Understanding Greek Immigration Policy

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February 2001

Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop
Understanding Greek Immigration Policy

ABSTRACT

This paper traces the undulating development of Greek immigration policy since 1991, focusing on the incongruence between strong anti-immigrant public sentiment and the pursuit of relatively liberal legalization policies. While many theories explain recent trends in migration policy as a product of various international factors, it is domestic politics that shaped the Greek case. The PASOK government has prioritized the economic impact of migration, discounting social consequences important to the Greek electorate. The government has been able to distance itself from public opinion because the Greek political system has many elements of a cartel party system. These features strengthen the ties of the party in government to the state, lower the risk of successful third party emergence, and thus weaken the link between policy and public opinion. Immigration is an issue on which this distancing is possible because it does not fit neatly on the right-left political spectrum.

I. Introduction

A. Puzzle

In the 1980s and 1990s, South European countries, which had traditionally been immigrant-exporting nations, became destination countries for different groups of immigrants, originating from North Africa and the Balkans. Despite the range and size of these migrations, the policies followed by South European countries differed dramatically both from the “organized” guest-worker schemes of Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, and from the increasingly restrictionist Western European policies of the 1990s. In the past two decades, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal each introduced one or more extensive and liberal regularization programs. Why did these countries take a liberal path when one might expect them, based on the experience of other European states, to crack down on illegal immigration?

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1 Financial assistance from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Center for European Studies at Harvard made research for this project possible. Prof. Michael Jones-Correa offered invaluable advice and encouragement at every stage of this project.

2 Hammar (1985) distinguishes between a) regulation of flows of immigration and controls of aliens, and b) immigration policy, which handles matters of settlement and integration. As Southern European countries have mostly been concerned by the former, I use the term immigration policy loosely, to discuss both controls of
These legalization choices are puzzling at the comparative European level, and are no more intuitive at the individual, national level. Greece, the primary case examined here, received within a ten-year period an influx of illegal immigrants amounting to more than 20% of its workforce. Greek citizens, belonging to a very homogeneous country with a high unemployment rate, were no more welcoming towards these newcomers than were average Europeans. In fact, Eurobarometer data show that Greeks had the highest levels of intolerance for the presence of illegal immigrants of all European citizens.

Greeks were strongly opposed to the legalization policy, and no group placed strong countervailing pressures on the government—there existed no long-standing immigrant communities representing the nationalities of the new arrivals, while labor, employers, and the Orthodox Church were only mildly supportive of the legalizations. As the government had not encouraged any form of immigration, arguments commonly made in other countries that the government had a duty to legalize those it had invited were not made. Furthermore, tense relations between Greece and the home countries of the new immigrants meant that diplomatic channels did not impose a significant pressure for legalization. Indeed, the few EU discussions on illegal immigrants pointed in the opposite, restrictive direction.

Surprisingly, in these unfavorable conditions, the Greek government chose to legalize approximately 220,000 illegal immigrants from 1997 to the present. By doing so, it undercut a very restrictionist 1991 policy on undocumented workers, minimizing this category and giving the newly legal immigrants an improved status. For a variety of reasons, a large fraction of the illegal immigrants present in Greece in 1997 ended up with neither Green nor White residence cards. The proposed immigration law currently debated in Parliament liberalises some of
provisions of the 1991 law and calls for a second legalization. This paper explores the reasons for, and methods by which, the Greek government has been pursuing an unpopular immigration policy.

B. Methods

I used printed primary and secondary materials, conducted about 30 interviews with Greek, French and Italian policy-makers and activists, and analyzed *Eurobarometer* data as well as country level indices of political variables to compare European countries that had passed amnesties to those that had not.

C. Trends of immigration to Greece

Historically, Greece has been a country of emigration rather than immigration. Return migration first exceeded emigration in 1975 (King, Fielding and Black 1997, 3). Immigration to Greece was limited until the late 1980s, at which point developments in neighboring countries led to a dramatic increase in the number of people willing and able to cross borders to settle in Greece. The availability of jobs and the permeability of Greek borders contributed further to the dramatic rise in the number of immigrants in Greece. Current estimates indicate that up to one million foreigners reside in Greece, a figure equivalent to 10% of the population (interview with Eustathiadis, General Secretary of Public Order Ministry; interview with Spanou, Chair of Labor Ministry Committee on Migration). This has been a transformative event for a country where 95% of the population was linguistically, ethnically and religiously homogeneous according to the last census (1991).

Who are these immigrants? The best data available to answer this question is information collected through the white card applications of 373,000 irregular immigrants. This sample is not fully representative of the illegal immigrant population, as many did not come forth, while others
may have misrepresented themselves. From this data, however, it appears that 65% of the immigrants were male. 65% were of Albanian origin, with Bulgarians, Romanians and Pakistanis each composing between 3% and 7% of the population of illegals. The median education level was secondary school; the median age was between thirty and forty-four years (OAED 1999, 1-5).

II. Policy Making History


In 1991, in response to the sudden influx of illegal immigrants, the conservative government passed law 1975/1991, regulating the entry and exit, presence, work, and expulsion of foreigners, replacing an immigration law dating from 1929. Calling the 1991 law conservative is an understatement. Of doubtful constitutionality, and clearly in violation of international treaties, the law established very severe penalties for illegal immigrants, denying them all access to education and health care, and prohibiting any contact with government agencies, while rendering “legal immigrant access to work extremely difficult” (Papasiopi-Pasia 1995, 22, 64; interview with Verney, office of the Ombudsman; interview with Kourtovic, immigration activist). The standard legal explication of the law begins by questioning whether the legislators had any intention to reduce illegal immigration. This document accused the government of having had a “primary interest in legalizing the tolerance of abuse (εκμετάλλευση)” (Manitakis 1995, 11). In Parliament, discussion on this law was partisan; the socialist and communist opposition voted against the law introduced by the Conservative Party (Parliamentary Transcripts 1991, 773-784). Lone socialists, notably current Foreign Minister Papandreou, introduced the idea of an amnesty in that debate (Parliamentary Transcript 1991, 255), but the Socialist Party did not endorse this idea for a few more years. Although unions had pressured the communist party
to take a harsh anti-immigrant stance in 1991 (interview with Kourtovic), the General Confederation of Labor leadership became quite supportive of an immigrant legalization by 1995, and was critical in formulating and implementing the legalization bills (interview with Patrikios).

**B. Law 2434/1996**

In 1996, a provision on the legalization of immigrants was buried in an employment bill, which became law 2434/1996. 373,000 applied for the “white card”-- a temporary residence permit. “This was an easy legalization, in the sense that the foreigner had to be in Greece for only one month and no proof of employment or residence was required” (*Migration News*, March 2000). The white card had been designed as a prerequisite for a “green card” application -- a renewable work and residence permit of 1 to 5 years. An important requirement for the second phase of the legalization was documentation indicating that the immigrant had been legally employed since January 1, 1998 and had earned an income equivalent to at least half of the earnings of an unqualified worker for 40 days\(^3\). The Greek bureaucracy had not been prepared for so massive a registration of immigrants; the process worked in a very disorganized manner; deadlines were repeatedly extended. Furthermore, the process was modified so that white card holders gained additional rights initially reserved for green card holders only, while immigrants could now apply for a green card without having received a white one (Papantoniou-Frangouli and Leventi, 2000). As of March 2000, 195,000 green cards had been issued; OAED and EKA expect that the total number of immigrants with Green cards from this process will reach 220,000 (OAED, EKA information, Jan. 2001). The main reason for which the remaining immigrants were unable to receive green cards was the reluctance of employers to pay social insurance
contributions.

