of previous citizenship for that period were Morocco, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. Clarke et al. (1998) discern three trends in naturalisation:

1. the increase in naturalisation among long established 'guest-worker' categories and their family members;
2. links with former colonies clearly visible in the acquisition of citizenship figures;
3. naturalisation of citizens from 'refugee producing' countries.

Differences in national legislation with regard to naturalisation may have an effect on the actual rates of naturalisation. Naturalisation rates in the early 1990s are highest in the Netherlands and Sweden (around 6% in 1994), while the naturalisation rate in Germany is the lowest (below 1%

in 1993) if nationality changes for ethnic Germans are excluded. Naturalisation rates of non-nationals in Germany are expected to rise after a liberal change in citizenship legislation has taken place the end of the 1990s.

Unfortunately, there exists no statistical information for all individual EU countries on their population by country of birth. Figures presented by the OECD (1999) for the Netherlands and Sweden show large differences between the size of the foreign-born and the foreign/non-national population in 1997. While the foreign born population is 1.5 million in the Netherlands and nearly 1 million in Sweden, the foreign/non-national population is 0.7 million in the Netherlands and 0.6 million in Sweden. Similar differences may be found in countries such as France and the UK with large populations born in former colonies. Germany, due to its thus far restrictive naturalisation legislation, and new countries of immigration, will show a lower discrepancy between the two figures.

Migration Policies

The regulation of migration in the EU takes place at different levels. A distinction has to be made between international migration of EU citizens and that of non-EU citizens. Most types of migration of EU citizens are nowadays ruled by the supra-national regulations of the EU.

Since 1968, the year wherein the regulation on the freedom of movement for workers within the Community was introduced, the number of regulations concerning free movement rights of EU citizens has gradually increased. Regulations and directives followed: on the right to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State (1970); on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services (1973); on the right of nationals of a Member State to remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued there an activity in a self-employed capacity (1975); on the right of residence (1990); on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity (1990); and on the right of residence for students (1990).

The basic principle of free movement rights for EU citizens within the EU is that either income can be generated by a job or self-employment, or by the Member State of origin in case of study, or by a pension from the Member State of origin etcetera. Unemployed EU citizens are entitled to look for a job in another EU country for a period of up to three months, but have to return to their country if no job is found. Those who move for other reasons, such as in the case of a marriage with a national of another

EU Member State, fall under the national regulations of admission of foreigners for that Member State.

Non-EU citizens enjoy none of these rights. Even if they have permanent establishment rights in another EU Member State, they are not entitled to move freely within the EU. All international migration of non-EU citizens is regulated by national law, unless it concerns specific categories of migrants for whom international treaties are valid.

Admission policies of individual Member States of the EU have generally become more restrictive towards most types of non-EU immigration. The admission of low- and unskilled foreign labour has practically become impossible since the oil crisis of 1973. Only temporary, seasonal labour is in certain cases admitted, mainly in relation to temporary labour shortages in horticulture and agriculture. Rules on the admission of family members of legally resident third country nationals were tightened. Since the increase in the numbers of asylum seekers, most European destination countries have taken all kinds of restrictive measures to decrease the number of asylum claims, particularly putting emphasis on fighting those who, as non-genuine asylum seekers, abuse the system. Germany, which once had a most generous asylum provision in its Basic Law, has amended the relevant Article 16(2) 'Persons persecuted for political reasons enjoy the right of asylum' with specifications and restrictions (Bosswick 1997). Asylum seeker receiving countries started to introduce a number of principles regarding the right to apply for asylum, such as: the safe country principle (lists of countries whose citizens will have practically no chance of receiving a protection status); and safe third countries (countries where asylum seekers could have applied for asylum during their journey).

The Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention, started as inter-governmental initiatives and introduced the principle that an asylum claim will only be dealt with in the first Member State of arrival. Simultaneously, a large number of measures were taken to shift responsibility for the arrival of foreigners who lack the proper documents and visas, to the carriers. After the introduction of carrier sanctions, a number of readmission agreements were concluded with neighbouring countries of the EU. These agreements stipulate that the respective country (A) will readmit her own citizens and those foreigners who arrived illegally or stay illegally in the respective EU country, while having arrived from that country (A). As a consequence of all these restrictive measures it has become increasingly difficult for potential non-EU migrants ('third country nationals'), whether or not forced to migrate, to arrive in a legal way or to apply for a stay permit in an EU Member State. Although the figures for registered migration to EU Member States have largely decreased since the early 1990s, there

are signs that it is increasingly difficult for individual clandestine migrants to arrive without assistance and that irregular migration is largely becoming part and parcel of an organised (criminal) business. Trafficking and human smuggling are becoming the unintended but negative side effects of the ever-restrictive entry policies of EU countries.

Trafficking and Human Smuggling

Irregular migration is not in itself a new phenomenon. But European countries, both EU Member States and other European countries, have increasingly been confronted with trafficking and human smuggling. Traffic in migrants has received more media attention since more often loss of life has been reported related to trafficking. Reports mention the number of 120 people who have lost their lives while crossing the Gibraltar Strait in the first six months of the year 2000, or, since 1993, the number of at least 1,574 people who have died trying to reach Europe (*Trafficking in Migrants*, (21)). Koser refers to three debates on asylum in Europe: the efficacy of asylum policies; the trafficking of asylum seekers; and their growing vulnerability. There is

empirical evidence to support the view that increasing proportions of asylum seekers are being forced to turn to traffickers in order to negotiate restrictive asylum policies; the ways in which trafficking is exposing asylum seekers – including at least some ‘genuine’ refugees – to new forms of vulnerability; direct links exist between asylum policies, trafficking and vulnerability, and that the blame for growing vulnerability lies more with asylum policies than with traffickers or with asylum seekers themselves (Koser 2000, p. 91).

A vicious circle seems to develop between increasingly stricter entry controls and the need for potential (forced) immigrants to turn to the services of traffickers or smugglers. In recent literature an important distinction is made between smuggling and trafficking. The main purpose of smuggling is related to facilitating the illegal crossing of a border. Trafficking is a concept that requires consideration not only of the manner in which a migrant has entered the country, but also of his/her working conditions and whether he/she consented to the irregular entry and/or these working conditions (Salt 2000).

The information on trafficking routes is still in an incipient phase. The information is largely based on incidental or anecdotal information, and suggests five main trajectories: through Russia, the Baltic and Poland; through the Ukraine, the Balkans and the Czech and Slovak Republics; through Bulgaria, Romania and the Balkans; through the Middle East and

the Eastern Mediterranean; and from North Africa towards Italy and the Iberian peninsula (Salt 1998).

Common EU Policies on Migration and Asylum

For the scope of this article it is not feasible to try to present a full overview of the initiatives and activities that are undertaken in order to try to realise common EU policies on migration and asylum. Policies on migration and asylum were, until the introduction of the Amsterdam Treaty, developed at the intergovernmental level (Schengen Treaty, Dublin Convention). The introduction of the Single Market under the Single European Act (in force in 1987) as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”, meant the abolishment of internal border controls within the EU. The deadline was set for 31 December 1992. This date was neither adhered to by Schengen (in force in 1995) nor by the EC (European Parliament 2000). The UK and Ireland are in a special position by maintaining their border controls. Individual Member States temporarily (re)introduce border controls (e.g. France) or have inserted controls behind the border (e.g. the Netherlands, Germany). The need for common migration and asylum policies was not only deemed necessary due to the abolishment of internal border controls, but also due to the important rise in asylum applications in EU Member States and the absence of a common policy on temporary protection in case of mass flight. The increase in irregular migration and the presence of clandestine migrants may have been another negative factor to get a common policy off the ground. The Amsterdam Treaty (in force on 1 May 1999) gave an important impetus to the establishment of Community law on migration and asylum by moving the decision making process from the intergovernmental third pillar to the Community first pillar. Title IV on ‘Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other Policies related to Free Movement of Persons’, Article 61, states that:

in order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and justice, the Council shall adopt: within a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, measures aimed at ensuring the free movements of persons [. . .], in conjunction with directly related flanking measures with respect to external border controls, asylum and immigration, [. . .] and measures to prevent and combat crime [. . .]