In contrast to the combative and extensive debate over the previous 1991 Immigration Law, the discussion on this measure was surprisingly brief and amicable. One imprecise article covered immigrants; the specifics were decided in a special committee after the bill was passed. For example, the question of whether the Albanians, who comprised the majority of the illegal immigrants and the group against which most opposition had been rallied, would be legalized was not raised until a year later. At that stage, it was resolved by ministers of the governing party and not by the Parliament. Committee procedures had much to do with the final liberal form of the presidential decrees. The Labor Ministry was given the agenda-setting role; a ministry more liberal than the potential alternatives (Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry, Public Order Ministry) thus had power. The chair of the committee, the Labor Ministry Secretary General, used this power to grant seats to two immigrant rights groups, the Immigrant Forum and the Network for Social Support of Immigrants and Refugees, despite the fact that the law clearly enumerated a different set of committee members. Despite lacking the conventional forms of power, information permitted immigrant protection groups to exert a disproportionate influence on the outcome of committee deliberations (Interview with Papadopoulou; Interview with Spanou; Interview with Kourtovic).

C. Current Immigration Law Proposal

At present, the situation of hundreds of thousands of irregular immigrants in Greece remains precarious—these are immigrants who either did not participate in the first legalization or who have since arrived to Greece. Furthermore, the 1991 immigration law remains the

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3This requirement varied by sector; agricultural workers were given preferential treatment.
framework regulating immigration policy—it is applied erratically, depending at best on changing ministers’ directives and more commonly on the discretion of individual public servants. Thus, the interior ministry has drafted a new immigration law, debated in committee in December 2000 and expected to be debated in the full parliamentary session this month.

The new immigration bill repeats several of the restrictive clauses of the 1991 law, while liberalizing others. The Interior Ministry becomes primarily responsible for migration, and regional immigration offices are created. The bill proposes an elaborate procedure according to which the needs of the Greek economy will be evaluated, and legal immigrants will be invited from their countries of origin to fill particular posts. The bill proposes a second amnesty permitting immigrants who can prove that they have been in Greece since November of 1998 to receive a new temporary residency permit. An immigrant who has paid social security contributions, who has an employment contract or who can provide more complex paperwork indicating that he is self-employed can renew his temporary permit. Finally, the new bill calls for the automatic renewal of permits expiring by June 2001.

The bill has drawn fire from both liberal and conservative critics. Immigration activists, labor unions and the ombudsman’s office critique provisions of the new law that maintain the status quo and severely limit undocumented migrants’ access to public services. About 1,000 Greeks and foreigners marched in protest to the parliament building on January 18th (Athens News, Jan. 19, 2001). The lack of provision for the education and health care of illegal immigrants, as well as the three year period necessary for family reunification have been stressed. One hopes that the bill will be modified to deal with these very important questions. On the other hand, New Democracy considers the proposed method of employment offices to encourage legal migration suiting Greece’s labor needs unrealistic and has objected to a second legalisation
However, other important provisions of the bill have not drawn the attention of either critics or the press. Migration policy, which until now had been haphazardly dealt with by the Public Order and then the Labor Ministry, is officially assigned primarily to the Interior Ministry. Furthermore, regional immigration and foreigner bureaus are created. Italy, whose federal system has made regional offices important in every amnesty, has seen very different rates of immigrant legalization and integration as a consequence of regional autonomy. It is also important that basic rights of legal immigrants to equal treatment—access to insurance and education systems—are clarified, while public prosecutors are called upon to initiate suits when immigrant rights are violated. The bill does not link legal entry into Greece with a Greek employer but provides ways for self-employed immigrants to enter; this is progressive and unusual in the European context.

The main argument that should be advanced against legalizations is that they may attract additional irregular immigrants, both in the short term, and in the long term. Germany, for instance, has avoided them for this reason (Miller 1999, 37). When they are implemented, legalizations should always be publicized as one-time deals, according to which only immigrants already present on the territory before a cut-off date are covered. The Greek government did not even abide by this basic rule, as the length of the period between the initial discussions on the amnesty and the passage of the law indicate. Pronouncements about the second legalization to be implemented in 2001 were circulating at the time of the first legalization, and one can only hope that this time round, the Greek government will make clear and credible statements that further amnesties are not in store.

A notable feature of the policymaking process has been the changing locus of
decisionmaking. The 1991 bill was drafted as a security measure, and implemented primarily by the Ministry of Public Order. The Employment Ministry played the lead role in the 1996-7 legalizations. Once the new immigration bill passes, the Interior Ministry will have primary responsibility for immigrants. This changing locus of policymaking reveals the changing way in which immigrants are viewed by policymakers. First, they were seen primarily as a threat, next primarily as workers and finally, more holistically as people with certain rights and duties.

D. Other features of Greek immigration policy

Greece has had a *jus sanguinis* system: one in which nationality is passed on from parent to child only; naturalizations of non-ethnic Greeks have been very rare. Laws applicable to the entry, residence and naturalization of ethnic Greeks are therefore significantly more favorable to the immigrant. There exists a basic consensus that ethnic Greeks are prospective Greek citizens and should be treated accordingly; debates focus on whether the requirements needed to prove one’s ancestry impose an unnecessary burden on immigrants or whether these are too lenient, permitting many non-ethnic Greeks to benefit from the more favorable procedures.

Refugees form a very small fraction of the foreign population residing in Greece. In the past decade, Greece has been accepting between 1000 and 5000 asylum applications each year. Fewer than 10% of these applicants are granted refugee status.

Another central aspect of immigration policy is security. It is commonly asserted that in conjunction with these new liberalization measures, expulsions and deportations have stepped up. The chart below indicates that there is no such upward trend. The police has indeed

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*The Greek Public Order Ministry uses the term deportation to refer to the repatriation of Albanians illegally residing in Greece, in accordance with a bilateral agreement. Illegal immigrants of other nationalities are
conducted some highly publicized, very controversial and offensively named “sweeping” operations, while the government has publicized the reorganization of the border patrol—tasks that were left to the army patrolling the borders and to local police forces until 1999 are now handled by a special border police force. However, no radical rethinking of border patrolling has occurred, as residents of the border region of Epeiros in particular have demanded.