These measures are stipulated in Articles 62 and 63. Secondly, the asylum and immigration paragraphs of the intergovernmental Schengen accord have been incorporated into the EC and EU treaty. The application of Title IV is subject to the provisions of the respective Protocols on the posi-

tion of the UK and Ireland, and that of Denmark. In order to meet the five-year deadline the Justice and Home Affairs Council decided in Tampere (October 1999) to work on the following main areas: co-development with the countries of origin of immigrants; keeping immigration movements under control and combating networks involved in smuggling immigrants; and the integration of third country nationals residing legally in an EU Member State. On 27 March 2000 the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted a programme ('scoreboard') containing a timetable of directives and regulations necessary for the realisation of an area without internal borders (*Migration News Sheet*, April 2000, August 2000). Interestingly, these developments took place at the same time as plans were being made for another enlargement of the EU. Which way this will impact on the enlargement, or specifically on the free movement rights of citizens from these potentially new Member States, still needs to be answered.

The Integration of Immigrants: The Case of the Labour Market

One of the most important indicators of the incorporation of immigrants into a country is their integration in the labour market. Comparative data on the labour market integration of immigrants is scarce. Only recently EUROSTAT (2000) published data on the (un)employment of the working population by main groups of citizenship. These figures distinguish nationals in an EU Member State from other EU nationals and non-EU nationals. These data do not provide information about the wider categories such as foreign-born immigrants and their descendants, who might have the nationality of that particular EU Member State.

The available figures show a grim picture of the unemployment rates of non-EU nationals in the EU Member States in Table III. The unemployment rates among non-EU nationals are generally far above the unemployment rates of the nationals, while the unemployment rates of the other-EU nationals tend to be much closer to the unemployment rates of the nationals. Table III only provides some general insight into the situation in 10 Member States. Country reports on ethnic minorities and immigrant groups in the labour market (*Employment Observatory* 1999) do not provide a different picture for the other Member States. These country reports lack definitional standards for comparison, but for the countries for which data are given they show that not only are the unemployment rates substantially higher among non-EU citizens, but also that the labour market participation rates among non-EU citizens are below the average. In other words, a relatively smaller proportion of the potential labour force among non-EU citizens takes part in the labour market, while unemployment rates among

TABLE III

Unemployment rates by main groups of citizenship in selected EU Member States, 1996/1998 (% , unemployed persons as a percentage of total working population of each group).

EU Member States	Total	Nationals	Other EU	Non-EU
Denmark (1997)	6.8	6.3	11.3	25.0
Germany (1998)	9.7	9.0	10.4	20.1
Spain ^a	20.8	20.8	15.4	23.9
France (1997)	12.3	11.6	10.1	31.3
Ireland (1997)	10.3	10.2	16.2	5.4
Netherlands (1997)	5.5	5.1	8.4	24.7
Austria (1997)	5.1	4.4	5.6	11.4
Portugal (1997)	6.7	6.6	9.0	11.5
Finland (1997)	19.3	18.9	24.7	53.4
United Kingdom (1998) ^b	6.1	6.0	7.0	11.9

Source: EUROSTAT (2000), Table D-1.2.

^aBased on working population living in households.

^bLabour Force Survey.

this category are generally much higher than among the nationals or the other EU citizens. Immigrant unemployment is especially high among the 'guest-workers' of the past, and specifically among the low- and unskilled of non-EU origin. The labour market integration of the more recently arrived refugees and humanitarian status holders is less well documented. Indications of the employment situation among some of the refugee categories in the Netherlands (Van den Tillaart et al. 2000) and Sweden (Westin 2000) do not show a very favourable picture, even if the skills and educational level of an important proportion of the refugees is above that of the formerly recruited foreign labour force.

Immigrant settlement is predominantly an urban issue, and the rate of immigrant settlement tends to increase with the population size of the urban area. The problematic aspects of the labour market integration of immigrants, which partly coincides with segregation in housing, has predominantly become an urban issue.