![Expulsions and Deportations](chart)

Source: Ministry of Public Order

### III. Drawing on Migration Theory to Explain the Greek Case

The usual question is “why are states accepting more immigrants than they want?” The usual answer is based on international factors. Soysal argues that an emerging global discourse on human rights is undermining citizenship and leading to liberal policy (1994). Key emphasis is given to the judiciary, which, sheltered from public opinion pressures, grants rights to aliens expelled.
(Guiraudon, 1998). A three-pronged globalization argument, made most clearly by Sassen, gives further support to the thesis that states have lost their ability to control borders. It is argued that states lost control first because immigration policy is now shaped by supra-national institutions, such as the EU and the European Court of Human Rights, and second, because there exists an international human rights regime which limits state ability to act in contravention of such rights. Finally, the tension between wanting free flows of capital and restricted flows of labor results in loose immigration controls (Sassen, 1996)\(^5\).

One might expect that the Greek case would fit well within this explanatory framework. Since Greece is a small country, a member of the EU and a state relatively dependent on the international community, international pressures should be particularly acute. Furthermore, the absence of domestic political debate provides no counterweight to oppose these pressures. In showing that the internationalist argument does not apply to Greece, my evidence supports a competing minority view.

Unlike those who emphasize international issues, Freeman argues that what matters is domestic politics\(^6\). In developing a model based on the US situation, he interprets the lack of control as a simple case of concentrated interests (immigrant lobbies, employers), and diffuse costs. If this model were applicable to Greece, its validity would be greatly extended because Greece is more politically integrated into a supranational body and dependent on the international

\(^5\)The structure of this paragraph draws from Hansen’s and Joppke’s discussions of these theories (Hansen 1999; Joppke 1998).

\(^6\)Freeman’s argument is intended as a general model of immigration policy making in democratic states, but as he concedes, his evidence is principally applicable to settler societies of primarily British origin (1995, 887). Brubaker highlights that Freeman’s analysis is not only spatially, but also temporally limited (1995, 907). The only application of the Freeman model I know of is by Randall Hansen, who revisits the British case and uses it to support parts of the Freeman argument (1999). Joppke modifies Freeman in two ways, both irrelevant to the Greek case (1998, 271). Freeman’s analysis of immigration policy in Southern Europe draws solely and uncritically on secondary sources, and is inconclusive.
system than the US. Thus, international pressures should influence policy much more in Greece than in the US. Moreover, the lobbies in the Greek case are much weaker. Interest groups in general are weak, and there exists no established ethnic or immigrant lobby. Thus, the case for domestic momentum is more difficult to make. Finally, while US nationalism contains some positive symbolism on immigration, Greek nationalist discourse is based on a concept of ethnic and religious homogeneity; the limits to “racist” discourse found in the US are more permissive in Greece.

IV. Foreign Pressures?

Many analysts attribute particular decisions in European nations’ immigration policies to EU pressures\(^7\). Policies thought to be influenced in this way are usually restrictive in nature. Applying such an argument to legalization decisions is problematic in two ways. The first is that an entirely different argument, one emphasizing human rights, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the European Commission, would be needed to explain liberal policy. This argument would in fact be contrary to the one required to justify pressures for restriction. The second objection concerns the scarcity of concrete evidence of EU pressure on any immigration-related issue. Both the usual EU carrot, which in this case could have taken the form of EU aid for the patrolling of external frontiers, and a possible stick, even in the mild form of a binding decision, were absent.

The strongest plausible argument for the impact of the EU would suggest that more than a decade of discussions on this broad topic had created a common lens through which immigrants were regarded by European governments. The EU first addressed the question of immigration in

\(^7\)Such authors include Cornelius (1994) and Apap (1997). Others of course argue that EU pressure was irrelevant in many cases (Wihtol de Wenden 1999, 71), while the Greek and Portuguese literature largely ignores the
1986, with the formation of an ad hoc group on the issue. In 1988 the European Commission proposed coordination on matters of asylum, refugees, non-EU nationals, visas and deportation. In 1990 the Dublin Convention was adopted, allocating responsibility for asylum applications. The same year witnessed the signing of the Schengen Implementing Convention, whose negotiation had begun in 1984 as an effort by France and Germany to minimize controls on their borders. The Convention on the Crossing of External Frontiers was completed in 1991, but is still under review because of conflict between the UK and Spain over Gibraltar.

Countries of Southern Europe began developing their immigration policies concurrently with the above discussions at the European level. Their lack of expertise on these issues and their general position within the EU minimized their impact on immigration discussions at the EU level. The reverse side of this coin was that any common guidelines were consequently less appropriate for the Southern European countries, and less likely to be implemented.

A reason that the EU’s influence may be overstated is that governments benefited from presenting such a story; they frequently used the EU as a scapegoat, to justify measures they would have implemented anyway. In Italy, Martelli, the minister after whom the main 1990 law was named, is quoted as claiming that his policy was making Italy comparable to other occidental nations (Migration News, April 1999). In Spain, the Gonzales government has tried to link immigration harmonization to other efforts for greater integration into the EU (Cornelius 1994, 362).

Since the first Greek legalization, EU action in this area appears to be increasing. In Tampere, Finland, EU leaders agreed to develop common asylum guidelines, while pursuing programs to limit illegal immigration and programs to integrate legal immigrants. The EU issue (Baldwin-Edwards 1997, 506), which may indicate the absence of significant EU influences.
Commission began a debate on a common immigration policy in November 2000. While a common asylum policy is expected by 2004, policy harmonization is unlikely to occur in other immigration areas soon, since in Nice, EU leaders agreed to retain unanimous voting on most immigration policies. Furthermore, any common European policy does not seem to be in harmony with the steps Greece is taking; the most recent EU Commission statement on illegal migration this past November stated that regularizations were not the solution and called for stepped up immigration controls (Migration News, January 2001; http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0757en01.pdf).

Influence exerted by sender nations through diplomatic channels was the other potential source of foreign pressures on Greece. However, Greek Foreign Ministry officials rejected the suggestion that migration policy depended on considerations of bilateral relations with sender nations, although they recognized nonetheless that it impacted on these relations (interview with Papadopoulou, Foreign Ministry; interview with Boukaouris, Foreign Ministry). While Panteli Majko, the Albanian Prime Minister, had made some remarks regarding allegations that Greek police discriminate against Albanians, as well as some apologies for the behavior of some Albanians, he had been greatly limited in his demands by the fact that Albanians enter Greece illegally. Albania’s influence on Greek immigration policy was further weakened by Greece’s claims that the Greek minority in Albania was being mistreated. The most important limiting factor on Albanian pressures was an unequal power relationship.

V. Domestic Forces

Why did the Greek government pursue an unpopular immigration policy? This paper argues that the government considered the economic impact of migration to be positive and
significant, and it discounted social consequences important to the Greek electorate. Next, the
government was able to distance itself from public opinion because the Greek political system
has many elements of what Katz and Maier term a cartel party system. These features
strengthened the ties of the party in government to the state, lowered the risk of third party
emergence, and thus weakened the link between policy and public opinion. Finally, immigration
was an issue on which this distancing was possible because it does not fit neatly on the right-left
political spectrum. This problem is particularly acute in the case of Greece, as there exist several
other difficulties with classifying the main parties on a right-left spectrum. Thus, the main
Conservative Party could only politicize the immigration issue, by raising law and order
concerns, to a point. After this point, it would alienate economic liberals with a restrictionist
stance. As the main parties did not politicize the immigration issue, and third parties had little
chance of rising to power, voters opposed to immigration were left without their preferred
alternative as an option.

A. Comparing Elite and Public Opinion

While public opinion on immigration has been very hostile to legalization processes, with
expulsions the preferred solutions, there is a wide discrepancy between public and elite opinion.
Greece does not aspire to the “melting pot” ideal of settler nations; it perceives itself as a
homogeneous society. Even prior to the influx of immigrants, there was a general apprehension
about foreigners. In 1988, 95% of Greeks replied that there are no or few people of a different
ethnicity in their neighborhood; for 27%, the term ‘different ethnicity’ brought nothing in
particular to mind (Dodos, 337). In the same survey however, the percentage of people who
linked foreigners with unemployment and criminality was significantly above the EU average
(Dodos, 338).
Hostility increased in the period between the 1991 and 1996 laws, due to the continuation of large numbers of immigrant arrivals, and the concurrent rise in criminality, which was blamed on immigrants. As Mitropoulos argues, a sensationalist media contributed to a worsening of public opinion of immigrants: “Almost every violent crime committed by foreigners was granted prime-time coverage, complete with ominous music, re-enactments and special effects” (Mitropoulos 1999, 36-37).

Dodos et al. study Greek attitudes on immigration from 1988 to 1992 and conclude that Greeks were more hostile to immigrants than other Europeans (321). Hostility increased over the four-year period studied. Two surveys containing questions on immigration policy were conducted in Greece in 19968. The first one was organized by Kappa Research and financed by the Athens Work Center, a labor union institute, while the second was carried out by Eurobarometer for the European Commission. The quota samples were of 2000 and 1000 Greeks respectively. Question 47 of the Kappa Survey asked “and with respect to illegals staying in Greece what do you believe?”. 50.5% answered “they should be expelled.” 37.3% answered “Only those necessary to the Greek economy should be legalized.” Just 9.4% of the population replied “all should be legalized soon,” showing support for the policy chosen by the government (Kappa Research1996). According to a 1998 survey, 58.5% of the Greek public opposed the legalization (VPRC 1999, 402).

The 1997 Eurobarometer data presents an even more dramatic picture. 72% of Greeks “tend[ed] to agree” with the statement that “all illegal immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without exception.” Of the 15 EU countries surveyed, Greece had the highest

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8While the legalization law was passed in 1996, it did not begin to be implemented or publicized until 1997; thus respondents were probably unaware of the amnesty in the making.
percentage of respondents agreeing to this statement. Greece retains the title of the most xenophobic EU country according to the most recent 2000 *Eurobarometer*, with 38% of Greeks -- as opposed to 15% of Europeans on average--bothered by the presence of people of a different ethnicity in their country (Ta Nea, 1 Nov. 2000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% supporting expulsions</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Greece</th>
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<td>63.1</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>70.6</td>
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<th>% supporting expulsions</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Italy</th>
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<td>59.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
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<th>% supporting expulsions</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
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<td></td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
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Source: Eurobarometer 47.1 1997

The economic advantages of legalization—social security contributions and other taxes and demand for cheap labor, especially in agriculture—appeared significant to a ruling elite, which was able to implement its views because of the lack of interest and political debate on the issue. For the government, the question was not migration per se, but economic growth. Thus, concerns about cultural disruption became secondary in an attempt to furnish the economy with labor in key sectors, and to minimize underground activity. Economic performance is the main issue on which the government had hoped to be re-elected; it had hoped voters would use Greece’s entry into the European Monetary Union as the yardstick of policy success heightened control is one way in which the discounting of public preferences can be explained.

When economics is the dominant lens through which most political issues are seen, it is not surprising that migration politics is understood in economic terms. While my main source of information on the way in which the government considered the issue is a series of interviews
with top officials in all the relevant ministries as well as socialist Members of Parliament, statistical data strengthen this argument. I conducted an OLS regression mapping net attitudes on immigrants as a function of specific claims about the impact of minorities. For the Greek public as a whole, the perception of foreigners as threats to culture or religion is much more significant in predicting attitudes towards immigrants than any belief on the economic effects of immigration. However, economic considerations determine the views of socialist elites (See Appendix D). Thus, it does not strike one as surprising that the subset of socialist elites that forms relevant governing bodies would view migration through an economic lens.

B. Greek Institutions and Political Parties

The second argument explains how the preferences of a governing elite could be translated into policy. First, I explain how Greek institutions permitted the government to shield itself from public opinion and conduct unpopular policy. To provide support that government centralization mattered, I conduct a statistical comparison of EU countries, indicating that those in which had decentralized, representative systems were less likely to have had amnesties.

The first argument focuses on Greek institutions, explaining how the positions of parties and interest groups influenced policy. The conventional institutional argument on immigration politics privileges the role of the courts, which, shielded from public opinion pressures, can implement liberal policy (Soysal, 1994; Guiraudon, 1998). In Greece, the power of the judiciary is small in comparison to that of the legislative, which is in turn directly influenced by the executive.

The existence of strong parties helps explain both the shift from a conservative to a liberal immigration policy, and the ability of the socialist government to isolate itself from public
opinion in pursuit of liberal policy. This occurs because a strong party minimizes the independence of the various branches of government, and thus reduces the likelihood of a veto to oppose the decision of the executive. The existence of a particular type of strong party, a type resembling what Katz and Mair term a “cartel party” (1995), helps explain the liberal immigration policy. Some may argue that a model of one-party dominance more accurately describes the Greek system. Pimple’s four criteria of dominance (numerical, bargaining position, chronological, governmental) all apply to PASOK; for the last two decades it has consistently won high pluralities, been in government and both developed and implemented a historical mission (1990, 3-4). However, Greece does not fit the one-party dominance model perfectly, as it has had highly competitive elections and right-wing governments. Whether Greece is more correctly classified as a cartel party system or as a one-party system does not matter for this argument. Any party type with strong control of government facilities is less dependent on the electorate. In gaining strength by co-opting state institutions, parties become less dependent on voters’ preferences. It is thus possible to conduct unpopular policy, with less fear of electoral loss.

The strength of Greek parties is great, and oft noted. As Sotiropoulos indicates, the post-dictatorship constitution gave parties great powers; they commanded and command greater public confidence than the state, while able technocrats rise through parties, and not through the civil service (1993, 52-53). Additionally, Sotiropoulos lists and outlines the number of administrative laws passed under the PASOK years (1981-1989), followed by a number of comparable laws under the New Democracy rule (1990-1992) (Sotiropoulos 1993, 43). These laws led all top posts in the bureaucracies, as well as thousands of posts at all levels of the civil service to be dependent on party loyalty. Some indicative statistics: 224,000 public sector
employees were hired in the first term of PASOK (1981-85); New Democracy hired 60,000 from 1990 to 1991 alone (Sotiropoulos 1993, 43).