Continued Debate on Future Migration

At the beginning of the new millennium the migration debate received another impetus, this time not due to the unexpected arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers, or the detection of new major trafficking routes, but because of a publication from the Population Division of the United Nations (2000). The publication called *Replacement Migration* is a demographic exercise concerning the size of the future migration needed to re-

place declining and ageing populations. Europe's population will decline and age in the near future. The conclusions of the report on the European Union tell us that:

- if the total population of the European Union is to be kept constant until 2050 it would be necessary to have 47.4 million immigrants between 2000–2050 or 949,000 immigrants per year;
- if the size of the population aged 15–64 is to be kept constant until 2050, it would be necessary to have 79.6 million immigrants between 1995–2050 or 1.4 million immigrants per year;
- if the support ratio of the persons aged 15–64 years for each person aged 65 years or older is to be kept constant until 2050, it would be necessary to have 701 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or 12.7 million immigrants per year.

How politically unrealistic these scenarios are can be read about in the same report. In the case of keeping the support ratio (c) constant, Europe's population would need to grow threefold until 2050 and three-quarters of the total population in 2050 would consist of post-1995 migrants from outside the European Union and their descendants. It would be an unprecedented case of mass immigration even when compared to traditional immigration countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia.

A declining population is not so much a problem in itself as an ageing population. For example, European welfare states will be increasingly faced with problems as to how to continue financing general pension systems. Trying to raise the participation and employment rates of the resident immigrant and non-immigrant population might as well be part of the solution as well as selective immigration with regard to age and skills.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Member States of the European Union have undoubtedly changed into *de facto* countries of immigration. Since the upswing in migration in the late 1980s, net migration for the 15 EU Member States together has not been below 500,000. Germany has been the main net receiver of immigrants between 1960–2000. Large differences exist between the current 15 Member States with a view to migration histories and immigrant settlement. Immigration patterns have developed between specific countries of origin and individual EU Member States. As a consequence the absolute and relative size of the immigrant population, the duration of stay, and the countries of origin of immigrants may vary greatly between the Member States. Recently, Northwestern European countries have become the dominant

receivers of asylum seekers, while Southern European countries receive relatively more clandestine migrants. The fear for massive East–West migration has never been realised, except for the large inflow of ethnic Germans into Germany.

The total non-national resident population in the 15 EU Member States is 19.1 million of a total population of 375 million, equalling 5.1% (1–1998). 13.1 million have a non-EU nationality, while 6 million have a nationality of another Member State. It is evident that the total immigrant population is much larger if we include the effect of naturalisation, specifically in countries with simple naturalisation procedures.

The freedom of movement of EU nationals to other EU Member States is largely governed by EU law. The admission of non-EU migrants mainly takes place at the national level. Restrictive national and intergovernmental (Schengen, Dublin) immigration or admission policies have developed as answers to rising numbers of (forced) immigrants. One of the unintended consequences of partly closing the entrance gates for work and asylum is the irregular migration of non-EU migrants and the increased importance of traffickers and smugglers. The political reaction of EU Member States, faced with difficulties in regulating the migration of non-EU citizens whilst having committed themselves since 1987 to a Single Market ‘without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons and capital is ensured’, has been the initiative to try to develop a common immigration and asylum law before 2004 (Amsterdam Treaty, in force 1 May 1999).

The labour market integration of at least part of the non-EU immigrant population in EU countries is an area of concern. Unemployment rates among the non-EU citizens are generally far above the unemployment rates of nationals or of EU nationals from other Member States. Unemployment rates are not only high among the un- and low-skilled ‘guest-workers’ of the past, but also among the more recently arrived, and often better skilled, forced migrants of the 1990s. It is evident, with a view to a successful labour market integration of the resident immigrant population and to future labour migration, that more attention must be paid to the development or the selection of the required skills, and to measures to combat discrimination of non-EU nationals in the labour market.

REFERENCES

- Böcker, A. and T. Havinga, *Asylum Migration to the European Union: Patterns of Origin and Destination*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998.