“Reinforced” proportional representation—in which votes are reallocated to big parties—and centralization are crucial to the maintenance of such a system in Greece. The legacy of a dictatorship is a further obstacle to the rise of parties of the extreme right.

A manifestation of party strength is parliamentary discipline. In Greece, this discipline is extremely strict; if a bill on any issue is voted down, this may be seen as a vote of no confidence in the government and precipitate elections. Kaklamanis, the President of the Greek Parliament, reminisced that in his 25-year career as a Member of Parliament (i.e. the entire post-dictatorship period), he could not recall a single bill proposed by the government that failed (Interview with Kaklamanis). Even judiciary appointments are frequently party-based. Thus, both legislative and judicial review are weak or non-existent as potential veto points. Neither Greek law nor precedent facilitate policy through popular referenda, thus eliminating another potential check on executive rule9. Strong parties, in a system with few checks on them, imply that a minor change in executive mindset can be magnified into radical policy shifts.

Strong links to the media are part of the definition of a cartel party. Media moguls can influence the government through their power, but reverse is also true. The government—through its control of licensing and regulation—can also exert some pressure on a system of centralized media. This type of relationship is fertile ground for the development of a cartel party. Governments can develop unpopular policy and depend on limited coverage.

Katz and Mair also list other criteria by which cartel parties can be defined. Cartel parties

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9In surveying European immigration policies, Freeman concludes that the Swiss illiberal policy aberration is primarily due to referenda (1995, 905).
do not compete on the basis of policy effectiveness, but on the basis of managerial skills (1995, 18). The selection of Semites and a cabinet of technocrats to the party leadership, along with Paso’s 1996 Fourth Conference manifesto, reflect a turn towards party competition on managerial skills.

Katz and Mair further highlight that in a cartel party system, parties depend on state subventions for their funding, rather than on money collected from a wide variety of sources (1995, 18). In 1994, only 19.8% of party income came from member contributions (Kathimerini, 6 August 1994), while in September 1995 a unanimous parliament raised government subsidies towards parties by 50% (nominal prices) (Spourdalakis 1998, 50).

In a cartel party system, membership is devalued, as parties blur the distinction between members and supporters (Katz and Maier 1995, 18). While it is difficult to measure a qualitative change in membership characteristics, quantitative data on membership figures are available. They indicate a decline from a peak in 1987 of 220,000 to a trough at 82,000 in 1990, after which membership was never to exceed 160,000 (Spourdalakis 1998, 400). This supports the aspect of the cartel party theory that highlights a weakening link between party membership and leadership.

Since the Greek political system makes the rise of successful third parties very difficult, voters are left to choose between two parties. Although the Conservative party had taken a more restrictive stance in 1991, and critiques the government on every issue including immigration, it does not offer a very different alternative proposal. Since immigration does not fit neatly into the traditional left-right axis, the Socialist Party would have alienated social liberals by taking a more restrictive, protectionist stance. The Conservative Party has repeatedly blamed the socialist government for uncontrolled borders and rising criminality. However, the Conservative Party is
very limited in the alternatives it can suggest; by opposing the government’s proposal on social
grounds it runs the risk of alienating economic liberals. The fact that migration does not fit on
the right-left spectrum may be more important in Greece than in other countries, as the left-right
spectrum is not a perfect descriptor of party ideological positions to begin with. Consequently,
party affiliation is not a very good predictor of whether delegates will have pro- or anti-
immigrant views. Thus, the voter has had no real choice between the two main parties on this
issue. Since third parties cannot flourish in a cartel party system, the governing socialist party
was at greater liberty to take an unpopular stance.

The above argument highlights that strong Greek parties permitted rapid and thorough
changes in immigration policy. Once elite socialists had decided to take a liberal immigration
course, a cartel party system weakening their dependence on voters by tightening the link
between the party and the state permitted PASOK to implement an unpopular policy.

C. Common features of countries that have passed legalizations

The conclusions suggested by the case study evidence are further supported by some
statistical evidence. I used two indexes from a paper by Bruneau at al. (2000), that assign
European countries a score on “electoral disproportionality” and “decentralization” dimensions.
Electoral disproportionality “is the square root of the sum of the difference between the
percentages of votes received and seats won by each party, squared and divided by two,” a measure
designed by Gallagher and modified by Lijphart (Bruneau et al. 2000). Decentralization is measured
by computing “local and regional government spending as percentage of total government
spending, excluding Social Security”. Using all available evidence, and in particular the SOPEMI
1998 survey article on legalizations, and Migration News, I concluded that the only six European
countries with large amnesty programs from the 1980s to the present were the four Southern
European countries, France and Belgium. I thus created a dichotomous “legalization variable”. T-tests, chi-square tests, discriminant analyses and logistic regressions presented in Appendix C all support the conclusions that countries with low decentralization levels are more likely to legalize immigrants than countries with high levels and that countries with high disproportionality levels are more likely to legalize immigrants than are countries with more proportional electoral systems.
APPENDIX A

The following individuals graciously permitted me to conducted one-on-one informational interviews with them, from June to November 1999. To update information, I conducted some follow-up phonecalls in January 2001. Prof. Demitrios Papademitriou was very helpful in arranging some of these interviews. Andreas Kakridis, Kathleen Hartnett, Victoria Meng, Bonnie Meguid, Thalia Chantziara and Evangelos Liaras reviewed substantial portions of my argument and offered invaluable comments. Most of all I am indebted to Prof. Michael-Jones Correa who advised me at every stage of this project, spending countless hours reading over messy drafts and assisting me with any difficulty I encountered.

Greece

Mr. Analytis  
President of Greek Industrialists’ Union (ΣΕΒ); Member of Parliamentary Economic and Social Committee which reviewed immigration legislation

Mr. Boukaouris  
Ambassador responsible for migration in Greek Foreign Ministry

Mr. Brakatsoulas  
General Secretary of Labor Ministry; President of Committee Drafting Legalization Decrees

Dr. Chantzis  
Doctor at the Athens Work Center (EKA)

Mr. Eustathiadis  
General Secretary of Public Order Ministry

Mr. Kaklamanis  
President of Greek Parliament

Mr. Konstantinidis  
Officer responsible for Immigration and Border Control. Public Order Ministry

Ms. Kourtovic  
President, Network of Social Support to Immigrants and Refugees; Member of Committee Drafting Legalization Degrees

Ms. Koutsivitou  
Expert on immigration for Greek Industrialists’ Union (ΣΕΒ); Member of Parliamentary Economic and Social Committee which reviewed immigration legislation

Prof. Theodoros Lianos  
Professor at Economic University of Athens; Author of main study of the economic effects of
migration in Greece

Mr. John Marinos
MP in European Parliament (New Democracy)

Mr. Nissuraivos
Legal Advisor to Interior Minister

Ms. Tatiana Papadopoulou
Expert on Migration in Greek Foreign ministry; Foreign Ministry Representative on Committee Drafting Legalization Decrees

Mr. Stelios Pathemelis
Former Minister of Public Order; MP (PASOK)

Dr. Thomas Patrikios
Expert on Immigration, Athens Worker Center

Prof. Robollis
Professor of Panteion University; Researcher on Immigration for the General Confederation of Greek workers (ΓΣΕΕ)

Mr. Antonis Samaras
Former Foreign Minister; Leader of Political Spring

Ms. Kalliopi Spanou
Ass. Professor at University of Athens; Chair of the Labor Ministry Committee on Migration, 1997-1998

Mr. Vasileiou
Expert on immigration for Union of small businessmen (ΓΣΒΕΕ); Member of Parliamentary Economic and Social Committee which reviewed immigration legislation

Prof. Susannah Verney
Professor at Panteion University; Responsible for migration at Ombudsman’s office

I also received written memoranda from:

Office of Mr. Nikitas Kaklamonis
MP in European Parliament, (New Democracy)

Ms. Evgenia Markova
Researcher on Greek Immigration, University of Athens.
Italy

Dr. Guido Bolaffi
Head of Cabinet for Social Solidarity in Ministry of Social Affairs

Mr. Jonathan Chaloff
Researcher, Center of Social Investment Studies (CENSIS)

Dr. Maffioretti
Director, Center of Immigration studies of Rome (CSER)

Dr. Ugo Melchionde
Director, Italian Federation of Immigrant Workers and their Families (FILEF)

Dr. Franco Pittau
Researcher on Immigration, Catholic Church foundation (Caritas Roma)

France

Prof. Georges Tapinos
Professor, University of Paris

Professor Patrick Weil
Professor, University of Paris

Ms. Anstett
Director of Information Center, Ministry of Labor and Solidarity

Mr. Jean-François Martini
Researcher, Support and Information Group for Immigrant Workers (GISTI)

Mr. Omar Benfahid
Expert on Migration, French Labor Federation (CFDT)

European Commission

Ms. Florian Sipala
Expert on policy concerning illegal immigration, DG V
## APPENDIX B

### Main Immigrant Amnesties in OECD Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Immigrants legalized</th>
<th>Immigrants legalized as a percentage of citizen population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>48,900</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>~200,000</td>
<td>~2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1987-1988</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>217,000</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>147,900</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>39,200</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>21,800</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1985-1986</td>
<td>43,800</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>110,100</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>18,800</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,684,900</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: *Trends in international migration; Migration News; World Bank online population data.*
APPENDIX C

This section provides statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that specific features of political systems can facilitate the passage of amnesties, by permitting governments to distance themselves from their electorates. As the number of cases is very limited—18 European countries are compared on few measures—this material is intended only as a supplement to the case studies presented.

Two variables, decentralization and disproportionality, are used to express the ability of government to act independently of voters. Electoral disproportionality measures the distance between party support and party power. It is a “least-squares [index] designed by Michael Gallagher (1991) [calculated as] the square root of the sum of the difference between the percentages of votes received and seats won by each party, squared and divided by two” (Bruneau et al. 2000). Decentralization is measured as “local and regional government spending as percentage of total government spending, excluding social security” (Bruneau et al. 2000). Public opinion data is based on Eurobarometer 47.1 (1997), an annual survey of the European Commission that polls public opinion in all EU member states. The “public opinion” value for each country is the percentage of its nationals who tend to agree with the statement that “all illegal immigrants should be expelled”. Western European countries are grouped into the six which have passed amnesties (Value=1) and the twelve which have not (Value=0) (see Appendix C).

Simple boxplots indicate that public opinion is unrelated to whether countries legalize immigrants; the statistically insignificant pattern in fact shows countries whose populations exhibit greater hostility towards immigrants to be more likely to have passed amnesties. Boxplots also highlight that countries with higher decentralization are less likely to have legalized immigrants, and that countries with high disproportionality are more likely to have legalized immigrants. As these tendencies are in the expected direction, I then test a) whether these differences are statistically significant; b) the magnitude of the impact of these variables; and c) the extent to which they are good predictors of whether legalization occurred or not. As the sample size used is very small, 18, and thus any single result would be suspect, I present several different test of statistical significance appropriate for small samples: t-tests, chi-square tests, discriminant analysis and logistic regressions.

T-Tests

6 countries had legalized immigrants. Their mean disproportionality score was 6.42 (SD=3.42), whereas the means score for the 12 that did not legalize immigrants was 3.50 (SD=2.38). The difference was statistically significant: t=2.13, p=0.049.

The mean decentralization score for the 6 countries that legalized immigrants was 24.15 (SD=4.18). The mean for the 11 countries that did not was 46.46 (SD=13.28). Data is missing on Luxembourg, but this should not alter conclusions as Luxembourg a relatively decentralized state that did not legalize immigrants. The difference in decentralization scores was statistically significant: t=-3.56, p=0.003. Decentralization
on Norway, Iceland and Switzerland is missing, as Eurobarometer data covers EU members only. The difference in public opinion scores was insignificant, and in the opposite direction from the expected one: \( t=0.530, p=0.605 \).

**Chi Square Tests**

To further examine whether a trend exists in the data, namely to find out whether the probability of legalization increases with an increase in the level of disproportionality, I created a four level variable of disproportionality, using 2.5, 3 and 4 as cut off values.

**Grouped Crosstabulation Count**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disproportionality Grouped</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No amnesty</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The linear trend test performed was significant (Linear-by-linear-association chi square value = 0.028), verifying that an increase in disproportionality increases the probability of legalization. The chances that a country will legalize immigrants increase by 33% with an increase in disproportionality from category 3 to category 4 (the odds ratios of movement between categories 1 and 2 and between 2 and 3 are infinite).

The same test was performed for the decentralization variable. The cut-off values for grouping decentralization were 0.30, 0.40 and 0.50.

**Grouped Crosstabulation Count**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decentralization Grouped</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Amnesty</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The linear trend test performed was significant (Linear-by-linear-association chi square value = 0.028), verifying that a decrease in decentralization increases the probability of legalization. An increase in decentralization from category 1 to category 2 decreases the odds of legalization by 500% (the odds ratio is infinite in the subsequent categories).

**Discriminant Analysis**

Discriminant analysis, a procedure most often used for predictions, was used here because of its advantages over linear regression when independent variable groupings are truly categorical. I examine the extent to which the independent variables were good predictors of legalization, and to find out which cases (countries) caused deviations from the model. These results were
significant at the 1% level (Wilks’ Lamda).