- Bosswick, W., Asylum policy in Germany. In: Ph. Muus (Ed.), *Exclusion and Inclusion of Refugees in Contemporary Europe*, pp. 53–77. Chapter 6. Utrecht: ERCOMER, Utrecht University, 1997.
- Clarke, J., E. van Dam and L. Gooster, New Europeans: Naturalization and citizenship in Europe. *Citizenship Studies*, 2(1), pp. 43–67, 1998.
- Coleman, D., International migration to Europe in the late 1990s. In: D. Coleman and E. Wadensjö (Eds), *Immigration to Denmark: International and National Perspectives*, pp. 46–104. Chapter 2. Aarhus: The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, Aarhus University Press, 1999.
- Ethnic minorities and immigrant groups on the labour market. *Employment Observatory SYSDM Trends*, (32), Summer 1999.
- European Parliament, *The Impact of the Amsterdam Treaty on Justice and Home Affairs Issues*. Working Paper, 1;2. Civil Liberties Series, LIBE 110 EN, Strasbourg: Directorate General for Research, 2000.
- EUROSTAT, *Demographic Statistics: Data 1960–99*. Theme 3: Population and social statistics. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999.
- EUROSTAT, *European Social Statistics: Migration*. Theme 3, Population and social statistics. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000.
- International Migration: Quarterly Review*, 38(3), pp. 3–131, 2000. Special Issue (1): Perspectives on Trafficking of Migrants.
- Koser, K., Asylum policies, trafficking and vulnerability. *International Migration: Quarterly Review*, 38(3), pp. 91–111, 2000.
- Migration News Sheet*. Brussels, April 2000.
- Migration News Sheet*. Brussels, August 2000.
- Muus, Ph., *Internationale migratie naar Europa: een analyse van internationale migratie, migratiebeleid en mogelijkheden tot sturing van immigratie, met bijzondere aandacht voor de Europese Gemeenschap en Nederland*. Amsterdam: SUA Publishers, 1993.
- Muus, Ph., *Migration, Immigrants and Policy in the Netherlands. SOPEMI-Netherlands-1999*. Utrecht: ERCOMER, Utrecht University, 2000.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), *Trends in International Migration, SOPEMI Annual Report, 1998*. Paris: OECD, 1998.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), *Trends in International Migration, SOPEMI 1999*. Paris: OECD, 1999.
- Okolski, M., Regional dimension of international migration in Central and Eastern Europe. *GENUS*, 54, pp. 1–26, 1998.
- Salt, J., *Current Trends in International Migration in Europe*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, CDMG, 99(10), Strasbourg, 1998.
- Salt, J., Trafficking and human smuggling: A European perspective. *International Migration: Quarterly Review*, 38(3), pp. 31–56, 2000.
- Simon, G., ‘Un point de vue sur la mobilité dans la CEE: tendances et perspectives à l’aube du marché intérieur’. *Europe sociale*, 3/90, pp. 20–33, 1990.
- Trafficking in Migrants, *IOM Quarterly Bulletin*, (21), Summer 2000.
- UNHCR Statistics. *Asylum Applications in Europe in 1999*, www.unhcr.ch/statist/0002euro/text.htm.
- United Nations, Population Division, *Replacement Migration*. UN, 2000.

- United Nations (UN), *Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?* Population Division. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat. 4 May 2000. <http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration.htm>
- Van den Tillaart, H., M. Olde Monnikhof, S. van den Berg and J. Warmerdam, *Nieuwe etnische minderheden in Nederland: een onderzoek onder vluchtelingen en statushouders uit Afghanistan, Ethiopië en Eritrea, Iran, Somalië en Vietnam*. Nijmegen: Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociale Wetenschappen (ITS), 2000.
- Westin, Ch., *Settlement and Integration Policies towards Immigrants and Their Descendants in Sweden*. International migration papers (34). Geneva: ILO, 2000.

*ERCOMER/Faculty of Social Sciences
Utrecht University
Heidelberglaan 2
3584 CS Utrecht
The Netherlands
E-mail: Ph.muus@fss.uu.nl*