The estimate of the classification function for countries which do not legalize is
\[ D = 0.802(\text{Disproportionality}) + 0.349 \text{ (decentralization)} - 10.209 \]

For countries that do not, the function is
\[ D = 1.023 \text{disproportionality} + 0.215 \text{decentralization} - 6.568 \]

These functions permit one to discriminate between the two groups; given a set of
disproportionality and decentralization values for a country, they would lead one to expect
whether it would legalize. 82.4% of the cases were correctly classified using these functions.
Three cases were incorrectly classified: Italy, Great Britain, and Iceland. It is simple to see why
Iceland does not make sense in the model—having no illegal immigrants, the information that it
hasn’t passed a legalization is not surprising. The fact that Great Britain’s is an island puts it in a
similar, though less extreme, position—in comparison to continental European countries, a
smaller need for and thus probability of legalization is not unexpected. In the Italian case, anti-
immigrant parties did arise, facilitated by the proportional electoral law and the relative
decentralization of the country. Their inability to translate their proposals into policy was in part
due to the general difficulty of combining social conservatism with economic liberalism on the
question of immigration, and in part due to the legacy of fascism, with which parties of the
extreme right could not afford to be associated.

Logistic Regressions

Having established that the decentralization and disproportionality variables matter, I attempted
to find the extent to which this is true. The logistic regression method, appropriate for
dichotomous independent variables, was chosen. Unfortunately, the independent variables
electoral disproportionality and centralization are strongly correlated (R=-0.5). Thus, I could only
conduct regressions where they are used in separate models. Both models were statistically
significant at the 10% level, and had relatively high explanatory power, considering that only one
independent variable was used in each case. The decentralization model (significance = 0.056)
has an antilogarithm B value (expB) of 0.832. This is an odds ratio, indicating that the odds of
legalization decrease by 17% for every one unit change in the decentralization scale (range 1-
100). The disproportionality model has significance level of 0.081 and an expB value of 1.43,
indicating that the odds of legalization increase by 43% for every unit increase in the
disproportionality scale (range 0-15 in the cases presented).
This appendix examines public opinion data from Eurobarometer 47.1 (1997) to facilitate cross-national comparisons. Eurobarometer is a survey of 1000 to 2000 nationals of each EU country, designed for the European Commission. The data presented do not clash with any national survey I am aware of. The first part of the appendix examines national differences in public opinion on immigration. The second part provides support for the hypothesis that the Greek government took an unpopular stance because it viewed immigration differently than the Greek public. Beliefs about minorities were used as independent variables in OLS regressions whose dependent variable was preferences on policy towards illegal immigrants. While the social impact of immigrants concerned the public most, and thus shaped their beliefs on the impact of immigration, the pool of elites from which government officials are drawn was most influenced by economic concerns.

Part 1

Eurobarometer 47.1 does not ask explicitly about immigrant legalization. However, the question on expulsion of illegals is a reasonable proxy; the greater the support for expulsion, the lower one would expect the support for legalization to be. The data on Greece indicate a strong link between the two measures; while about 60% of the Greek public opposed the legalizations, approximately 70% tended to agree that all illegals should be expelled.

Anti-immigrant sentiment, especially with regard to illegal immigrants, is very strong in Greece and Italy, but significantly lower in Portugal and Spain. As the comparison with the European countries below indicates, the percentage of Greeks and Italians agreeing that all illegal immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without exception is higher than that of any other EU nationality. Thus, the restrictionist policies of many Western European nations are not a product of more restrictionist public sentiment than that found in Italy and Greece. Below are the percentages of people in EU member countries who answered affirmatively when asked whether they tend to agree or tend to disagree with the following statement: ‘All illegal immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without exception’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% supporting expulsions</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Luxembourg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% supporting expulsions</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% supporting expulsions</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To analyze people’s attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy more generally, I constructed an index based on responses to the following 10 items. Respondents were asked whether they tend to agree or tend to disagree with the following 9 statements:
1) Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the (nationality) citizens.
2) Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the right to
bring members of their immediate family in (our country).
3) Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent back to their
country of origin if they have been convicted of serious offenses.
4) Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent back to their
country of origin if they are unemployed.
5) Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should all be sent back to
their country of origin.
6) Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be able to become
naturalised easily.
7) All illegal immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without exception.
8) All immigrants, whether legal or illegal, from outside the EU and their children, even those
who were born in (our country), should be sent back to their country of origin.
9) The right to asylum in (our country) should be easier to obtain.

I recoded ‘don’t know’ responses 0, an affirmative response to items 1,2,6,9 and a
negative response to items 3,4,5,7,8 as 1, and disagreement with statements 1,2,6,9 and
agreement with items 3,4,5,7,8 as -1. The question “Generally speaking, do you think that (our
country) benefits from the presence of immigrants from non-European Union countries, or do
you think that (our country) would be better off without them? Would you say a great deal or a
little?” was added to the index, with the response “Benefits a great deal” recorded as 2, “Benefits
a little” recorded as 1, “Would be a little better off” coded -1, and “Would be a great deal better
off” coded as -2. Respondents who spontaneously stated that “Whether they are here or not
makes no difference” or didn’t know received a 0.

The attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy index was constructed by
summing the recoded score of the 10 items listed above; the last question was coded so as to
weigh more than other ones as it asked for an aggregate opinion. The index was constructed so as to
capture the many dimensions of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy, to
minimize the impact of errors resulting from misreading or misunderstanding particular
questions, and to establish finer distinctions than would be possible using a single question.

This index supports two points made in the text. The first is that Greeks scored at the EU
mean. On an index ranging from –11 to 11, the Greek mean was 0.2771 (SD=4.5367) and the EU
mean 0.4117 (SD=5.1237). The difference between the Greek and EU mean is small and
statistically insignificant. The second point concerns regional differentiation. Eurobarometer data
permits one to differentiate between 9 large regions in Greece. Ipeiros scores -2.1 on this index,
whereas the Greek mean is 0.2; the standard deviation for Ipeiros is 2.7; this result is significant
at the 0.005 level using an ANOVA test. However, the views of Ipeiros representatives in
parliament did not reflect this differentiation.

The salience of the immigration issue is lower in Greece and Portugal than in Spain, and
much lower than in Italy. Eurobarometer 47.1 question 43 asked respondents to select, from a
list of 12 issues, the ones the three they were most worried about, and the three they were least
worried about. The question text read: “I am going to read out a list of some of the big political
and social issues of our time. Could you please tell me which three you are most worried about?”
The follow-up question was: “And which three are you are least worried about?” Respondents
could choose from: 1. International economic competition / The globalisation of the economy, 2.
Poverty 3. Unemployment in Europe, 4. Racism, 5. The ageing population, 6. The environment,
Immigration among top three concerns (% of nationals)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration among last three concerns (% of nationals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table indicates that the country with the largest proportion of citizens concerned by immigration is Italy. In Spain, a majority considers immigration of moderate importance, as both respondents placing it in the bottom and those placing it in the top are few. The Portuguese are the least worried by immigration. Greeks find the issue generally less salient than other Europeans do, 4% of respondents place it among their top three concerns, a figure similar to that in Greek national surveys. As discussed in chapter two, it seems that immigration is of moderate, rather than low salience. While the issue was more politicized in Italy than in Greece, the 4% figure does not mean that Greeks hardly cared about this issue. The data implies that an additional 67% of Greeks—those listing it neither on the top nor on the bottom of their list—considered immigration of moderate importance.

### Part 2

Public opinion positions in Spain “are not clearly differentiated along class-lines, but are rather a product of their ideals concerning other topics, such as nationalism, the importance of ‘culture’, egalitarianism or the protection of human rights” (Colectivo IOÉ, 1995). The following regression indicates that Spain is not unique. The importance of cultural over economic explanations in shaping attitudes towards migration is common across European publics. The regression results highlight and partially explain the distance between governments and publics. As the regression of Greek elite shows, the economic, rather than social effects of immigrants determine elite attitudes on immigration.

The following survey questions were used as independent variables. Tend to agree answers were coded 1, tend to disagree as –1, and don’t know/no response answers as 0.

“For each of the following opinions, please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?
1. In schools where there are too many children from these minority groups, the quality of education suffers.
2. People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits.
3. People from these minority groups are enriching the cultural life of (country).
4. The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life.
5. People from these minority groups pay more into our social security system than they claim.
6. The presence of people from these minority groups is a cause of insecurity.
7. People from these minority groups do the jobs which others do not want to do.
8. People from these minority groups keep entire sections of (country)'s economy going.
9. The presence of people from these minority groups increases unemployment in (country)”.

I consider questions 2, 5, 7, 8 and 9 to examine the economic impact of minorities, and questions 3 and 4 their social impact. Questions 1 and 6 were included as other potential explanatory variables of net attitudes on immigrants. Question 6, on insecurity, proved to be a
significant predictor of net attitudes on immigrants.

The independent variable coded responses to the question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (our country) benefits from the presence of immigrants from non-European Union countries, or do you think that (our country) would be better off without them? (If benefits / If better off without) Would you say a great deal or a little?’ “Benefits a great deal” was coded as 2, “benefits a little” as 1, “would be a little better off” as –1, and “would be a great deal better off” as –2. If the responded answered spontaneously ‘whether they are here or not makes no difference” this was recorded and coded as 0.

The questions asked were not ideal for the purposes of this paper, because there were no questions about specific concerns related to immigration. Thus, I had to use beliefs about the impact of minorities on the national society as a proxy, for beliefs about the impact of immigrants. Beliefs about the impact of these two groups are likely to be highly correlated in the Greek public. Not only are questions not ideal, but they are also biased against supporting the hypothesis presented. Thus, while the researchers asked five questions about the economic impact of minorities, they only asked two on the social impact of minorities. Furthermore, these two questions do not capture the main social fears a Greek would have about minorities or immigrants. As the church is well entrenched, and quite many immigrants are Orthodox Christians, religious fears are much less prevalent than fears about ethnic or linguistic decline. However, even questions limited in this way show significant support for the hypothesis that while European publics, including the Greek one, judge migration on the basis of its social impact, Greek socialist elites were more likely to judge immigration on the basis of its economic effects.

Model 1: Determinants of EU public opinion on immigration with country, age and gender controls

The independent variable for this model was public opinion on the net impact of immigrants, and the dependent variables were the beliefs about minorities listed above. The entire sample of 15000 citizens of EU countries was used. All the variables on beliefs about minorities were significant predictors of a net evaluation of immigrants, regardless of the respondent’s nationality, age and gender. The table highlights that beliefs about the cultural, rather than the economic impact of minorities shape beliefs on the net impact of immigration. Thus, the correlation coefficients for cultural variables—minorities enrich culture B=.209, have threatening religion B=-.139—were larger than the coefficients for the economic variables. The most important economic ones were minorities increase unemployment B=-.134 and minorities abuse social security B=-.127.
Model 1: Determinants of EU public opinion on immigration with country, age and gender controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Minorities hurt schools</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Minorities abuse social security</td>
<td>-.127</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Minorities enrich culture</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Minorities have threatening religion</td>
<td>-.139</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Minorities pay more into social security</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Minorities do unwanted work</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Minorities cause insecurity</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
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<td>8. Minorities keep sectors going</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Minorities increase unemployment</td>
<td>-.134</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1C: Belgium</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.467</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1C: Denmark</td>
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<td>.080</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1C: Germany</td>
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<td>.426</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1C: Greece</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.552</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1C: Spain</td>
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<td>.062</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1C: France</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1C: Ireland</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.007</td>
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<td>Q1C: Italy</td>
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<td>Q1C: Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1C: Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1C: Portugal</td>
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<td>.044</td>
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<td>Q1C: UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1C: Austria</td>
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<td>.275</td>
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<td>Q1C: Sweden</td>
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<td>Q1C: Finland</td>
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<td>.137</td>
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<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.065</td>
<td>.000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Model 2: Determinants of Greek public opinion on immigration with age and gender controls

This regression was performed on the subset of the dataset consisting of Greek nationals (n=1000). As in the other regressions, the independent variable for this model was public opinion on the net impact of immigrants, and the dependent variables were the beliefs about minorities listed above. The table highlights that beliefs about the cultural, rather than the economic impact of minorities shape beliefs on the net impact of immigration. Four of the independent variables on beliefs about minorities were not significant at the 0.05 level (minorities hurt schools, pay more into social security, keep sectors going, increase unemployment), but the remaining five were. Thus, the correlation coefficients for cultural variables—minorities enrich culture $B=.209$, have threatening religion $B=-.139$—were larger than the coefficients for the economic variables. As the table below shows, the two social impact variables (beliefs on religion and culture) have the highest and third highest correlation coefficients.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.451</td>
<td>.203</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>1.2282</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1. Minorities hurt schools</td>
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<td>2. Minorities abuse social security</td>
<td>-.171</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Minorities enrich culture</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
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<td>4. Minorities have threatening religion</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Minorities pay more into social security</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.139</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Minorities do unwanted work</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>.034</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Minorities cause insecurity</td>
<td>-.164</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Minorities keep sectors going</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Minorities increase unemployment</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Model 3: Determinants of opinion on immigration of Greek socialist elites

A subset of Greek socialist elites (n=129) was used in this model. Greeks who placed themselves at 3, 4 or 5 on the ten point left-right scale and whose education exceeded the high-school level were selected. The independent and dependent variables were the same as in previous regressions. The table highlights that, for Greek socialist elites, beliefs about the economic, rather than the cultural impact of minorities shapes beliefs on the net impact of immigration. All of the independent variables on cultural beliefs about minorities were not significant at the 0.05 level. Instead preferences on immigration which were predicted much better by two beliefs on the economic impact of minorities, their belief that minorities do unwanted work and the belief that they abuse social security. The latter variable had a particularly large coefficient (B=−.378).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.536</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>1.1864</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1. Minorities hurt schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Minorities enrich culture</td>
<td>.156</td>
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<td>4. Minorities have threatening religion</td>
<td>-.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Minorities pay more into social security</td>
<td>.069</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Minorities do unwanted work</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Minorities cause insecurity</td>
<td>.106</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Minorities keep sectors going</td>
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<td>9. Minorities increase unemployment</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.048</td>
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